Barracks Observation | The "Ideological Shockwave" of a Heavy Weapons Concentrated Training Exercise
Engage Upon Arrival — Difficult and Dangerous Subjects Tackled First
■ PLA Daily Reporter Wu Anning, Contributing Reporter Liu Xiaoyun
Soldiers of a brigade under the 82nd Group Army had just moved into a certain range when, before their supplies were even fully sorted, they received orders to immediately commence live-fire shooting training.
"Run through the difficult and dangerous subjects with live fire first, then target the problems for intensive, refined practice." The moment the new plan was issued, worry showed on the faces of many cadres and senior soldiers: "A lot of the troops are firing live rounds for the first time — safety isn't guaranteed." "Some subjects are highly difficult; going straight to live fire is too risky." … Amid the murmuring there was hesitation, there was fence-sitting, and above all there was anxiety about "being held responsible if something goes wrong."
"I've thought about it, and I've weighed it. But what undertaking comes without risk? Where under heaven is everything so smooth and steady, so plain sailing? Precisely because there is risk, there is all the more need for someone to step up." When the brigade commander leading the exercise learned that officers and soldiers were apprehensive, he immediately convened cadres and senior soldiers for a dedicated discussion. A few short sentences steadied everyone's nerves: "As long as we conduct meticulous checks and each person fulfills his responsibilities, we can reduce risk to the minimum. If someone really must be held accountable, I'll take it."
That resolve was not a moment of hot-headedness. It grew from a sense of urgency about longstanding deficiencies in the brigade's combat-capability building. The brigade is stationed in a location with particular constraints; training grounds are limited, and live-fire exercises with various types of heavy weapons cannot be conducted within the garrison area. In the past, the brigade used a method of "in-garrison simulation plus field insertion," squeezing live-fire shooting into the tactical training phase to get it done.
"The tactical training phase already has many subjects and tight time — inserting live-fire shooting on top of that has troops running day and night without stop, and the result is usually that neither side is trained deeply or practiced solidly." A brigade leader acknowledged candidly that the "debts" of skewed training (偏训) and missed training (漏训) kept accumulating, and the strange cycle of "repeating the first grade every year" was constraining the brigade's leap in combat capability.
At the beginning of this year, the brigade Party committee decisively broke the training-organization model that had been followed for many years. It proactively coordinated with training bases and neighboring units for range space, and more than a month before the start of tactical training, pulled eight types of heavy weapons and over a thousand officers and soldiers out to the field for concentrated training. The intent was clear: to pay back the "debts" of skewed and missed training, to fill in the "shortfalls" of difficult and dangerous subjects, and to eliminate the "hollow work" (虚功) in combat-capability building.
"Easy things, comfortable things — everyone can do those. What's left are the risky things, the hard bones that are difficult to chew. Those are what truly test a leading cadre's Party character and willingness to step up." Once thinking was unified, the brigade's officers and soldiers stopped looking left and right. Instead, with single-minded focus, they studied training methods, checked for hidden dangers, and drew up contingency plans, putting all their energy into resolving risks, ensuring safety, and improving quality and effectiveness.
The first live-fire exercise after moving in proceeded on schedule. That morning, the brigade commander leading the exercise brought cadres and senior soldiers two hours early to adjust security deployments, demonstrate artillery position construction, standardize firing actions, and fill sandbags to reinforce positions — leaving more time for officers and soldiers to practice technique and find their feel.
On the position, soldiers from every specialty raced against the clock to reinforce muscle memory: regulating breathing, acquiring targets, slowly squeezing the trigger … Everyone was firmly resolved: the range is the battlefield; if you can't hit the target, you can't defeat the enemy; only by treating training as actual combat can you maximize the destructive power of every shell that leaves the barrel.
By mid-morning, the sun was blazing, too bright to look at directly. Through binoculars, the range was fully laid out: long-distance ground-ring targets, elevation-and-depression-angle bunker targets, and concealed moving targets — all in place. These were the difficult and dangerous items that officers and soldiers "rarely see and rarely fire at" in ordinary times, and now they were right in front of them.
Just then, a gust of wind swept in carrying yellow sand, and the targets flickered in and out of view through the dust. Someone suggested waiting for the wind to die down before firing. "We don't wait!" the brigade commander leading the exercise said with iron finality. "Does the battlefield wait for the weather? Begin!"
"Boom — Boom —" Round after round of shells streaked toward their targets trailing flame. Every type of heavy weapon fired in turn; the range shook with the thunder of it, smoke and the smell of gunpowder filling the air.
When the smoke cleared, a set of figures was electrifying: the live-fire excellence rate for difficult and dangerous subjects across all weapons exceeded 80 percent.
That scorecard boosted morale and fighting spirit, and it also led officers and soldiers to a realization: as long as something benefits the improvement of combat capability, difficulties must not be avoided — act boldly, act resolutely. Dare to take on challenges, dare to step up and take responsibility, and you will surely reap results and make your mark on the journey of strengthening the military.
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The "Ideological Shockwave" of a Heavy Weapons Concentrated Training Exercise
■ PLA Daily Reporter Wu Anning, Contributing Reporter Liu Xiaoyun
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Why Heavy Weapons Training "Appears Every Year, Runs Up Debts Every Year"
A year ago, Private First Class Wang Jialong, a mortar gunner in a company of a brigade under the 82nd Group Army, could not have imagined he would qualify as a "First-Class Expert Marksman" (神炮手) so quickly.
"The military's assessment of 'Three Experts' (三手) — Expert Marksman (神枪手), Expert Cannoneer (神炮手), and Technical Specialist (技术能手) — follows a strict standard, and 'Expert Cannoneer' is the hardest: not only must professional skills be solid, but a first-round hit is mandatory." When Wang Jialong arrived at his company last year, second-class and above Expert Cannoneers across the entire battalion could be counted on one hand.
The change came from the brigade's heavy weapons concentrated training exercise. Many young soldiers like Wang Jialong emerged from it, and a cohort of "Expert Marksmen," "Expert Cannoneers," "Technical Specialists," and outstanding "Four-Capable" (四会) instructors sprang up like mushrooms after rain.
Previously, because training conditions at the garrison were limited and live-fire exercises with heavy weapons could not be conducted within the garrison area, the brigade could only insert live-fire subjects into the tactical training phase. But with too many subjects and too little time, training quality and effectiveness were compromised, and the problem of skewed and missed training was never fundamentally resolved.
At the year-end training review, the brigade had dozens of weakly-trained subjects, and several heavy weapons subjects were "on the agenda every year, running up debts every year."
"In the past, we also thought about solving the heavy weapons live-fire problem during the professional training phase, but the safety pressure was great, coordination was difficult, and organizational risks were many. Everyone was afraid of accidents, and we never managed to make up our minds." Staff Officer Zhu of the Operations and Training Section was blunt: "Organizing a concentrated live-fire exercise for heavy weapons means the lead officer takes on enormous risk …"
For the brigade, a genuine dilemma stood squarely before them: among the members of the Party committee standing committee, half had been in post for less than a year, and the other half were approaching the end of their terms and facing reassignment. Both groups were at a "critical juncture." Playing it safe seemed like the most "secure" choice.
But this year, the "box" that everyone had tacitly accepted was broken open by the brigade Party committee itself. At the year-opening conference on war-fighting and training (议战议训会), the problem of skewed and missed training was placed on the table, and the standing committee members' remarks carried a sharp edge:
"On the battlefield, can we really rely on one or two Expert Marksmen and Expert Cannoneers to win everything? Wait this year for next year, wait next year for the year after — when will the problem ever be solved?"
"Behind these weakly-trained subjects there are genuine objective difficulties. Many of the problems cannot be solved at the brigade level. We might as well report them up and let higher authorities make unified arrangements."
"If everyone finds objective excuses, what do we need leading cadres for?"
"Grasping realistic combat training means you cannot be afraid of risk or responsibility. There is no such thing as a personal 'critical juncture.' When you get down to it, this is a distorted view of political achievement (政绩观) — seeking stability and fearing mistakes, content with the status quo, unwilling to step up or take responsibility!"
In the end, the Party committee standing committee unified its thinking and made up its mind: stop waiting and stop relying on others. Proactively coordinate range space and organize a heavy weapons live-fire concentrated training exercise in advance to fill in the weak-training shortfalls and build up the "Three Experts" ranks.
After intensive preparation and coordination on multiple fronts, a concentrated training exercise covering eight heavy weapons specialties, lasting more than a month, got underway.
"This exercise had quite a few 'unexpected surprises.'" A brigade leader told the reporter: "In the past we always fell into a misconception — thinking that only 'good seedlings' could be cultivated into Expert Marksmen and Expert Cannoneers. This exercise proved that with scientific training organization and careful cultivation, every soldier is a thoroughbred."
The reporter leafed through the training-results registers of various battalions and companies: dense annotations in different colors, many figures precise to two decimal places. The excellence rate for multiple professional subjects reached 100 percent; the excellence rate for one type of weapon improved by nearly 50 percent compared with previous years; and the number of personnel passing second-class and above "Three Experts" assessments jumped from single digits to more than ten.
"The deeper training goes, the more you realize how much potential the soldiers have," Staff Officer Zhu reflected. "At this rate, within three years the proportion of 'Three Experts' in each company will grow substantially."
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"Once the Unnecessary Procedures Were Streamlined, There Was Much More Time to Actually Build Skills"
Halfway through the exercise, Staff Officer Chen of the Combat Support Section noticed a "strange" phenomenon: of the three boxes of printing paper brought at the outset, less than half a box had been used.
"We originally brought it to print all kinds of meeting materials, but as it turned out, very few meetings were held during this exercise." With less time spent in meetings, more time was available for training. Staff Officer Chen counted on his fingers: eight training teams with mixed unit compositions, from moving into position to setting up camp, took only three days — cutting the original planned time exactly in half.
Throughout this exercise, from site reconnaissance to unit entry, many matters that previously required layer-upon-layer requests for approval were now decided on the spot by the leading officers, who took responsibility themselves — saving the grassroots units a great deal of "back-and-forth running."
"No matter how many meetings you hold or how well the materials are written, nothing beats teaching hands-on, one time through. When leaders lead by doing it once themselves, battalion and company commanders naturally get it." A brigade leader acknowledged this was his experience from years of leading troops, and the most effective method: "Leading means leading everyone in doing the work — not standing in the back playing the hands-off boss."
From day-to-day management to planning and organization, from range setup to training instruction, several brigade leaders were present at the front line throughout, breaking down problems on the spot and resolving contradictions on the spot.
"The leaders kept saying that if problems arose, they would bear the responsibility, and told us to focus single-mindedly on training and honing our skills." The words of participating officers and soldiers captured the most distinctive feature of this exercise.
"Many battalion and company commanders had only recently taken up their posts and lacked experience in organizing training. Organizing this exercise was both a chance to practice professional skills and a chance to teach training-organization methods." A brigade leader explained.
"Company Commander Zhao, have the safety officer pay close attention to position five. His last round's point of impact was low — check whether it's a scope mil-dot problem or a gunner technique problem." Live-fire training for a certain type of weapon was underway, and the brigade commander leading the exercise was not sitting in the command post. One moment he was in the standby area checking each shooter's preparation one by one; the next he was at the firing position conducting on-site instruction, and when explaining key and difficult points of operation, he stepped in directly to demonstrate.
"Since this is real training with real rounds, every shell must produce maximum effect. All parameters and operational essentials must be burned into officers' and soldiers' minds before they fire." Speaking of the first-round firing of a certain type of weapon, this leader knew every detail: "For all weapons and equipment, we require cadres and senior soldiers to learn first, practice first, and fire first. Only when your own technique is solid do you have the standing to lead soldiers."
This principle was fully borne out in the training arrangements. From brigade leaders down to battalion and company commanders, all led by firing first, with scores announced on the spot. Before live-fire training, all personnel had to complete solid theoretical study, simulation training, and operational reinforcement. Many detail problems that had been overlooked in the past were identified and corrected on the spot by on-site commanders, and training precision improved substantially.
For a certain newly-fielded individual weapon, many soldiers were firing live rounds for the first time — yet every single one achieved a first-round hit. Looking at the scorecard, officers and soldiers could not conceal their excitement, and their confidence in the training methods of this period grew even stronger.
"My biggest takeaway is that the new equipment's performance is one factor, but more importantly, this exercise streamlined all the unnecessary procedures, so there was much more time to actually build skills." A platoon leader explained the reason for the improvement this way: "From officers to soldiers, everyone's progress is visible and tangible."
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All Participating Personnel Received a "Homework Assignment"
The heavy weapons concentrated training had just ended when Staff Officer Zhu received a new task: systematically organize the eight major categories of dozens of lesson plans produced during the exercise and compile them into a standardized set of results.
"Lesson plans and instructors are important carriers for the transmission of combat capability — especially mature experience validated by live-fire data. Consolidating that is foundational work with long-term benefits." Staff Officer Zhu explained that over the years, equipment has been updated and iterated rapidly, combat styles have changed greatly, and many lesson plans are still the "old almanac" from years ago, with some content no longer suited to the performance of new equipment or new training requirements.
As early as the planning stage of the exercise, the brigade Party committee had resolved to seize this opportunity to conduct a comprehensive revision of training methods and lesson plans for each type of weapon, led by brigade leaders.
Opening the lesson plan for a certain type of grenade launcher, the margins are filled with handwritten annotations, old and new layers of ink overlapping. "Revising lesson plans is slow work. Every piece of experience must be supported by live-fire data, and it takes several successive cohorts of officers and soldiers working in relay to refine it, adding firing parameters for different weather conditions and different terrain." A brigade leader said: "Combat-capability building is a relay race. You cannot only look at the 'target' in front of you — you must keep the long term in view."
Not long ago, Private Hong Jingguo put in extra hours to complete a special "homework assignment."
As the "rising star" who achieved excellence in every subject of the exercise, he worked under the guidance of senior soldiers and, drawing on his own live-fire experience, completed the drafting of a single-subject lesson plan.
Writing lesson plans used to be the work of officers and senior instructors. Why involve a private who was firing live rounds for the first time?
"For combat-capability building to advance steadily and go far, a talent pipeline with a reasonable gradient must be cultivated. Experience can be written on paper, but in the end it is individual people who go to the battlefield." A brigade leader's words revealed the thinking behind the decision.
"It wasn't just him — quite a few participating personnel had this 'homework assignment.'" Staff Officer Zhu told the reporter that among the participating officers and soldiers, more than one-third were newcomers like Hong Jingguo who had never fired live rounds before. Brigade leaders specifically required every person to participate in drafting one subject's lesson plan.
"The military is an iron camp with a flowing stream of soldiers. If we don't work hard to cultivate new backbone personnel this year, when the old backbone soldiers leave the service in the next year or two, won't the talent pipeline run dry?" The brigade leader explained: "Through drafting lesson plans, we can not only help officers and soldiers consolidate and summarize their insights from live-fire shooting, but also identify backbone 'seedlings' for focused cultivation going forward."
Cultivating backbone personnel often cannot show results within a single leader's tenure — it requires the sustained effort of several successive cohorts. In this exercise, they identified many promising seedlings among the enlisted soldiers.
Not long ago, a complete set of training-organization procedures developed from this exercise's summary was distributed to all battalion and company commanders. The plan lays out a checklist, covering every link from range setup and organizational implementation to data compilation, with standards, procedures, and methods for each step — providing battalion and company units with an "operations manual" for independent training organization.
"In the future, no matter who is in charge of training, if they follow this proven approach, combat capability will continue to improve." A brigade leader said.
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The More You Encounter Difficulties and Contradictions, the Less You Can Walk Around Them
— The Barracks Observation Section Editor in Dialogue with the Chief of Staff of a Brigade under the 82nd Group Army
The military exists to prepare for war. All work must uphold the combat-capability standard and focus on being able to fight and win battles. The brigade Party committee of a brigade under the 82nd Group Army confronted shortfalls in combat-capability building, refused to avoid hard issues, dared to step up, and conducted solid heavy weapons live-fire concentrated training — a vivid practice of the current military-wide deepening of political rectification (政治整训) and the establishment and practice of a correct view of political achievement (政绩观). This section's editor spoke with the brigade's chief of staff on topics related to combat-capability building.
Editor: Organizing live-fire training immediately upon arrival carries especially high risk. Why did the brigade Party committee resolve to chew on this hard bone?
Chief of Staff: The reasons behind weakly-trained subjects are complex, but "it is a lifelong shame for an official to avoid hard issues" — the more you encounter difficulties and contradictions, the less you can walk around them. Otherwise, how do you build troops that dare to fight and are certain to win? The military exists for war. Leading cadres must be willing to bear responsibility. Only when we leading cadres dare to charge forward and lead from the front will the troops we produce have fighting spirit and ferocity.
Editor: How do you understand the saying "success need not be achieved by me, but success must have my contribution" (功成不必在我，功成必定有我)?
Chief of Staff: Our brigade is a heroic unit with glorious traditions. Today's achievements and honors are not the credit of any one standing committee or any one individual — they were hammered out, nail by nail, by generation after generation of officers and soldiers. We never pursue individual heroism; we pursue collective heroism. As long as something benefits the brigade's long-term development, even if the results only become visible after one's tenure, you must throw yourself into it and do it solidly. Combat-capability building is like a relay race — you must run it baton by baton, and every person must run their own leg well.
Editor: After this heavy weapons concentrated training exercise, what is the most visible change in the brigade's combat-capability building?
Chief of Staff: The effects are, I would say, comprehensive. The effect of live-fire shooting training on officers' and soldiers' technical and tactical improvement is something simulation training can never replace. The two most direct changes are these: first, the numbers of Expert Marksmen, Expert Cannoneers, and Technical Specialists at every level have grown substantially, and the foundation of the talent pipeline is now much stronger; second, command echelons have been compressed — brigade leaders directly mentored battalions and companies, and the training-organization capability of front-line commanders has been concretely improved. The key to building the force lies at the grassroots. When grassroots commanders are capable, the overall training level of the force naturally rises.