New Winds, Words from the Heart | How the Battle Is Fought Is How Political Work Must Be Conducted
Chairman Xi profoundly observed at the 27th collective study session of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee that the fundamental aim and the standard of evaluation for high-quality advancement of national defense and military modernization is always combat effectiveness. This important statement provides the fundamental guide for high-quality advancement of national defense and military modernization. Political work, as the lifeline of our military, must in both peacetime and wartime closely align with the central task and take root at the combat post, resolutely breaking out of the "self-referential loop" (自我循环) that drifts away from combat effectiveness. At the All-Army Political Work Conference, Chairman Xi demanded that the entire military establish four fundamentally important things: ideals and convictions, Party principles, the combat-effectiveness standard, and the authority of political work. Firmly establishing the combat-effectiveness standard answers the directional question of "whom political work serves and where it should direct its efforts" — it is not an abstract slogan but a hard benchmark for measuring the results of all work.
Political work is work done with people, and it must be carried out by going straight at real problems and live thinking (活思想). After the Liberation War shifted to strategic offensive, large numbers of newly emancipated peasants and liberated soldiers joined the People's Army. As the ranks expanded, ideological problems among some officers and soldiers became increasingly prominent. Our military creatively carried out a new-style rectification movement (新式整军运动) centered on "speaking bitterness" (诉苦) and the "three investigations" (三查). Soldiers were made to pour out their grievances and dig out the roots of their suffering, sublimating personal anguish and indignation into class consciousness. Far from affecting combat readiness, this movement enabled officers and soldiers to complete a spiritual rebirth (精神涅槃) on the ideological front, greatly enhancing the cohesion and combat effectiveness of the troops. This gives us the profound lesson that conducting political work must resolutely discard the formalist ruts (形式主义窠臼) of "mountains of documents and seas of meetings" (文山会海) and "trace management" (痕迹管理), and truly direct energy toward resolving the ideological knots and practical difficulties of officers and soldiers. Political cadres must strive to be "experts in both fields" (两个行家里手) — proficient in both politics and military affairs — proactively embedding themselves at the front lines of exercises and training, ensuring that wherever a mission advances, political work follows, so that officers and soldiers can shed their burdens, go into battle unburdened, and devote themselves single-mindedly to studying and planning for war.
Political work must closely serve the battlefield and serve combat effectiveness, ensuring that how the battle is fought is how political work is conducted. During the Long March, political work was transformed into the iron-blooded conviction of "keep marching" and the resounding pledge of "the lightly wounded do not leave the line of fire"; political cadres took the lead in charging forward, conveying a spirit of revolutionary optimism through songs and slogans. On the battlefields of the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, faced with a vast disparity in equipment between the enemy and our forces, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army broadly carried out the "movement to kill the enemy and render meritorious service" (杀敌立功运动) and the "cold-gun cold-cannon movement" (冷枪冷炮运动). Political work did not confine itself to hollow slogans but combined closely with tactical innovation, accumulating small victories into great ones through "nibbling at taffy" (零敲牛皮糖), greatly inspiring the officers and soldiers' spirit of revolutionary heroism and producing a cohort of crack marksmen and gunners such as Zhang Taofang. These combat examples make clear: wartime political work must absolutely not be a matter of reading from scripts or going through the motions, but must closely track the course of operations, precisely conduct pre-battle mobilization and psychological protection, and always resonate in step with operational requirements. Political cadres must possess battlefield command capability, able at critical moments to assume command and act decisively, truly becoming front-line combatants who "support the main attack without competing for credit, add luster without adding confusion" (助攻不争功、添彩不添乱).
Looking toward the future battlefield, system-of-systems operations (体系化作战) and joint operations place higher demands on political work in the new era. Modern warfare is a system-of-systems confrontation in which all services and arms are deeply integrated and multiple dimensions are engaged simultaneously. Within a vast and precise operational system, any single link's wavering of conviction or failure of coordination could trigger a "butterfly effect," causing the operational chain to break. Political work is precisely the "adhesive" (黏合剂) that bridges inter-service differences and consolidates the system's combined strength — through unified ideological education, forming an "integrated chessboard" (一盘棋) operational mindset; through thorough and meticulous psychological services, fortifying the spiritual line of defense under extreme conditions; through precise and efficient battlefield agitation (战场鼓动), ensuring that every combat post maintains a high state of morale, so that the system truly becomes "linked" and "alive," aggregating countless individual "small selves" into the overwhelming force that defeats the enemy. Political cadres across the force must strengthen their thinking as a combat team (战斗队思想), and with solid military-political quality and a pragmatic work style, embed their work into the combat chain, continuously strengthening the lifeline, and providing a strong political guarantee for achieving the centenary goal of army building.