Doctrine

Grasp the Culminating Point of Attack, Plan Offensive Operations — Contemporary Lessons from Key Operational Thinking in On War

把握进攻顶点运筹攻势作战——《战争论》重要作战思想的当代启示

PLA Daily (解放军报) 23 August 2026

Summary

Writing in what appears to be a PLA professional military education outlet, Geng Xuyao applies Clausewitz's 'culminating point of attack' (进攻顶点) to the planning of future offensive operations, arguing that campaign and tactical commanders must anticipate force attrition thresholds, set objectives calibrated to sustainable strength, and pursue swift decisive victory before the offense-defense transition reverses. The article draws on Sun Tzu alongside Clausewitz and explicitly warns against 'piecemeal commitment' (添油战术) and unchecked expansion of strategic objectives — framing that fits a recurring pattern in PLA doctrinal writing that uses classical Western and Chinese military theory to reinforce joint campaign planning concepts. Its value is as a record of how PLA professional military education frames offensive operational theory for mid-grade officers, not as evidence of a specific operational plan or posture change.

Translation

Grasp the Culminating Point of Attack, Plan Offensive Operations — Contemporary Lessons from Key Operational Thinking in On War

■ Geng Xuyao

The theory of the "culminating point of attack" advanced by Clausewitz in On War profoundly reveals the inherent laws governing the waxing and waning of forces in offensive operations and the transition between offensive and defensive postures. This truth — born of the practice of war and repeatedly validated by history — carries important strategic guidance and practical warning significance for the scientific planning and precise execution of future offensive operations, and for avoiding the slide from a "culminating point of victory" to a "starting point of defeat."

The theory of the "culminating point of attack" profoundly reveals the inherent laws of offensive operations. On War states: "The superiority in military strength of the attacker must inevitably diminish gradually in the course of a strategic offensive… Most strategic offensives can only be carried to the point where the forces are still sufficient to conduct a defense while awaiting a peace settlement. Beyond this point a dramatic reversal occurs, and a powerful counterattack is encountered… We call this moment the culminating point of the attack." This thinking originated in the experience of European military history and has been repeatedly validated through the practice of war; it is a truth that reflects the objective laws of offensive operations. Clausewitz emphasized that the "culminating point of attack" is "the basis of almost all campaign plans." A deep understanding of its essential spirit and an accurate grasp of its meaning and substance carry important reference value for the scientific planning of future offensive operations.

Clearly discern the law of the culminating point: grasp the critical threshold of the offense-defense transition. Clausewitz vividly compared the strength of a strategic offensive during its advance to "a flame with diminishing fuel," which must inevitably weaken progressively. He pointed out that the moment when the attacking force is able to achieve its maximum military objective is often also the moment when its "fuel is nearly exhausted" and its defensive capability has fallen to its weakest. At this moment, the "positive factors" accumulated by the defending side will be converted into a powerful counterattacking force. The attacker's "culminating point" can in an instant become the "culminating point of victory," whereupon the attacker is compelled to shift to strategic defense or even retreat. The culminating point of attack therefore refers to the critical threshold in time and space at which the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. The wise course of action at this moment is to halt the offensive, shift to defense, and mass forces to seek renewed battle. To disregard the law of the culminating point and press forward by force is to face the grave risk of a devastating counterattack. Whether a decisive objective can be achieved before the culminating point is reached is the key to success or failure in offensive operations. A deep understanding of this objective law carries important methodological guidance value for the future organization and execution of strategic offensives or strategic counteroffensives.

Calibrate means to capability and set policy accordingly: the cornerstone of rationally setting strategic objectives. Clausewitz revealed the profound causal relationship between offensive strength and strategic objectives. British military theorist Liddell Hart also pointed out: "Overextension of forces inevitably leads to a halt. This is a confirmed strategic law." If the director of war ignores this law and, when strength has already reached its limit, still covets larger objectives, the result will inevitably be an "overdraft" of strength. As strength continues to be overdrawn, military power will turn from flourishing to declining, the offense-defense posture will reverse accordingly, and even a reversal of the overall strategic situation may be triggered. Throughout history, many initially powerful attackers, after an initial victory, overestimated themselves and underestimated the enemy, allowed their strategic objectives to expand unchecked, and ultimately fell into protracted war or multi-front operations and were utterly defeated — a deeply instructive lesson. Strategic decision-makers must therefore, when planning an offensive, carefully determine objectives based on the limits of their strength, ensuring a precise match between strength and objectives; during execution, they must assess force attrition in real time, precisely control the "heat" (火候) of the offensive, ensuring that the strategic offensive fully releases its energy while absolutely never exceeding the culminating point, and strictly guarding against the "culminating point of victory" becoming the "starting point of defeat."

Precisely calculate and anticipate the culminating point: seize the strategic initiative in the offense-defense transition. Foreseeing the time and place at which the culminating point will appear is a test of a commander's strategic quality. Clausewitz emphasized that this requires comprehensive consideration of "countless circumstances": whether the enemy, after receiving the first blow, tends toward cohesion or disintegration; the degree to which it is weakened and paralyzed after its supply lines are cut; the international political reactions triggered by the offensive action; and so on. Only by precisely assessing these variables can one discern where the "culminating point" lies, design appropriately calibrated offensive objectives, estimate the degree of force attrition, and ensure that the attacking force approaches the culminating point "just right" without crossing it, thereby avoiding a reversal of the offense-defense posture and a strategic defeat. Napoleon's 1812 campaign to invade Russia is the classic example of crossing the culminating point and suffering a catastrophic defeat. Modern directors of offensive operations must therefore deeply grasp the characteristics and signs of the culminating point's appearance and meticulously prepare contingency plans for the offense-defense transition. Campaign commanders must foresee their own side's culminating point and make every effort to achieve objectives before it arrives; tactical commanders must take measures to delay the arrival of the culminating point; and logistics support must precisely anticipate resource consumption in long-range, extended-duration operations, ensuring continuous support at critical nodes in time and space. If such foresight cannot be guaranteed, commanders at all levels must decisively adjust their operational plans.

Strive for swift battle and decisive victory: the core formula for defeating the enemy before the culminating point. Clausewitz regarded "surprise" and "uninterrupted advance" as the "two wings" of the offensive, indispensable above all in an offensive aimed at thoroughly destroying the enemy. He emphasized that the attacker should strive to achieve a swift and decisive victory before its strength reaches the culminating point. The advantages of time and terrain often belong to the defender — "it has been heard that speed in war, even if clumsy, is valued; a prolonged campaign that is skillful has never been seen" (兵闻拙速，未睹巧之久也). If strength is dispersed in pursuit of minor gains, or if hesitation and delay give the enemy time to recover, the offensive's sharp edge will inevitably be blunted, uncertainty will increase, and the prospect of decisive victory before the culminating point will diminish. To this end, offensive operations must dare to and be skilled at concentrating absolutely superior forces on the main axis, forming an overwhelming superiority of "weighing yi against zhu" (以镒称铢); they must strike the enemy's center of gravity as early as possible to achieve decisive battle, avoiding the "piecemeal commitment" (添油战术) that leads to prolonged indecision. Under the conditions of modern warfare, particular attention must be paid to building an offensive deployment with depth and echelonment and a powerful reserve, so as to cope with deep-echelon defense, ensure the capability for sustained offensive and continuous breakthrough, effectively handle unexpected situations, and ultimately seize victory in the strategic offensive.

Clausewitz's thinking on the "culminating point of attack" warns us that offensive operations are absolutely not unlimited advance — one must deeply understand and respect the objective law of the waxing and waning of forces. In planning and organizing future offensive operations, when facing a complex and severe battlefield environment, one must take "clearly discerning the law of the culminating point" as the foundation of strategic thinking, take "calibrating means to capability and setting policy accordingly" as the iron rule of objective-setting, take "precisely calculating and anticipating the culminating point" as the key to controlling the initiative, and take "striving for swift battle and decisive victory" as the formula for defeating the enemy. Only in this way can one plan scientifically, apply strength precisely, and execute transitions meticulously — locking in victory before the critical threshold of the offense-defense transition, avoiding the repetition of the historical lesson that "beyond the culminating point lies the abyss," and ensuring the continuous seizure of strategic initiative in future wars.

Original Chinese

把握进攻顶点运筹攻势作战 ——《战争论》重要作战思想的当代启示 ■耿需要克劳塞维茨在《战争论》中提出的“进攻顶点”理论，深刻揭示了攻势作战力量消长与攻防态势转换的内在规律。这一源于战争实践、被历史反复验证的真理，对于科学筹划和精准实施未来攻势作战，避免由“胜利顶点”滑向“失败起点”，具有重要的战略指导和实践警示意义。 “进攻顶点”理论，深刻揭示了攻势作战的内在规律。《战争论》中讲：“进攻者的军事实力优势在战略进攻中必然逐渐减弱……大多数战略进攻只能进行到其力量尚足以进行防御以等待媾和的时刻为止。超过这一时刻就会发生剧变，遭遇强力还击……我们称这个时刻为进攻的顶点。”这一思想源于欧洲战史经验，并经战争实践反复验证，是反映进攻作战客观规律的真理。克劳塞维茨强调，“进攻顶点”是“几乎所有战局计划的依据”。深刻理解其精神实质，准确把握其内涵要义，对于科学筹划未来攻势作战具有重要借鉴意义。明辨顶点规律：把握攻防转化的临界点。克劳塞维茨形象地比喻道，战略进攻力量在推进过程中如同“灯油渐少的火苗”，必然逐渐削弱。他指出，当进攻力量能够实现最大军事目标之时，往往也正是其“灯油将尽”、防御能力降至最弱的时刻。此时，防御方积蓄的“积极因素”将转化为强大的反击力量。进攻方的“顶点”，瞬间便可能成为“胜利的顶点”，进而被迫转入战略防御乃至退却。因此，进攻顶点是指攻方战斗力在时空维度上不再超越守方战斗力的临界点。此时明智之举是停止进攻，转入防御，集结力量寻求再战。若无视顶点规律，强行推进，则会面临毁灭性反击的极大风险。能否在抵达顶点前达成决定性目标，是攻势作战成败的关键。深刻认识这一客观规律，对未来组织实施战略进攻或战略反攻，具有重要的方法论指导价值。量力定标施策：合理设定战略目标的基石。克劳塞维茨揭示了进攻力量与战略目标之间深刻的因果联系。英国军事理论家利德尔·哈特也指出：“兵力伸展过度，必然导致停顿。这是一条获得了证实的战略性规律。”战争指导者若忽视此规律，在力量已达极限时仍贪图更大目标，必将导致力量“透支”。伴随力量持续透支，军事实力将由盛转衰，攻防态势随之逆转，甚至引发战略全局的反转。历史上，诸多起初强大的进攻者，初胜后便高估自己、低估对手，战略目标不断膨胀，最终陷入持久战或多线作战而一败涂地，教训十分深刻。因此，战略决策者在筹划攻势时，要依据力量极限审慎确定目标，确保力量与目标精准匹配；在实施过程中，应实时评估兵力损耗，精准掌控进攻“火候”，使战略进攻既充分释放能量，又绝不逾越顶点，严防“胜利顶点”沦为“失败起点”。精算预判顶点：掌控攻防转换的战略主动。预见顶点出现的时间和地点，是对指挥员战略素养的考验。克劳塞维茨强调，这需要综合考虑“无数情况”：敌遭遇首次打击后是趋于团结还是分崩离析，其补给线被切断后的削弱瘫痪程度，攻击行动引发的国际政治反应，等等。唯有精准研判这些变量，才能洞悉“顶点”所在，设计恰如其分的进攻目标，估算力量削弱程度，确保进攻力量“恰好”抵近顶点而不越界，从而避免攻防态势逆转和战略败局。拿破仑1812年侵俄战役是越过顶点招致惨败的经典战例。由此，现代攻势作战指导者必须深刻把握顶点出现的特点与征兆，周密做好攻防转换预案。战役指挥员须预见己方顶点，并全力在顶点到来前达成目标；战术指挥员须采取措施延缓顶点到来；后勤保障则必须精确预见远距离、长时间作战的资源消耗，确保在关键时空节点持续提供支撑。若预见无法保障，各级指挥员必须果断调整作战计划。力求速战决胜：在顶点前击垮敌人的核心要诀。克劳塞维茨将“突然性”和“不断前进”视为进攻的“双翼”，尤其在以彻底打垮敌人为目标的进攻中不可或缺。他强调，进攻方应力求在力量到达顶点前速战速决。时间与地形之利常属防御方，“兵闻拙速，未睹巧之久也”。若因贪图小利分散力量，或因犹豫拖延予敌喘息之机，必将削弱进攻锐势，增加不确定性，降低在顶点前决胜的把握。为此，进攻作战必须敢于并善于集中绝对优势兵力于主要方向，形成“以镒称铢”的压倒性优势；必须尽早击敌重心实施决战，避免“添油战术”导致久拖不决。在现代战争条件下，尤其要注重构建纵深梯次、拥有强大预备队的进攻部署，以应对大纵深防御，确保具备持续进攻、连续突破的能力，有效处置意外情况，最终夺取战略进攻的胜利。克劳塞维茨的“进攻顶点”思想警示我们，攻势作战绝非无限推进，必须深刻认识并尊重力量消长的客观规律。在筹划和组织未来攻势作战时，面对复杂严峻的战场环境，必须将“明辨顶点规律”作为战略思维的基点，将“量力定标施策”作为目标设定的铁律，将“精算预判顶点”作为掌控主动的关键，将“力求速战决胜”作为克敌制胜的要诀。唯有如此，方能科学运筹、精准发力、周密转换，在攻防态势转换的临界点前锁定胜局，避免重蹈“顶点之后即深渊”的历史覆辙，确保在未来战争中持续掌握战略主动权。