Exercises Doctrine Political Work

A Navy Brigade: Tackling Hard Problems to Study Tactics, Leading the Charge to Win

海军某支队：向难攻坚研战法带头冲锋谋打赢

PLA Daily (解放军报) 19 August 2026

Summary

A submarine brigade of the Eastern Theater Command Navy ran adversarial exercises in open ocean, using a brigade-level 攻坚计划表 (hard-problems assault plan) to drive after-action reviews after each crew unit completed simulated attack runs against opposing-force blockades. The article documents a specific institutional failure the brigade had to correct: Party member cadres were selectively implementing the plan—avoiding difficult tactical problems to reduce personal risk—which the brigade's Party committee diagnosed as a distorted 政绩观 (view of political achievement) and a breakdown in 健全上下贯通、执行有力的组织体系 (vertically integrated, forceful execution). The framing points to a persistent PLA tension between paper compliance and combat-realistic training, with the brigade using Xi's July 1st speech and 带头揭榜挂帅 (leadership personally claiming responsibility) as the corrective mechanism—though the article does not specify which tactical problems were actually solved or at what proficiency level.

Translation

Recently, deep in the ocean, an intense adversarial training exercise was underway. Facing layer upon layer of obstacles set by the opposing force, officers and soldiers of a submarine crew unit (艇员队) of a certain Eastern Theater Command Navy brigade responded flexibly, successfully broke through the blockade, and completed a simulated attack. After the adversarial training concluded, the crew unit's Party branch led officers and soldiers in reviewing and summarizing results item by item against the hard-problems assault plan (攻坚计划表), ensuring that "every battle fought yields a step forward."

The brigade's leadership told reporters: "Conducting after-action reviews against the hard-problems assault plan has become standard practice for each crew unit in studying and training for war."

Yet this hard-problems assault plan itself once underwent a transformation from "implementation on paper" to "drawing the sword in the deep sea."

Previously, the brigade's Party committee conducted an in-depth investigation to identify bottleneck problems constraining combat capability generation, compiled and produced a tactical hard-problems assault plan, and required all subordinate units to strictly implement the relevant plans during training. However, during a periodic review, they found that progress varied widely across units, with some showing no progress whatsoever.

"The contents of the plan were thoroughly deliberated—why do some units still remain on paper?" Carrying this question, brigade leadership conducted in-depth research and discovered that some items in the hard-problems assault plan were quite difficult, and that some Party member cadres harbored a mentality of "fear of failure, fear of making mistakes, fear of bearing responsibility." They reasoned that rather than expending effort to work through "bonus questions," it was easier to stick to familiar ground and handle the "basic questions."

"On the battlefield there is no distinction between 'bonus questions' and 'basic questions'—there is only one exam question: winning the war! Selectively implementing the hard-problems assault plan reveals that we have shortcomings in 'building an organizational system that is vertically integrated and capable of forceful execution (健全上下贯通、执行有力的组织体系).'" At the Party committee meeting, brigade leadership pointed directly to the root cause, demanding that all units conduct thorough self-examination and reflection, and educating and guiding Party member cadres to establish a correct view of political achievement (政绩观). Targeting the identified problems of "prioritizing materials over actual results, prioritizing paper over real effectiveness (重材料轻实绩、重纸面轻实效)" and "not conducting training in dangerous conditions, not drilling troops in risky situations (危不施训、险不练兵)," they produced targeted rectification plans.

To further correct deviations in the view of political achievement, the brigade's Party committee organized Party member cadres to earnestly study the spirit of Chairman Xi's important "July 1st" speech, and conducted discussions around "for whom political achievements are built, what kind of political achievements to build, and what to rely on to build political achievements." All agreed: training cannot be "armchair theorizing (纸上谈兵)," there can be no mentality of shrinking from difficulties, the combat-realistic standard must be upheld at all times, and everything must be oriented toward winning as the ultimate objective. Members of the brigade's Party committee standing body took the lead in claiming responsibility (带头揭榜挂帅), and in conjunction with opportunities such as embarking with crews during training and commanders' study days, they worked together with officers and soldiers to study countermeasures and find methods, driving the hard-problems assault plan to take root and be implemented at the training front line.

Leadership and Party member cadres taking the lead effectively ignited officers' and soldiers' enthusiasm and motivation to tackle hard problems. In one crew unit, a research report on a certain tactical breakthrough subject was overturned and restarted multiple times before the relevant results ultimately withstood the test of combat-realistic exercises. In the meeting room of one submarine, crew members who had just completed multiple rounds of close-quarters engagement with an opposing force in unfamiliar waters refined their tactics against nautical charts. In one support battalion, officers and soldiers worked to find breakthroughs for improving the efficiency of torpedo and munitions support in nighttime conditions. As the hard-problems assault plan was transformed from paper planning into research and combat results, the brigade's combat-realistic training level steadily improved.

During a recent training exercise organized by the brigade, one submarine engaged an opposing force in a confined sea area. After comprehensively assessing the environment of the mission sea area, the submarine's commander decisively decided to lie in covert wait in the zone with the most complex underwater acoustic environment, then commanded the submarine to break through in one stroke the "heaven-spanning net and earth-covering web (天罗地网)" carefully laid by the opposing force, rapidly occupy an attack position, and launch an effective attack.

"In peacetime, benchmarking against actual combat to study and drill tactics, applying self-imposed pressure and creating difficult situations for oneself—this yields greater odds of victory in wartime." Brigade leadership stated that they will further strengthen the combat-unit mindset (战斗队思想), uphold the combat capability standard, comprehensively strengthen training and war preparations, and complete all tasks to a high standard with stronger capabilities and more reliable means.

Original Chinese

近日，大洋深处，一场对抗训练正在激烈进行。面对对手层层设阻，东部战区海军某支队某艇员队官兵灵活应对，成功突破封锁，并完成模拟攻击。对抗训练结束，该艇员队党支部带领官兵对照攻坚计划表逐条逐项复盘总结，确保“打一仗、进一步”。该支队领导告诉记者：“对照攻坚计划表复盘，已成为各艇员队研训谋战的常态做法。” 然而，这份攻坚计划表也曾经历从“纸面落实”到“深海亮剑”的转变。此前，该支队党委深入查摆制约战斗力生成的瓶颈问题，梳理形成战法攻坚计划表，要求各单位在训练中严格落实相关计划。但在阶段性盘点时，他们发现，各单位攻坚进度参差不齐，有的甚至毫无进展。 “计划表内容经过了充分论证，一些单位为何仍停留在纸面上？”带着疑问，该支队领导深入调研发现，原来攻坚计划表中有些内容难度较大，部分党员干部存在“怕失败、怕出错、怕担责”的畏难思想，认为与其费心费力研究“附加题”，不如轻车熟路做好“基础题”。 “战场上没有‘附加题’‘基础题’之分，只有胜战这一道考题！选择性落实攻坚计划表，说明我们在‘健全上下贯通、执行有力的组织体系’上存在短板。”党委会上，该支队领导直指症结，要求各单位深入检视反思，教育引导党员干部树立正确政绩观，针对查摆出的“重材料轻实绩、重纸面轻实效”“危不施训、险不练兵”等问题，拿出针对性整改方案。为进一步校正政绩观偏差，该支队党委组织党员干部认真学习习主席“七一”重要讲话精神，围绕“政绩为谁而树、树什么样的政绩、靠什么树政绩”展开讨论交流，大家一致认为：训练不能“纸上谈兵”、不能有畏难思想，要始终坚持实战标准，一切以打赢为最终指向。该支队党委班子成员带头揭榜挂帅，结合随艇参训、指挥员学习日等时机，与官兵一起研对策、找方法，推动攻坚计划表在训练一线落地落实。领导和党员干部带头干，有效激发了官兵向难攻坚的热情动力。在某艇员队，某战法攻关课题研究报告多次被推翻重来，最终相关成果经受住实战检验；在某潜艇会议室，刚在陌生海域与对手完成多回合缠斗的艇员们，对照海图完善战法；在某保障大队，官兵努力探寻夜暗环境下提升雷弹保障效率的突破点……随着攻坚计划表从纸面规划转化为研战成果，该支队实战化训练水平稳步提升。该支队近期组织的一次训练中，某潜艇在狭小海区与对手展开较量。综合考量任务海区环境后，该潜艇指挥员果断决定在水声环境最复杂地带隐蔽待机，随后指挥潜艇一举突破对手精心布下的“天罗地网”，并迅速占领攻击阵位，发起有效攻击。 “平时对标实战研练战法，自我加压自设难局，战时才更有胜算。”该支队领导表示，他们将进一步强化战斗队思想，坚持战斗力标准，全面加强练兵备战，以更强大的能力、更可靠的手段，高标准完成各项任务。