South China Sea East China Sea Military Diplomacy

International Outlook | Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation Upgrade Undermines Regional Peace and Stability

国际瞭望丨日澳升级防务合作冲击地区和平稳定

PLA Daily (解放军报) 21 May 2026

Summary

A commentary by Xiang Haoyu of the China Institute of International Studies' Asia-Pacific Studies Institute, published in PLA-affiliated media, frames the Japan-Australia defense relationship — including the December 2025 Strategic Defense Coordination Framework, Australia's procurement of 11 Mogami-class frigates, and the JS Kaga's participation in 'Trident 25' — as Japan exploiting bilateral ties to dismantle its postwar constitutional constraints and project military power into the South Pacific. The piece documents how official Chinese analysts are framing Japan's defense normalization as the primary threat driver, with Australia cast as an instrument rather than an independent actor. The framing points to a deliberate effort to delegitimize the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance before regional audiences by invoking World War II-era grievances and 'bloc confrontation' (集团对抗) language, though the article itself does not establish what policy response Beijing is considering.

Translation

Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation Upgrade Undermines Regional Peace and Stability

■ Xiang Haoyu

Not long ago, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi paid an official visit to Australia and, together with Australian Prime Minister Albanese, issued the Japan-Australia Joint Statement on Strengthening Defense and Security Cooperation, explicitly stating that both sides would advance a new round of upgrades to defense and security cooperation. Takaichi also declared that Japan and Australia "have established a relationship akin to a quasi-alliance."

In recent years, Japan and Australia have sought comprehensive binding in the military and security domain — using defense agreements as a cornerstone, arms cooperation as a lever, and multilateral frameworks as a platform — with multiple layers of strategic calculation concealed behind this effort. In particular, Japan is attempting to develop Australia into a critical springboard for further breaking through postwar military restrictions and projecting force abroad. The spillover effects of this approach pose a challenge to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific.

From "Special Strategic Partners" to "Quasi-Alliance"

Japan-Australia defense cooperation is not a short-term tactical choice but a long-term strategic design that has been laid out over more than a decade and has accelerated in its implementation in recent years. Driven actively by Japan, the bilateral relationship is moving from "special strategic partners" toward a "quasi-alliance" phase of deep military integration.

As early as March 2007, Japan and Australia signed the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, establishing a "2+2" meeting mechanism between their foreign and defense ministers. In July 2014, the two countries described their relationship as a "special strategic partnership" at a summit meeting. In January 2022, Japan and Australia signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement. This agreement provided a legal framework for Japan Self-Defense Force personnel to conduct joint exercises and training, deploy equipment, and carry out logistical support on Australian territory. This marked the institutionalization of mutual military access and the establishment of a genuine "quasi-alliance" relationship. Since then, bilateral defense cooperation has continued to deepen, and the scope of Japan Self-Defense Force activities has extended into the South Pacific region. In December 2025, Japan and Australia established a "Strategic Defense Coordination Framework" to strengthen policy alignment and intelligence sharing, further consolidating the coordination mechanism.

Building on these institutional frameworks, Japan and Australia have continuously intensified the frequency, scale, and combat-oriented character of their joint exercises. Exercise content has progressively expanded from early non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief to high-intensity combat subjects spanning all domains — land, sea, air, space, and cyber. After the Reciprocal Access Agreement formally entered into force in August 2023, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force deployed two F-35 stealth aircraft to Australia for the first time, conducting cross-regional combat-oriented training. Since then, both sides have routinely conducted exercises in highly sensitive subjects including amphibious landings, anti-submarine warfare, maritime blockade, and cyber defense, while simultaneously advancing personnel training, new equipment testing, and logistical maintenance coordination. During the "Trident 25" joint exercise conducted by Japan and Australia in September of last year, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force dispatched the light aircraft carrier JS Kaga and the frigate JS Kumano to conduct anti-submarine warfare, tactical maneuvering, and data-link coordination exercises with the Australian Navy destroyer HMAS Brisbane in the Western Pacific and other waters, in order to strengthen the blue-water combat capabilities of both sides' naval forces.

The export of defense equipment and technology cooperation also constitute an important component of Japan-Australia defense cooperation. In April of this year, Japan and Australia achieved a major breakthrough in defense equipment cooperation. Australia formally confirmed the procurement of 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates from Japan. This is Japan's largest export of main combat equipment since the end of World War II, and simultaneously the largest warship procurement order in the history of the Australian Navy. For Australia, which is in a period of defense modernization transition and urgently needs to enhance its maritime capabilities, this class of vessel — featuring advanced stealth performance and a high degree of automation — can significantly improve the Australian Navy's blue-water anti-submarine, anti-ship, and area air defense capabilities.

This is the first time since World War II that Japan has, under the name of "joint development," achieved the systematic export of lethal main combat platforms. Japan has gradually adjusted restrictions on weapons exports in recent years; through this major deal, it hopes to advance its defense industry's expansion overseas via Australia, and seeks to establish a full-chain defense industrial cooperation system encompassing "technology sharing — joint production — integrated logistics support." By embedding its defense industry standards, data-link systems, and logistical maintenance standards into Australia's main combat platforms, Japan is attempting to bring Australia into its own defense industrial system and defense ecosystem. This deep binding of technology and equipment enables Japan to enhance its military presence and influence in the South Pacific region through long-term contracts for maintenance and upgrades.

Both Countries Have Their Own Calculations

The sustained deepening of Japan-Australia defense cooperation is both the result of the two countries pursuing their respective strategic objectives and reflects the practical need of both sides to elevate their strategic standing in the relevant region.

For Australia, strengthening defense cooperation with Japan can, on the one hand, further enhance its national defense capabilities — particularly by addressing shortfalls in maritime power. By introducing advanced Japanese warship technology, Australia can fill the "capability gap" before its nuclear submarine program is delivered, while also improving its own defense manufacturing and shipbuilding capabilities. On the other hand, Australia hopes to continuously strengthen maritime situational awareness, cross-domain joint operations, and blue-water power projection capabilities through cooperation with Japan and other countries, extending its military influence toward the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean and thereby elevating its strategic standing and influence in the region.

Japan's active promotion of military cooperation with Australia conceals far more strategic ambition. First, Japan is gradually breaking through the constraints of the "Peace Constitution" and the principle of "exclusively defensive defense" (専守防衛). Under the guise of defense cooperation with Australia, Japan frequently dispatches Self-Defense Force personnel overseas for high-intensity military exercises and exports offensive weapons platforms, fundamentally transforming its defense policy. Second, Japan is seeking to transition from an "economic power" to a "political and military power." As a defeated nation in World War II, Japan has long been dissatisfied with its "abnormal" status in international security affairs. Japan is attempting to use Australia's unique geographic position to extend its military reach into the South Pacific and even the Indian Ocean, in order to rebuild military influence and even seek a leading role in the regional security architecture. Third, Japan is manufacturing geopolitical confrontation to pursue its own interests. Looking at Japan-Australia defense cooperation as a whole, it carries a strong character of bloc confrontation. Japan is introducing the logic of military confrontation into the Asia-Pacific region, attempting to stoke regional contradictions and antagonism by intervening in regional flashpoints, thereby creating pretexts for its own military buildup.

Undermining the Foundation of Peace in the Asia-Pacific

The fundamental reason the Asia-Pacific region has maintained economic growth and prosperity over the past several decades is that countries in the region have broadly adhered to an approach of openness and inclusiveness, dialogue and consultation, and mutual benefit and win-win outcomes. However, the continuous escalation of Japan-Australia defense cooperation, and the series of exclusive small cliques derived from it, will undermine this foundation of peace and stability.

The essence of Japan-Australia defense cooperation is to substitute military confrontation for dialogue and consultation, and to substitute exclusive small cliques for inclusive multilateral cooperation mechanisms. This approach runs counter to the universal aspiration of Asia-Pacific countries for peace, development, and cooperation, and once again casts the shadow of bloc confrontation over the Asia-Pacific. In particular, the two sides' continuous strengthening of military presence and deterrence posture in sensitive areas not only does nothing to resolve existing differences but will instead compress the space for diplomatic mediation and political dialogue, causing regional flashpoints to become more complex, potentially intensifying regional bloc confrontation, and raising the risk of accidental military conflict.

The continuous escalation of Japan-Australia defense cooperation is not the "maintenance of regional stability" that Japan claims it to be, but rather an important step in Japan's gradual breaking of postwar constraints and its attempt to reshape the Asia-Pacific military order. Faced with Japan's continuous projection of military power and expansion of its military influence, countries in the region should remain vigilant and jointly safeguard the hard-won peace, stability, and prosperity of the region.

(Author's affiliation: Asia-Pacific Studies Institute, China Institute of International Studies)

Layout design: Hu Yunyan

Data compilation: Wu Jiaqing, Dou Tianyang

All images in this article are archival photographs.

Original Chinese

日澳升级防务合作冲击地区和平稳定 ■项昊宇前不久，日本首相高市早苗对澳大利亚进行正式访问，并与澳总理阿尔巴尼斯发表日澳《加强国防与安全合作联合声明》，明确表示双方将推进新一轮防务安全合作升级。高市早苗还宣称，日澳两国“已经建立起类似准同盟的关系”。近年来，日澳两国以防务协议为基石、以军备合作为抓手、以多边框架为依托，谋求军事安全领域的全方位捆绑，其背后隐藏多重战略考量。尤其是，日本正试图将澳大利亚打造为其进一步突破战后军事限制、对外投送武力的关键跳板。这种做法产生的外溢效应对亚太安全稳定构成冲击。从“特殊战略伙伴”到“准同盟” 日澳防务合作并非短期的战术选择，而是历经十余年铺垫、近年来加速落地的长期战略谋划。在日本的积极推动下，两国关系正从“特殊战略伙伴”迈向深度军事一体化的“准同盟”阶段。早在2007年3月，日澳便签署了《日澳安全保障联合宣言》，双方由此确立外长和防长的“2+2”会晤机制。2014年7月，日澳进行首脑会晤时称，双方为“特殊战略伙伴关系”。2022年1月，日澳签署《互惠准入协定》。该协定为日本自卫队在澳大利亚领土开展联合演训、装备部署以及后勤保障提供了法律框架。这标志着两国实现了制度化的军事准入，建立起名副其实的“准同盟”关系。此后，两国防务合作持续深化，日本自卫队的活动范围得以向南太平洋地区延伸。2025年12月，日澳建立“战略防务协调框架”，以强化政策对接与情报互通，进一步固化协同机制。依托这些机制框架，日澳在联合演训的频次、规模和实战化倾向上不断加码。演习内容逐步从早期的灾害救援等非传统安全领域，向陆海空天网等全领域、高强度作战课目拓展。2023年8月《互惠准入协定》正式生效后，日本航空自卫队将两架F-35隐身战机首次部署至澳大利亚，进行跨区域实战化演练。此后，双方常态化开展两栖登陆、反潜作战、海上封锁、网络防御等高敏感课目演练，并同步推进人员培训、新型装备测试以及后勤维护协同。在去年9月日澳开展的“三叉戟25”联合演习中，日本海上自卫队派出了“加贺”号轻型航母和“熊野”号护卫舰，与澳海军“布里斯班”号驱逐舰在西太平洋等水域开展反潜作战、战术机动和数据链协同等课目演练，以强化双方海上力量的远洋作战能力。防务装备的出口与技术合作也是日澳防务合作的重要内容。今年4月，日澳在防务装备合作上取得重大进展。澳大利亚正式确认从日本采购11艘升级版“最上”级护卫舰。这是日本战后最大规模的主战装备出口，同时也是澳海军历史上最大规模的舰艇采购订单。对于处于防务现代化转型期、亟须提升海上力量的澳大利亚而言，该型舰艇具备先进隐身性能和高度自动化特点，能够显著提升澳海军的远洋反潜、反舰与区域防空能力。这是日本战后首次以“联合开发”之名，实现杀伤性主力作战平台的成体系出口。日本近年来逐步调整武器出口相关限制，通过这一大单，希望推动军工产业“借澳出海”，并企图建立一套“技术共享—联合生产—后勤联保”的全链条军工协作体系。日本通过将其军工标准、数据链系统和后勤维护标准植入澳海军的主战平台，试图将澳大利亚纳入自身的军工体系与防务生态圈。这种深度的技术与装备绑定，使得日本可以通过维护、升级等长期合同，提升在南太平洋地区的军事存在感和话语权。两国各怀心思，各有所图日澳持续深化防务合作，既是两国基于各自战略目标进行利益博弈的结果，也反映了双方在提升相关地区战略地位的现实需求。对澳大利亚而言，加强与日本的防务合作，一方面，可进一步提升其国防实力，特别是弥补海上力量短板。通过引进日本先进舰艇技术，可填补澳大利亚核潜艇项目交付前的“战力空窗”，并借此提升自身军工制造与造船能力。另一方面，澳大利亚希望通过与日本等国的协作，持续强化海上态势感知能力、跨域联合作战与远洋投送能力，将军事影响力向西太平洋和印度洋方向延伸，从而提升其在该地区的战略地位与话语权。日本积极推动与澳大利亚的军事合作，则包藏更多的战略企图。一是逐步突破“和平宪法”和“专守防卫”原则。日本借与澳大利亚防务合作之名，频繁派遣自卫队远赴海外进行高强度军演，并出口进攻性武器平台，使其防卫政策从根本上发生转变。二是谋求从“经济大国”向“政治军事大国”转型。作为二战战败国，日本长期不满其在国际安全事务中的“非正常”地位。日本试图借助澳大利亚特殊的地理位置，将本国的军事触角延伸至南太平洋乃至印度洋地区，以重建军事影响力，甚至谋求在地区安全架构中发挥主导作用。三是制造地缘政治对抗以谋求自身利益。纵观日本与澳大利亚的防务合作，带有浓厚的阵营对抗色彩。日本将军事对抗逻辑引入亚太地区，企图通过介入地区热点问题，挑动地区矛盾对立，为自身扩充军备创造借口。破坏亚太地区和平基石亚太地区在过去数十年里保持了经济增长与繁荣，根本原因在于本地区国家普遍坚持开放包容、对话协商、互利共赢的相处之道。然而，日澳防务合作的不断升级，以及由此衍生出的一系列排他性小圈子，将对这一和平稳定的基石造成破坏。日澳防务合作的本质，是以军事对抗替代对话协商，以排他性的小圈子替代包容性的多边合作机制。这种做法违背了亚太地区各国求和平、谋发展、促合作的普遍愿望，将阵营对抗的阴云重新笼罩在亚太上空。特别是，日澳双方在敏感区域不断加强军事存在、强化威慑姿态，不仅无助于解决现存分歧，反而会挤压外交斡旋与政治对话的空间，导致地区热点问题更趋复杂化，地区阵营对抗可能加剧，偶发性军事冲突的风险也会上升。日澳防务合作不断升级，并非日本所宣称的“维护地区稳定”之举，而是日本逐步冲破战后束缚、企图重塑亚太军事格局的重要步骤。面对日本不断输出军力、扩张自身军事影响力的行径，地区国家应保持警惕，共同维护来之不易的地区和平、稳定与繁荣。（作者单位：中国国际问题研究院亚太研究所）版式设计：胡云艳资料整理：吴家庆、窦天阳本文图片均为资料图片