Garrison Observation | The Change in Work Style Behind an Exercise Plan
"Wherever the Commander Stands, There the Banner Flies"
■ PLA Daily Special Correspondent Xu Qiushi
Midsummer. This correspondent entered a command-and-control shelter on a field training site, where Battalion Commander Chen of an Air Force unit was rapidly working the control panel, issuing intercept orders. As the blips representing the missile and its target converged on schedule, a brief, firm round of applause broke out inside the shelter.
The unit's leadership acknowledged candidly that some commanders had previously "prioritized process over effectiveness" during live training, causing the command chain to link up poorly. The thoroughly transformed command style seen today is inseparable from the ideological tempering and capability reforging brought about by the deepened political rectification training (政治整训).
"If commanders don't stand at the front, how will the troops dare to charge?" An unexpected confrontation exercise, and the figures who stepped forward one after another, showed this correspondent the sense of responsibility these commanders carry—
At 0300, the unit received an emergency movement order. Commanders at every level were the first to shoulder their packs and board vehicles, leading the troops to assemble rapidly. En route, the column came under simulated enemy satellite reconnaissance; the commander made an immediate decision to adjust the march route, successfully concealing the force. Upon reaching the designated operational area, the command element immediately entered the command-and-control shelter and at the first opportunity established a layered air-defense network.
A commander's exemplary role is not confined to moments of crisis—it shows in the small details of daily life. At an equipment maintenance site, Company Political Instructor Wang Yajun lay flat on the ground alongside a crew member, troubleshooting an electronic equipment fault. His face was smeared with grease; his copy of the Equipment Operating Manual was covered in handwritten annotations, with simple circuit diagrams sketched in the margins. "When even the political instructor pushes this hard, we'd be embarrassed not to learn well," said Private First Class Xiao Li.
"I am a political instructor, but I am also a commander. If I don't understand the equipment, I can't integrate into the combat chain," Wang Yajun told this correspondent. Now that new equipment has been fielded, it has become a standing rule that commanders must "pass the test" first. Stepping into the field command post, a "Commander Competency Checklist" (指挥员能力清单) is prominently displayed, encompassing a series of combat-realistic standards including command skills, battle-position proficiency, and emergency decision-making capability.
"Commander assessments now align far more closely with actual combat," said Company Commander Sun of a certain company, who had just returned from the firing position, his camouflage uniform still stained with launcher grease. He told this correspondent that every commander must be repeatedly tested under unscripted complex environments and extreme conditions: "Whether the results are good or not, the battlefield decides."
At dusk, the stand-down whistle sounded. The command element gathered around the communications vehicle for a serious after-action review of the confrontation exercise: "Next time, establish the communications link with sister units earlier during coordination"—"Initiate anti-jamming operations sooner"—The animated debate drew in many officers and soldiers, who silently committed the commanders' words to memory.
"Wherever the commander stands, there the banner flies." This correspondent heard that phrase repeatedly throughout the visit. As night deepened, the lights in the command-and-control shelter came back on. Not far away, radar antennas rotated without pause, guarding the peaceful night sky—and guarding this spirit of responsibility and inheritance captured in the phrase "each level leading the next" (一级带着一级干).
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The Change in Work Style Behind an Exercise Plan
■ Tang Chongding, Ma Lingchen, PLA Daily Special Correspondents Xu Qiushi and Wang Nan
On the northwest Gobi, night winds carrying fine sand beat steadily against the outer shell of the command-and-control shelter. Having typed the final revision, Deputy Company Commander Li Zhenlin of a battalion in an Air Force unit carefully reviewed the updated exercise plan on screen, then set aside the previous version—covered in red-ink annotations—and put it away.
"To make the exercise plan fit actual combat, we have already adjusted and refined it through more than a dozen versions," Li Zhenlin said.
The annotation marks across those pages bear witness to this plan's transformation from a "fixed script" copied from templates into a "guide to victory" (胜战指南) closely aligned with the battlefield. They also reflect the commitment of commanders at every level in the unit to anchor themselves to winning.
In recent days, this correspondent traveled deep into the desert, tracing the revision history of this operational plan in an effort to explore the ideological reforging and work-style transformation that deepening political rectification training has brought to grassroots commanders.
**Getting Clear on "What the Battlefield Needs and What the Troops Should Train"**
Li Zhenlin remembers that when he first received the battalion's assignment to draft the exercise plan, he felt entirely confident.
As a seasoned veteran, his plans had always been properly formatted, complete in all required elements, and precise in language—the battalion's universally recognized "inspection-exempt model." As the cross-regional exercise drew closer, Li Zhenlin opened his computer's "template folder" out of long habit, drew material from exercise plans of previous years, and adjusted the time, location, personnel, and tactical information for the current mission. After pulling several all-nighters, he produced a finished exercise script of more than thirty pages.
"At the time I thought: the template draft has all the elements and a smooth flow—it would at least pass the initial review without trouble, and I could fill in the on-site survey content later," Li Zhenlin said. He did not expect that this complacency would trip him up at the very first plan review meeting.
The moment the plan was projected onto the screen, it was marked up beyond recognition with red ink. The polished standard procedures and scripted language he had so carefully crafted crumbled under the questioning of those present: "What is the operational basis for the preset intercept range? Have you conducted live-equipment electromagnetic interference reconnaissance of this exercise area?" "The response to contingencies only states general principles—where are the specific handling procedures and backup plans?" "The anticipated contingencies are far too narrow. Can this plan hold up against compound jamming or a multi-target surprise attack?"
At the meeting, Li Zhenlin's knuckles went white around his pen, yet he could not answer a single question. Of the more than thirty neatly formatted, element-complete pages of the draft plan, virtually none contained actual measured data from the current mission.
At the subsequent combat-and-training review conference (议战议训会), the battalion's military political instructor (武教导员) took the lead in self-examination, holding up the red-annotated draft: "Operational requirements are the root of a plan; battlefield reality is its soul. As the political officer, I failed to run the requirements of deepening political rectification training through the entire plan-drafting process, and I failed to put 'how the war is fought is how the troops must train' (仗怎么打、兵就怎么练) into practice." He cut straight to the point: copying templates and going through the motions may look efficient, but it is a formalism (形式主义) of hollow training style—a stumbling block to combat readiness.
The political instructor's words made the grassroots commanders in the room flush with embarrassment. Li Zhenlin then placed the plan in a prominent spot on his desk, took his technical specialists into the exercise area, and collected every category of measured data. Through seven rounds of revision, they trimmed the plan from more than thirty pages to just over ten, cutting every empty phrase and stock formulation, leaving only concrete, combat-realistic measures. This time, Li Zhenlin brought the final version to the review board and, as expected, received unanimous approval.
It is understood that, to deepen political rectification training and reshape commanders' work style, the unit's Party committee established three hard criteria for plan drafting: no approval without on-site survey data; no approval without combat-realistic wargaming support; no approval without input from grassroots officers and soldiers. Drafting in isolation and copying templates are strictly prohibited, forcing commanders at every level to go down to the front line to understand the real situation, identify shortcomings, and formulate concrete measures.
"Before, I was picking at words and piecing together procedures in a cubicle, and I couldn't help feeling anxious because I had no solid foundation. Now, immersed in the actual position, I not only understand the path to fighting more thoroughly and get the plan sorted out more clearly—I also find it much easier to grasp what the battlefield needs and what the troops should train," Li Zhenlin reflected.
**Combat Confrontation Means Stepping Out of the "Comfort Zone" (舒适区) of Seeking Safety at All Costs**
Even after the exercise plan had been refined through multiple iterations, the first time it was put into practice on the ground, things still went wrong.
On the Gobi, wind and sand swirled as an intense air-ground confrontation unfolded. "Enemy aircraft" used terrain masking for a low-altitude penetration while simultaneously releasing strong electromagnetic jamming; false signals wrapped in clutter instantly flooded the radar screens. "Target detected!" Hearing the crew member's report, Company Commander Sun instinctively called out his familiar line: "Take it steady!"
What he did not expect was that this choice—which he considered prudent—would change the outcome of the engagement. On screen, before the radar could acquire the target, the "enemy aircraft" had already crossed into the edge of the engagement envelope, and they had completely lost the optimal intercept window. When the exercise ended, Sun stared at the brief but unbridgeable acquisition time gap on the screen, his mind blank.
For as long as he could remember, Sun had always sought "steadiness" above all else. "Better to be three seconds slow than to risk a single moment's danger" was a phrase he kept constantly on his lips. When organizing training, he invariably followed the plan's procedures to the letter, avoided high-risk training content whenever possible, and dispensed with extreme-condition drills whenever he could.
This time, however, Sun's "steadiness" cost him dearly. The headquarters assessment team confronted him directly: "The time lost by 'taking it steady' was enough for the target to break through the fire envelope!"
Those words hit Sun like a thunderclap. After the meeting broke up, he walked alone across the Gobi. Night wind carrying grit stung his face, and Sun came to a sudden realization: the "no mistakes" approach he had upheld for years was not prudence—it was an evasion born of fear of responsibility. To bring the exercise plan onto the battlefield, change was needed not only in the design and planning phase, but in the execution phase, where combat thinking had to be rebuilt.
"Only by turning the blade inward (刀口向内) to identify shortcomings can combat training be targeted and effective." Seizing this opportunity, the unit's Party committee organized a position-level discussion forum on "eliminating the accumulated ills of peacetime and rebuilding the performance concept oriented toward victory" (破除和平积弊、重塑胜战政绩观). Battalion and company officers took the lead in self-criticism, examining their own work deviation of "prioritizing safety over actual combat" in training and combat preparation. The forum made one point explicit: "A commander's duty has never been to monitor procedures or recite plans—it is to lead the charge against the hard points and produce real results. A force preparing for war would rather have lessons learned through bold action than safety bought through avoidance."
Sun then conducted a thorough self-reflection in front of his company's officers and soldiers and solicited their practical combat suggestions widely. He wrote that time gap in his notebook as a constant reminder. At the same time, Sun completely reversed his former training style of "seeking safety and fearing mistakes": he took the lead in high-risk subjects, repeatedly drilled extreme-condition operations, and even voluntarily requested additional training in difficult and dangerous subjects under conditions of extreme weather, compound jamming, and multi-target surprise attack.
Not long afterward, during an air-ground confrontation, the radar suddenly malfunctioned, and the troops' nerves instantly went taut. Sun did not panic. He simultaneously conducted pre-battle motivational work to steady the troops and organized his technical specialists to troubleshoot the fault, ultimately succeeding in intercepting the target.
"True responsibility is not dodging difficulties to prevent mistakes—it is being able to step up and win at the critical moment." Walking off the training ground, Sun gazed at the wind-driven sand filling the sky, his feelings complex.
Driven by the unit's Party committee, commanders at every level stepped out of the "comfort zone" of seeking safety at all costs, bringing the difficult and dangerous subjects in the exercise plan squarely onto the training ground. The troops' drive and sense of direction in preparing for war grew stronger and clearer.
**A Defeat Catalyzes a "Cognitive Upgrade" (认知升级)**
Deep in the night, the command post blazed with light. Battalion and company commanders, technical specialists, and headquarters staff officers sat around the conference table, conducting a focused discussion on the topic of "how older equipment can be integrated into new combat systems." Working through the exercise plan—now updated and supplemented through who knows how many versions—they scrutinized it sentence by sentence, refining it item by item.
It turned out that the version of the plan approved before the exercise had said very little about how older equipment should be employed within the system. In the eyes of most officers and soldiers, older equipment that had been fielded for years had fixed performance characteristics and could not keep pace with newer equipment—it was a drag. Accordingly, whenever a system confrontation was lost, the tendency was to attribute it to "the old equipment not being up to it."
Battalion Commander Chen had previously proposed detailing the tactics for employing older equipment within the system in the plan, but the idea had not gained wide acceptance. Many felt: "The performance ceiling of the old equipment is right there—it's hard to break through." Then a defeat in a system confrontation shattered everyone's habitual assumptions.
In that exercise, their new-type equipment successfully tied down the opposing force's main elements, creating an excellent intercept window. However, because the older equipment responsible for coordinated supplementary coverage could not keep pace with the system's operational tempo and failed to lock onto the target in time, they missed the optimal intercept opportunity.
The defeat left everyone deeply dispirited. Some grumbled privately: "If we had new equipment, this definitely wouldn't have happened." At the after-action review, Commander Chen cut straight to the point: "When we lose, we blame the equipment? Old equipment is not the biggest problem—outdated thinking and the unwillingness to take responsibility are!"
The room fell instantly silent. Chen picked up the plan—once again filled with red annotations—and led the self-examination: "Deepening political rectification training requires us to transform our training style and step out of the 'comfort zone.' Even older equipment cannot be isolated from the system." Those present could not help but bow their heads in reflection: for all this time, what had constrained the older equipment was not its performance, but their own conservative thinking of "not daring to break through, not willing to take responsibility." Only by breaking through cognitive boundaries could they shoulder the mission of winning.
Chen then took the lead in forming a Party-member assault team (党员攻坚小组), leading the command element and technical specialists to dig in at the Gobi training ground. With no ready-made experience to draw on, they measured data set by set, ran wargames again and again, and optimized coordinated tactics time after time. With no training conditions available, they proactively coordinated with neighboring units, repeatedly refining their approach through exercises in which they alternated as adversaries and teammates, converting unknown risks into controllable contingency plans.
Not long afterward, in a system confrontation, the opposing force launched multi-wave, multi-axis attacks with advanced equipment. The battalion's new-type combat elements were tied down, and everyone held their breath. At that moment, Chen decisively commanded the older equipment to move covertly to a preset position and, leveraging its stable advantage in medium-to-low-altitude engagement, wove a layered defensive net together with neighboring units and precisely struck the incoming targets—a clean comeback victory.
Deep in the night, the command post lights remained bright. After completing the after-action review of the day's confrontation, Chen picked up his red pen and added another line of annotation to the latest version of the plan. This exercise plan continues to be refined through each successive round of practical exploration. The commanders of this unit have never stopped expanding their capability boundaries and deepening their integration into the system.
"Only by breaking through the shackles of thinking (思维桎梏) and boldly breaking boundaries to tackle hard problems can every piece of equipment be brought to its maximum effectiveness—and on the future battlefield, can we shoulder the mission and responsibility of being able to fight and win," Chen said.
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As the interview concluded, this correspondent was left with much to reflect on. This exercise plan—repeatedly added to and revised—reflects the unit's deepening of political rectification training and its determined effort to "establish a good example for commanders" (立起指挥员好样子). Each update to the plan discards the ideological ailments accumulated through peacetime complacency and accumulates the confidence to march toward war and win.
Not long ago, the smoke of a live exercise had barely cleared, and the comrades were all feeling pleased with themselves over a good score. During the after-action debrief, however, the officer leading the unit threw cold water on us: "Does the score achieved on the exercise ground equal actual combat capability? Will it still hold up on the real battlefield?"
The tent fell instantly silent. The leader's question suddenly brought to mind a mistake I had made during an end-of-year assessment—
At the time, I had only recently taken up my post. With the year-end military training assessment approaching, and in order to prepare for the training department's inspection of the battalion, my comrades and I pulled several all-nighters filling every logbook to the brim.
What we did not expect was that the assessment that followed exposed us completely. Breakdown operations under a tactical scenario, emergency equipment repair in unfamiliar terrain—one after another, subjects close to actual combat left everyone scrambling. "Deputy Company Commander, get over here at the double!" An angry order rang out. I set down the cable I was holding and ran, gasping, to the assessment team. The training department chief's brow was tightly furrowed as he demanded: "Does combat effectiveness show up in the logbooks, or on the exercise ground?"
In that moment, my face burned. No matter how neatly the data in the notebooks was filled in, it was not the same as real training. I had been focused on "building" combat effectiveness on paper while ignoring the smell of gunpowder on the drill ground.
A subsequent field cantonment training mission made me even more alert. That mission incorporated complex electromagnetic jamming, live-force confrontation, full-element contingencies, and multiple other conditions. The "coordinated training" that had been glossed over with a single entry in the logbook became a brutal test in combat. A single error at one battle position could knock an entire fire unit out of action. During those days, we ground ourselves down again and again on the exercise ground, going through a thousand hammerings and a hundred refinements. The sweat the officers and soldiers shed and the effort they put in left a deeper mark than any ink in a logbook.
Stepping out of that memory and looking back at this exercise, I began to understand the intent behind the leading officer's question. When the after-action review ended, I took out my training journal. Instead of rushing to fill in data, I kept turning over questions in my mind: "Can we add one more contingency to tomorrow's training? Have we truly grasped the performance parameters of the equipment? Can we handle the adversary's attack patterns?"
Those question marks serve as warning bells, driving me toward the future battlefield with a clearer and more sober mind.
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**PLA Daily Special Correspondent in Dialogue with the Director of the Political Work Department of an Air Force Unit**
Since the military-wide deepening of political rectification training, how to establish a good example for commanders and become the "lead goose" (领头雁) capable of winning battles has become a critical subject for commanders at every level.
Whether a commander's work style is tough, whether their capabilities are strong, and whether their sense of responsibility is genuine directly affects the morale, fighting spirit, and actual combat capability of the force. Around this topic, this newspaper's special correspondent spoke with Director Lü of the Political Work Department of an Air Force unit.
**Correspondent:** In your view, what should a commander who can fight look like?
**Director Lü:** The most essential qualities are: politically solid, professionally capable, and daring to fight and charge. Deepening political rectification training focuses on correcting orientation and purifying loyalty (提纯忠诚). Commanders must engrave political loyalty to "following the Party's command" (听党指挥) into their bones, and resolutely correct the hollow work style of "prioritizing declarations over implementation, prioritizing process over effectiveness." They must embody the results of political rectification training on the front line of training and combat preparation—understanding both tactics and political requirements—and through the concrete actions of "standing firm, stepping up, and winning," build up the troops' confidence in achieving victory.
**Correspondent:** What thresholds must a commander cross in order to set a good example?
**Director Lü:** First, the ideological threshold: through deepening political rectification training, break the habitual thinking of "prioritizing form over actual combat" and discard the hollow mentality that "procedures in order equals work accomplished." Second, the capability threshold: commanders must understand both politics and military affairs; they must proactively address their weak points and shortcomings, take the lead in drilling skills and studying tactics, and avoid the situation of "wanting to charge but unable to, wanting to lead but unable to move the troops." Third, the responsibility threshold: use political rectification training as a lever to correct the conservative mentality of "fearing mistakes and fearing responsibility," and through the concrete action of taking the lead in charging at critical moments, transform the work-style requirements of political rectification training into a conscious commitment to combat readiness.
**Correspondent:** "To lead the way, first scout the path; to charge, I go as the foot soldier" (领路先探路，冲锋我为卒)—how should this be reflected in a commander's daily actions?
**Director Lü:** The core meaning of that phrase is "taking the lead" (带头). In training: be the first to explore new paths and drill hard skills; when new equipment is fielded, be the first to study it; be the first to tackle difficult and dangerous subjects; identify the hard points and bottlenecks in training, then lead the troops through them. In missions: be willing to serve as the vanguard—wherever the danger is greatest, charge there; wherever the stakes are highest, hold there. In daily life: claim no special privileges; consistently eat, live, and train alongside the officers and soldiers; transform a commander's self-imposed standards into a centripetal force that elevates morale.
**Correspondent:** In your view, what is the oldest tradition that commanders must never abandon?
**Director Lü:** There are many that must never be abandoned. One is the combat tradition of leading from the front and daring to fight and struggle (身先士卒、敢打敢拼). Our army's march from victory to victory is closely bound up with the outstanding tradition of commanders leading the charge and officers and soldiers sharing life and death. One of the important tasks of deepening political rectification training is to purge corrupting influences and return to fundamentals—to have commanders reclaim the traditional character of "follow me" (跟我上) and discard the slack mentality of the "hands-off manager" (甩手掌柜). In cantonment training, combat preparation, and exercise breakthroughs, commanders must take the lead in going to the front line and shouldering the hardest tasks, carrying forward the spirit of self-sacrifice exemplified by the older generation of revolutionaries who led the charge.