Doctrine Political Work

Establish and Practice a Correct Outlook on Achievements | Wring Out the Water from Courses, Raise Combat-Realistic Content

树立和践行正确政绩观丨挤干课程水分提升实战含量

PLA Daily (解放军报) 20 May 2026

Summary

The Naval Petty Officer Academy convened course review meetings this year that publicly named and criticized instructors and department heads for submitting combat-irrelevant curriculum reforms driven by career optics rather than NCO position requirements, then tightened acceptance standards to incorporate force feedback and student evaluations as binding criteria. The problem the article documents is institutional: a metrics-driven incentive structure at a PLA professional military education institution was producing formalist course reform—quantity over quality, recycled general-military content dressed as NCO-specific training—that the academy's own Party committee acknowledged was degrading combat-capability building. This fits the recurring PLA PME pattern in which top-down pressure to demonstrate reform output generates the appearance of reform without the substance, and the academy's response—public criticism, reduced acceptance rates, and reverse-pressure mechanisms—records one institutional attempt to break that cycle rather than manage it rhetorically.

Translation

Naval Petty Officer Academy Corrects Ideological Deviations Among Some Instructors—

Wring Out the Water from Courses, Raise Combat-Realistic Content

■ Guo Manping, Ni Shuai

"The instructional content of this course piles up large quantities of general foundational knowledge with little connection to the positions students will actually fill…" Some time ago, the Naval Petty Officer Academy convened a new round of review and acceptance meetings for pilot reform courses. The teaching supervision experts delivered on-site critiques with plenty of "bite," leaving more than a few instructors red-faced and sweating. This is a vivid snapshot of the academy's sustained effort to guide all instructors in establishing and practicing a correct outlook on achievements (政绩观) and firmly anchoring the clear orientation of educating personnel for war (为战育人).

According to reports, since the beginning of this year the academy, with an eye toward its mission of cultivating non-commissioned officer talent, has made course construction a key lever for improving the quality and effectiveness of talent cultivation. It has encouraged instructors to keep close watch on the actual state of combat-capability building in the force and to produce course reform results that closely match the needs of NCO positions. However, the academy's inspection team found that some instructors' submitted course reform proposals were disconnected from the force's actual combat requirements and did not meet the conditions for implementation in the classroom.

Through in-depth investigation, the academy's Party committee organs learned that some instructors, when submitting course proposals, harbored the mistaken mindset of "fearing falling behind and competing for recognition," which deviated from the original intent of course reform. Some took the attitude of "what matters is participating," worrying that since their colleagues had all submitted proposals, not submitting one themselves would make them look unambitious and leave them with nothing to show in work summaries. Some treated "how many course projects were submitted and how many teaching awards were won" as the sole standard for measuring work performance, prioritizing quantity over quality. Some engaged in "putting new wine in old bottles" (新瓶装旧酒), copying the framework of general military courses wholesale while ignoring the distinctive characteristics of NCO positions…

"Instructors bear the responsibility and mission of educating personnel for war. Treating course construction as a 'vanity project' (政绩工程) is not only irresponsible toward students' development—it is even more irresponsible toward the force's combat-capability building." On this matter, the academy's Party committee leadership took an unambiguous stance: the root of the problem is a deviation in the outlook on achievements, and it must be confronted squarely and corrected immediately.

In conjunction with carrying out study and education on establishing and practicing a correct outlook on achievements, the academy, benchmarked against the combat-capability standard, made clear that course reform should "not rush progress, not chase quantity" and should follow the principle of "submit one when one is ready." They placed on the table problems of formalism and utilitarianism identified during course review and acceptance, named and criticized the relevant instructors and the leaders of their departments, and demanded immediate rectification to wring the water out of courses. They organized instructors to hold discussions around topics such as "for whom are achievements built, what kind of achievements should be built, and on what basis should achievements be built," guiding everyone to clarify the dialectical relationship between visible achievements (显绩) and latent achievements (潜绩), break down mistaken thinking that prioritizes quantity over quality and form over substance, and firmly establish the orientation of educating personnel for war. They also improved course acceptance standards, making force feedback and student reputation important bases for reviewing and accepting course reform results, thereby creating reverse pressure on instructors to raise their teaching capabilities.

With ideological deviations corrected, action became more grounded. Some instructors proactively went down to the front lines of training to identify needs, find case studies, and address shortcomings. Some joined hands with instructors from other specialties to actively carry out joint research efforts. Some focused on the force's new equipment, new methods of warfare, and new missions to innovate instructional content… In the end, the number of course reform proposals that passed acceptance at the academy decreased somewhat, but quality improved markedly.

Recently, the academy organized instructors to deliver trial lectures, and students gave broadly positive evaluations. "Through the study and education on establishing and practicing a correct outlook on achievements, everyone has come to understand more deeply that an instructor's greatest achievement is cultivating more outstanding talent for the force—talent with solid professional quality and the ability to fight and win battles," said Instructor Song from one department with feeling.

Original Chinese

海军士官学校纠正部分教员思想偏差—— 挤干课程水分提升实战含量 ■郭满平倪帅 “这门课程的教学内容，大量堆砌通用基础类知识，与学员岗位任职关联较少……”前段时间，海军士官学校组织新一轮改革试点课程评审验收会。教学督导专家现场点评“辣味”十足，让不少教员红脸出汗。这是该校着力引导全体教员树立和践行正确政绩观，牢固立起为战育人鲜明导向的生动缩影。据介绍，今年以来，该校着眼军士人才培养使命任务，将课程建设作为提升人才培养质效的重要抓手，鼓励广大教员紧盯部队战斗力建设实际，拿出紧贴军士岗位需求的课程改革成果。然而校督查组发现，一些教员提报的课程改革方案与部队实战需求脱节，并不具备教学落地条件。该校党委机关深入调研了解到，部分教员提报课题时存在“怕落后、争彩头”错误思想，背离了课程改革初衷。有的认为“重在参与”，担心同事都报了课题，自己不报显得没追求，工作总结也无成绩可写；有的把“上报多少课题项目、拿了多少教学奖项”作为衡量工作成绩的唯一标准，重数量轻质量；有的“新瓶装旧酒”，照搬通用军事课程框架，忽视了军士岗位任职特点…… “教员肩负为战育人职责使命，将课程建设当成‘政绩工程’，不仅是对学员成长不负责任，更是对部队战斗力建设不负责任。”对此，该校党委一班人态度鲜明：问题根子是政绩观出现偏差，必须较真碰硬、立即纠治。结合开展树立和践行正确政绩观学习教育，该校对照战斗力标准，明确课程改革“不催进度、不赶数量”“成熟一个、上报一个”。他们把课程评审验收中发现的形式主义、功利主义等问题摆上桌面，点名批评相关教员和所在部门领导，并要求立即整改，挤干课程水分；组织教员围绕“政绩为谁而树、树什么样的政绩、靠什么树政绩”等话题开展讨论，引导大家厘清显绩与潜绩的辩证关系，破除重数量轻质量、重形式轻实效等错误认知，立起为战育人导向；完善课程验收标准，将部队反馈、学员口碑作为课程改革成果评审验收的重要依据，倒逼教员提升教学能力。纠正思想偏差，行动步子更实。有的教员主动沉到训练一线摸需求、找案例、补短板；有的携手其他专业教员，积极开展联合攻关；有的聚焦部队新装备、新战法、新任务，创新教学内容……最终，该校通过验收的课程改革方案数量有所减少，但质量明显提高。近期，该校组织教员试讲，学员们纷纷给出较高评价。“树立和践行正确政绩观学习教育中，大家更加深刻地认识到，教员最大的政绩是为部队培育更多专业素质过硬、能打胜仗的优秀人才。”某系宋教员感慨地说。