"Positive and Negative Lists" Appear Together on a Regular Basis — Doing Well and Doing Poorly Cannot Be Treated the Same
As summer arrived, the snow peaks of the Karakoram stood towering. When the reporter arrived at a certain brigade of the 76th Group Army, an unusual military assembly was underway. At the assembly, the brigade Party committee secretary read aloud on the spot the achievements recorded on the "positive list" and the problems recorded on the "negative list," along with the decisions on rewards and punishments. Below the stage, the officers and soldiers' warm applause intertwined with a sobering silence.
The reporter learned that the practice of presenting the "positive and negative lists" simultaneously and implementing rewards and punishments in tandem is one measure the brigade has adopted in carrying out study and education on establishing and practicing a correct view of political achievement (政绩观). "Resolving problems in the view of political achievement requires seeing specific events and specific people, with responsibility assigned to individuals. One must dare to grasp real cases and catch problems in the act, 'detoxifying and treating illness' through the process of making faces flush and breaking out in sweat (红脸出汗), so as to continuously eliminate ideological impurities, correct ideological deviations, and resolve ideological problems." After the assembly, the reporter met with the brigade Party committee secretary, who described the full background of how this mechanism was established—
"Doing Well and Doing Poorly Cannot Be Treated the Same"
■ Yuan Chao, Zhang Linfeng, PLA Daily Reporter Wang Yue
Reporter: I understand that going forward the "positive and negative lists" will appear together on a regular basis. What was the original intent behind establishing this mechanism?
Secretary: That is correct. The brigade Party committee introduced this mechanism precisely to strike at the root of correcting deviations in the view of political achievement. During prior research, some Party member cadres told us: "If doing well and doing poorly are treated the same, who would still want to put in the effort? Where would the sense of responsibility and initiative come from?"
During the research, the situation of one Party committee member in a certain battalion left a deep impression on me. When he was responsible for building up a certain company, he was driven by a strong desire to produce results, but over time the idea of "no incidents means good work" gained the upper hand. He devoted a large amount of energy to polishing report materials and creating "face-work" (面子工程) for inspections, while responding to problems raised by soldiers with empty promises that led nowhere. This caused the company's training results to lag behind for an extended period, and the urgent, difficult, worrying, and long-awaited problems of officers and soldiers were not effectively resolved.
Situations like this were not isolated cases. Examining them systematically, we found that in the past, work reviews and critical notifications from headquarters organs and grassroots units used vague language — the "fist" was like punching "cotton," failing to produce the motivating and cautionary effect it should have had. Some Party member cadres emphasized making declarations over implementation and reported only good news while concealing problems, harboring a "good enough" mentality of just getting by.
During that period, as we analyzed each issue in turn, we felt that one important reason for the emergence of contradictions and problems was weakness in the implementation of responsibility — those who did well did not receive sufficient encouragement; those who did not do well were not moved or put on alert. Therefore, resolving problems in Party member cadres' view of political achievement could no longer be handled with a spirit of "keeping everyone happy" (一团和气). It was necessary to see specific events and specific people, assign responsibility to individuals, and drive genuine resolution of problems with the force of leaving marks when grasping iron (抓铁有痕).
Reporter: At the assembly I heard some specific contents of the "positive and negative lists." Could you describe in detail the considerations that went into drafting the detailed rules for the lists?
Secretary: The core of drafting the "positive list" is to firmly establish the standard of combat effectiveness, to hold up the measuring stick of "emphasizing real work, real results, and real responsibility," and to conduct selection strictly according to the procedure of "grassroots recommendation, headquarters verification, Party committee review, and public announcement for supervision" — commending units and individuals with outstanding results who are recognized by officers and soldiers, ensuring that every step can withstand scrutiny.
For example, Assistant Officer Xiao Zhang of the brigade's support department, in response to problems such as complex high-altitude road conditions and dispersed training sites, took root at the training front line for several consecutive months, optimizing training processes and innovating training methods. He completed the driver refresher training tasks for all types of equipment across the brigade to a high standard, effectively improving the high-altitude transportation support capability of the driver force. His work performance received widespread recognition, and he was ultimately selected for the "positive list" by unanimous vote, becoming a model for everyone to learn from.
In sharp contrast to the "positive list," the "negative list" directly targets problems, exposing shortcomings and bringing embarrassments to light, which tests even more the commitment and courage of the brigade Party committee. In practice, drawing on in-depth research, we conducted precise profiling of common deviations in the view of political achievement found in the daily work of headquarters departments and grassroots battalions and companies, identifying several typical "ailments" such as "paper-only implementation" (纸面落实), "deflect, evade, and delay" (推绕拖), and "covering things up" (捂盖子).
Take the problem of "deflect, evade, and delay" as an example: before one live-combat training exercise, a certain battalion discovered that a new type of individual integrated combat system had problems including insufficient battery endurance and incompatibility with some equipment. After reporting this to the headquarters organ several times, the response each time was "it has been included in the plan and is being coordinated," yet no actual action was taken for a long time. This caused the battalion to suffer defeat in the subsequent confrontation training due to shortcomings in equipment performance. When the after-action review was conducted, the problem was placed on the table.
In handling this type of problem, we share a common understanding: it cannot be concealed or "smoothed over" (和稀泥). It must be exposed in the sunlight, pressed on the sore spot, and the paddle must land on a specific person — only then can it truly take effect.
Reporter: In practice, some measures amount to nothing more than "a gust of wind." How do you ensure that the "negative list" produces lasting results and does not end with "one notification and nothing more"?
Secretary: This is something we considered before establishing the mechanism. Strengthening the force of rectification and implementation relies both on supervision from higher levels and on oversight by officers and soldiers. On one occasion, a soldier posted online reflecting that the training methods for a certain weapons firing subject had been used for many years and were disconnected from the high-altitude, high-cold actual combat environment. After raising this with the company multiple times, he was told to train according to the syllabus for now and that the relevant issues would be reported for study. The brigade Party committee immediately formed an inspection team and found that not only did this company have this problem — individual specialized sub-units also had the same common problem of insufficient alignment between training methods and actual combat. We analyzed and felt that the reason this type of problem had dragged on unresolved in the past was that responsibility was not clearly delineated, with headquarters organs and grassroots units passing the buck to each other.
At the military assembly, we included this problem in the "negative list" and read it aloud, and the headquarters department cadres responsible for this area of work and the battalion's principal officers were named and criticized. After the assembly, the brigade Party committee specified responsibility down to individuals for rectifying this problem, requiring that within a set time the brigade complete a review and optimization of training methods for all high-altitude small arms firing subjects, produce standardized lesson plans, and organize full-force general training. During this period, we dispatched personnel to supervise the relevant functional department in taking up full-time residence at the grassroots level, working together with training backbone personnel to study actual combat factors such as high-altitude ballistic characteristics and wind speed effects, and refining the training process subject by subject. Upon expiration of the deadline, the brigade organized a special assessment. Later, during one research visit, some officers and soldiers proactively sought me out to give feedback that the brigade Party committee had resolved the problem in earnest, and that everyone's confidence and drive in training for war were growing stronger.
Reporter: Since this mechanism has been in operation, what visible and tangible changes has it brought to training for war?
Secretary: Doing well and doing poorly cannot be treated the same. The most direct change is that work styles have become more grounded, the morale of officers and soldiers has improved, and the drive to build combat effectiveness has grown stronger.
The change in the headquarters organs has been most pronounced. In the past, officers and soldiers handling one matter might have to run to multiple functional departments; now, relying on this mechanism to force problems to resolution, we have explored opening a "one-stop service window," and many requests from officers and soldiers can now be received at a single window and resolved within a set time. One headquarters department section chief remarked with feeling: "In the past I was satisfied as long as my own work didn't go wrong. Now what I think about most is how to precisely serve training for war, and how to demonstrate the value of the headquarters organ by resolving difficulties at the grassroots level."
The view of political achievement among principal officers of grassroots battalions and companies is also undergoing a profound transformation. Many people have shifted from previously fearing mistakes and fearing responsibility to now competing to offer ideas and vying to develop hard skills. Not long ago, two companies proactively applied to take on the tackling of a certain key and difficult subject under complex high-altitude conditions. They not only completed the task with distinction but also summarized practical tactical and training methods (战法训法). Some grassroots soldiers told me: "Now Party member cadres are out front in everything. Following them and charging forward, we feel very reassured."
Reporter's Notes
Making Rewards and Punishments Both Just and Strict
A thousand mobilizations are worth less than one instance of accountability. In correcting deviations in the view of political achievement, the greatest fear is that it amounts to "rain that only wets the surface of the ground." "If doing well and doing poorly are treated the same, who would still want to put in the effort? Where would the sense of responsibility and initiative come from?" This sentiment from the grassroots speaks to the long-standing malady of punishments that have been too lenient and too soft. In some units, work reviews lack principle and fighting spirit, or the orientation is not clear, habitually using vague expressions such as "individual units" and "certain comrades" — criticism that produces neither pain nor deterrence. Over time, individual Party member cadres can easily develop ideological deviations, and the scales of the view of political achievement quietly tip.
Rewards can establish a high standard, set up a model, and encourage Party member cadres to proactively strive for excellence; punishment draws a bottom line, sets a boundary, and makes Party member cadres know what to hold in reverence and take as a warning. In practice, we have seen that pinning the red flower on a specific person's chest and landing the paddle on a specific person helps guide officers and soldiers to understand more directly "what should be done and to what degree" and "what should not be done and what the consequences will be," thereby truly establishing the orientation that those who work hard are valued and those who "lie flat" (躺平者) are put on alert. As the saying goes: when rewards are just and punishments are clear, people of every kind will naturally find their proper path, exert their full effort, and exhaust their talents — why worry that the organization will not be well governed?
Grasping the cultivation of good habits is difficult in the persistence. Establishing and improving mechanisms helps to consolidate good experience, practices, and fine work styles, running them through daily life and all tasks, guiding Party member cadres to cultivate a strict, tight, and solid (严紧实) good work style through sustained and lasting persistence, truly focusing energy on preparing for war and combat, and creating achievements that can withstand the test of practice.