A Rocket Force Brigade Focuses on Pre-Combat Mobilization: Speak the Fewest Words, Inspire the Greatest Drive
To this day, Instructor Kang of a company in a certain Rocket Force brigade still vividly remembers the pre-combat mobilization that was stopped on the spot. It was an experience he had during a higher-echelon combat-realistic assessment. At the time, in accordance with combat procedures, a pre-battle mobilization was required to convey strategic intent, guide officers and soldiers to maintain high morale and a tenacious fighting spirit, and build up fighting spirit and drive.
However, after receiving the task, the first thought that came to Instructor Kang's mind was none of that. What he thought was: classroom instruction and education is his strong suit; if he was going to do it, he should do it well and strive to score high in the assessment and become a model for the entire brigade. He decided that when the time came, he would make full use of the time and run through the complete procedure.
And so, a carefully prepared "premium mobilization" got underway. The venue had to be arranged, tables and chairs set in order, banners hung straight, and the sound system tuned to the right level. From the order of entry to the rhythm of slogans, the entire procedure was meticulously organized. To squeeze out more time for a better display, the subsequent steps of inventory checks and equipment inspections were compressed accordingly, and some of the precious time that should have been used for pre-combat intensive training was also taken up.
On the day of the assessment, not long after the procedure began, the assessment team stopped it on the spot: "Is this a pre-combat mobilization or a variety show?"
The question left Instructor Kang frozen in place. The critique that followed went straight to the point: the purpose of pre-combat mobilization is to build morale and consolidate cohesion, to bring officers and soldiers mentally into a combat state — not to pursue an impressive spectacle or a complete procedure. Spending large amounts of time and energy on venue setup and rehearsal walk-throughs may look good on the surface, but in reality it eats into precious combat preparation time. "On an actual battlefield, will the enemy wait for you to finish hanging your banner before they attack?"
"You sacrificed substance for appearances (为了面子，丢了里子)." That line from the assessment team hit Instructor Kang like a heavy hammer. That assessment exposed quite a few other problems as well. Some units enforcing traffic control, when faced with civilians urgently needing to pass, only knew to rigidly block them per regulations and had no idea how to conduct mass-relations work (群众工作), provoking discontent. Some units that apprehended "enemy agents" managed to physically detain the individuals but, lacking knowledge of the relevant legal requirements, failed to collect evidence in a timely manner. Still other units evacuating "casualties" considered only the distance of the route and not road conditions, and were judged to have delayed the golden window for treatment, resulting in the "casualties" dying despite rescue efforts.
During the after-action review, the brigade Party committee did not stop at addressing the issues on a case-by-case basis. Instead, in conjunction with conducting political rectification training (政治整训), it dug into the root causes of these problems. Gradually, everyone came to recognize that these seemingly unrelated problems all pointed to the same underlying pathology — mechanical implementation (机械落实) without regard for integration with actual combat.
The essence of "mechanical implementation" is a "disconnect" between political work and the requirements of actual combat. The brigade Party committee acutely recognized that this was by no means a capability shortfall of individual cadres, but rather a chronic ailment left by political work operating in a long-term peacetime environment of "self-designed, self-cycling, self-assessed (自我设计、自我循环、自我检验)" processes. To that end, the brigade Party committee took the problems exposed in the assessment as the specific targets of political rectification training, and explicitly stated: political rectification training is not about starting from scratch, but about re-inscribing the character "war (战)" into every directive, every mobilization, and every contingency plan in political work.
Taking Instructor Kang's mobilization as an example: the brigade had compiled and printed a Manual for the Organization and Implementation of Wartime Political Work (《战时政治工作组织实施手册》), which specifies that mobilization must be combined with the unit's actual situation. The notes also emphasize that in urgent situations, mobilization can be conducted while assembling troops, while maneuvering, or while fighting. Yet some cadres only remembered "how to do it" and overlooked "how to integrate it" — they remembered to build morale but forgot to race against time; they remembered to organize activities but forgot to emphasize the combat flavor (战味).
"Regulations and manuals are guides, not dogma." A brigade leader told everyone: if you get used to walking with a crutch, you won't know how to walk once the crutch is gone — this shows that certain comrades have insufficient battlefield awareness and a serious tendency to wait and rely on others.
Battlefield mobilization is born of war and moves for war; its ultimate effectiveness must be able to withstand the test of the battlefield. A brainstorming session themed "rectifying ideological rust (纠治思想锈蚀)" was launched across the entire brigade. In the course of discussion, the brigade Party committee established an iron rule: before initiating political work procedures in combat-realistic exercises, three questions must first be answered — "What does this work have to do with the current enemy situation? Can it be completed faster under existing conditions? If the worst-case scenario occurs, does the contingency plan keep up?" If the three questions cannot be answered clearly, it is better to simplify the procedure than to run through empty motions (空转程序). Relevant departments analyzed the typical problems exposed in the assessment one by one, organized Party member cadres to examine themselves against these problems, and focused on rectifying tendencies such as prioritizing spectacle over effect and prioritizing procedure over actual combat.
During the discussion, Instructor Kang voluntarily stepped forward to speak from personal experience: "My biggest problem was not that I was insufficiently serious about the mobilization, but that I directed my seriousness to the wrong place…" His reflection left many cadres deep in thought. He said he had been thinking all along about how to make the mobilization more "grand (排场)," but had not thought about how to give officers and soldiers greater morale. When the direction is off, the harder you work, the further you drift from actual combat.
After education and rectification, the conduct of the brigade's Party member cadres was effectively tempered. Instructor Kang came to a genuine understanding: in pre-battle mobilization, war comes first — do not pursue grand spectacle; instead, emphasize being short, direct, and fast (短平快), leaving ample time for combat preparation. Content should not be overambitious or all-encompassing; focus on "what is the mission, where is the objective, and how should we proceed" — speak the fewest words, inspire the greatest drive.
The Manual for the Organization and Implementation of Wartime Political Work was also revised and refined with the battlefield in view. For example, the traffic control section was supplemented with key points on military-civilian coordination and communication with the masses; the section on handling enemy agents was refined to include the legal procedures for evidence collection, detention, and handover. When officers and soldiers now consult the manual, they feel more confident: the manual is not a fixed set of answers but a loose-leaf guide (活页指南), and behind every revision lies a consideration grounded in actual combat.
More importantly, revisions to the manual are no longer produced behind closed doors by the staff organs. Instead, after each exercise, political cadres who participated, operations and training staff officers, and grassroots soldier representatives jointly submit proposed revisions, and "homegrown methods (土办法)" and "golden ideas (金点子)" that have been tested in actual combat are promptly incorporated. The manual has transformed from a "fixed set of rules (死规定)" into a "living ledger (活台账)" — which provisions work and which do not, actual combat decides.
Not long ago, higher echelons organized a combat-realistic assessment. The exercise control group (导调组) issued multiple special-situation response tasks in succession to a certain battalion. Officers and soldiers handled them in a manner grounded in reality, taking into account both the battlefield environment and local customs and practices; both adhering to principles and applying flexible adaptation. Instructor Kang also participated in this assessment — no banners, no rehearsal. He stood in front of the formation and completed the mobilization in under ten minutes.
When the mobilization ended, he said only one sentence: "Everyone, follow me!" Some officers and soldiers said that those few words were more effective than any grand reasoning.