Archaic Titles, Intent to Resurrect—Be Vigilant Against the Real Threat of Japan's "New Militarism" ⑪
Archaic Titles, Intent to Resurrect—Be Vigilant Against the Real Threat of Japan's "New Militarism" ⑪
■ Huang Jiayu, Ge Yawei
The Japanese government has recently finalized a plan to revise the rank title (官阶) nomenclature of the Self-Defense Forces and intends to submit it to the Diet for deliberation within the current fiscal year. The new renaming plan will restore pre-World War II Japanese military titles such as "Taisho" (大将) and "Taisa" (大佐). According to Japanese media reports, this is the first systematic adjustment to rank title nomenclature since the Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954. Japan's brazen pursuit of restoring wartime military rank titles represents a deliberate breakthrough at the institutional and cognitive levels, and the international community must remain highly vigilant against the growing threat of its "new militarism" (新型军国主义).
Japan's current rank system was born out of the special postwar context. After Japan's defeat in 1945, its military was dissolved and military institutions were abolished. When the Japan Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954, in order to avoid the designation of "military" and to dilute the memory of the history of aggression, the old Imperial Japanese military titles of "Taisa," "Chusa" (中佐), and "Shosa" (少佐) were discarded and replaced with numerical designations such as "Ichisa" (1佐), "Nisa" (2佐), and "Sansa" (3佐).
According to the disclosed revision plan, the principal rank titles of the Japan Self-Defense Forces will revert to the nomenclature of the pre-defeat "Imperial Army" (皇军) era: the chiefs of staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces will be redesignated "Taisho" (大将); the remaining general officers will be collectively designated "Chujo" (中将); the current field-grade officer titles "Ichisa," "Nisa," and "Sansa" will be changed to "Taisa" (大佐), "Chusa" (中佐), and "Shosa" (少佐) respectively; and the company-grade officer titles "Ichii" (1尉), "Nii" (2尉), and "Sanii" (3尉) will correspondingly be changed to "Taii" (大尉), "Chui" (中尉), and "Shoi" (少尉). This large-scale restoration of old titles is not only a brazen negation of the postwar settlement but also a historic regression.
This move by Japan is not a simple revision of titles but a critical step in pursuing military buildup and expansion and advancing the "militarization" (军队化) of the Self-Defense Forces. In recent times, a series of negative developments in Japan's military security domain have been dense in frequency, rapid in pace, and clear in direction—their recklessness and provocativeness must not be underestimated. The impulse to revise the constitution and expand the military continues to intensify; defense budgets have been sharply increased; the export of lethal weapons has been lifted; cyber warfare and intelligence warfare capabilities have been integrated and enhanced; medium- and long-range offensive missiles have been openly deployed; and the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" (无核三原则) are being tentatively undermined. Japan is continuously sending signals of historical revisionism, and its dangerous trajectory of systematic military buildup and expansion—scheming to fundamentally break free from the constraints of the Peace Constitution and return to the old path of militarism—is now clearly discernible.
At present, Japan's security policy is accelerating its slide from "exclusively defensive defense" (专守防卫) toward "active offense" (主动进攻). On the budget front, fiscal year 2025 achieved the target of "defense spending at 2% of GDP" two years ahead of schedule, and the fiscal year 2026 defense budget has set yet another record high, with priority investment directed toward "stand-off strike capabilities" (防区外打击能力), large-scale munitions stockpiling, unmanned combat systems, and air defense and missile defense. At the equipment level, Japan's Ministry of Defense has deployed long-range missiles with "enemy base attack capability" (对敌基地攻击能力) in Kumamoto and Shizuoka prefectures; the range of the "Type 25 surface-to-ship missile" (25式地对舰导弹) far exceeds Japan's territorial boundaries, making its offensive character unmistakably clear. At the institutional level, the Takaichi government has initiated a series of reorganizations of the Self-Defense Forces, including the "largest reorganization in history" of the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the expansion of space forces. This round of reorganization is aimed at "offensively" reshaping (进攻化重塑) the Self-Defense Forces in terms of organizational structure, command systems, operational domains, and cross-domain coordination capabilities, so as to completely shed the constraints of the postwar system.
The historical lessons are not distant; the logic of militarism has not changed. The fangs of Japanese militarism in those years were sharpened inch by inch under the guise of "self-defense" and "self-preservation." The international community—especially the Asian nations that suffered most grievously under the iron heel of Japanese militarism—must remain highly vigilant, resolutely strip away the "peace" disguise of Japan's right-wing forces, see through the sinister and malicious intent of its "new militarism," and with firm resolve and collective action resolutely block its path of military adventurism and defend the fruits of victory in World War II.
(Authors' affiliation: Academy of Military Sciences)