Exercises Political Work

Field Rotation Training: The Headquarters Must Also "Adjust Its Tempo"

野外驻训，机关跟着“调节奏”

PLA Daily (解放军报) 19 August 2026

Summary

A battalion-level deputy political instructor from a brigade of the 74th Group Army, deployed on field rotation training (轮训), raised at a two-way review meeting (双向讲评会) that headquarters was flooding grassroots units with more than ten notifications per day — redundant information requests, multi-page directives with little unit-relevant content, and overlapping task deadlines — because headquarters workflows built for garrison conditions had not been adapted to the faster, less predictable tempo of rotation training. The brigade Party committee identified the failure as institutional: mature garrison-era consolidation mechanisms broke down in the field, and staff defaulted to verbatim document forwarding and repeated data calls. The article documents a friction point that rotation training consistently exposes — headquarters administrative load shifting downward to already-stretched company and battalion officers — and records the corrective measures the brigade introduced, including priority cataloguing, new field-specific workflows, and grassroots oversight of headquarters compliance.

Translation

"Notifications keep coming one after another, all with urgent deadlines — there's simply no way to keep up." Late one night, a string of phone calls from the headquarters left the deputy political instructor of a battalion under a certain brigade of the 74th Group Army — who was away on rotation training — with deeply conflicted feelings.

It turned out that the calls conveyed several notifications: one required each battalion to take turns delivering instruction to personnel at small, dispersed positions, and this week happened to be the turn of the deputy political instructor's battalion to prepare the lessons; another, from the operations and training department, required the battalion to prepare a course demonstration for observation. On top of all this, routine combat readiness, training, education, and other tasks came flooding in one after another, leaving the deputy political instructor stretched far too thin.

At a two-way review meeting (双向讲评会), the deputy political instructor raised this "aggravating matter," striking a chord with the commanding officers and key personnel of other battalions and companies:

"Information we were asked to report had already been submitted before, yet we're still being asked to compile it repeatedly." "Notifications run several pages long, but only a handful of sentences are actually relevant to the grassroots units." "There's no emphasis on overall coordination and integration — the practice of forwarding original documents verbatim and issuing them repeatedly still persists." …

Hearing these words, the headquarters staff felt deeply uncomfortable. They, too, had grievances: they had done a great deal of work to lighten the burden on grassroots officers and soldiers. Since the rotation training began, the headquarters headcount had not changed, yet there was far more work to do — "nights and weekends, Monday through Sunday" had become the norm for headquarters staff.

Staff Officer Li of the headquarters listed it out for this reporter: in addition to the specific work at hand, temporary tasks arrive at unpredictable intervals, and routine combat readiness duty, military training, study and education sessions, and regular meetings at the headquarters cannot be skipped.

Upon learning of this situation, the brigade's leadership took it very seriously. In the first half of this year, as the study and education campaign on establishing and practicing a correct view of political achievement (树立和践行正确政绩观) deepened, the headquarters had continuously reduced the burden on grassroots units, genuinely cutting back a significant amount of work and earning widespread praise from officers and soldiers. Yet since the rotation training began, statistics showed that in the first month alone, each battalion received more than ten notifications per day through official messages and phone calls.

Further investigation by the brigade's leadership revealed that the root of the problem lay in the headquarters' working methods failing to adapt in a timely manner to the tempo of rotation training. In garrison, the headquarters' work tempo was relatively stable, workflows were mature, and common document notifications and meetings of various sizes had already been consolidated and reduced. But at the rotation training site, temporary and unexpected situations increased; sometimes multiple tasks advanced simultaneously and several meetings overlapped in succession. The original workflows broke down and mechanisms failed. To maintain work efficiency, many headquarters staff reverted to their old methods: mechanically "copying and forwarding" documents, blindly applying document templates; taking the path of least resistance by having grassroots units repeatedly submit similar information; pushing work forward without overall coordination, issuing redundant directives …

The brigade Party committee leadership zeroed in on the root of the problem and studied and introduced targeted measures: headquarters departments were required to optimize their working methods and approaches in accordance with the realities of rotation training; routine and administrative tasks newly added during the rotation training period were to be catalogued and sorted by priority, with sufficient time reserved for grassroots battalions and companies to respond and handle them; new workflows for various types of work were to be drafted to reduce the headquarters' own workload at the institutional level, thereby reducing the burden on grassroots units; headquarters staff were explicitly required to proactively adapt to the new tempo and new conditions, with each department obligated to keep flexible personnel available to handle temporary notifications and tasks; a list was drawn up of the specific problem situations that had previously occurred, and grassroots officers and soldiers were invited to provide oversight, among other measures.

"Only help, never hinder; only share the burden, never add to the disturbance (只帮忙不添乱、只分忧不添扰)." Now, notifications have decreased, documents have been consolidated, and the arrangement of various tasks has become more scientific and rational. Everyone is able to devote more time and energy to training for combat readiness, and the quality and effectiveness of the rotation training are steadily improving.

Original Chinese

“通知一个接一个，时间要求都很急，实在顾不过来。”一天深夜，机关连着几通电话，让在外驻训的第74集团军某旅某营付教导员心情复杂。原来，电话下发的几项通知，一是要求各营轮流为小散点位官兵送课上门，这周刚好轮到付教导员所在营备课；二是作训部门要求营里准备课目示范观摩。除此之外，日常战备、训练、教育等各项任务接踵而至，一时间，付教导员分身乏术。在双向讲评会上，付教导员道出这件“闹心事”，引起其他营连主官及骨干的共鸣—— “要求上报的信息，之前都上交过，仍在反复统计”“下发通知好几页，与基层相关的只有寥寥几句”“不注重统筹整合，原文转发、反复下发的情况仍旧存在”…… 听了这些话，机关干部心里很不是滋味。他们也很委屈，为了减轻基层官兵的负担，他们做了大量工作。驻训以来，机关人数没变，事却更多，“白加黑、五加二”成为了机关干部的工作常态。机关李参谋给记者罗列了一下，除了手头具体工作外，还会不定时收到临时任务，机关的日常战备值班、军事训练、学习教育和例行会议更是不能缺席。得知这一情况后，该旅领导高度重视。今年上半年，随着树立和践行正确政绩观学习教育推向深入，机关为基层持续减负，确实压减了不少工作，收获广大官兵点赞。但驻训以来，据统计，仅在第一个月里，各营每日通过文电和电话接收到的通知高达10多条。该旅领导进一步调研发现，问题根子出在机关工作方式没能及时适应驻训节奏。在营区时，机关工作节奏相对稳定，工作流程成熟，常见的文件通知、大小会议也都作过合并压减。可到了驻训地，临时、突发情况增多，有时多个任务齐头并进，几项会议压茬进行，原来的流程断点、机制失效，不少机关干部为了维持工作效率，用回了之前的“老办法”：机械“照搬转发”文件、盲目套用文件；图一时方便，相似的信息让基层反复上报；工作推进缺少统筹协调，重复下文…… 该旅党委一班人瞄准问题根子，研究出台针对性举措：要求机关各部门围绕驻训实际，优化工作方式方法；梳理汇总驻训期间新增的日常性事务性工作，区分各项任务轻重缓急，为基层营连预留足够的时间应对处理；拟定各类工作的新流程，从机制层面减轻机关工作负担，进而为基层减负；明确要求机关干部主动适应新节奏、新情况，各部门必须留出机动人员应对临时性通知、工作；对此前出现的相关问题情形拉单列表，邀请基层官兵监督，等等。 “只帮忙不添乱、只分忧不添扰。”现在，通知变少了，文件合并了，各项任务安排更加科学合理，大家能把更多时间精力投入练兵备战，驻训质效稳步提升。