Garrison Observer | "Defeat Log": A Clear-Eyed Transparency
From "Covering Up Scars" to "Setting Up Targets"
■ Yang Yang, Zhou Yiren; PLA Daily Special Correspondent Wang Da
Deep in the jungle, a red-versus-blue confrontation exercise at a certain detachment of the People's Armed Police Zhejiang General Corps was in full swing. The blue force used electromagnetic jamming to sever the red force's communications links, instantly rendering the command post "deaf." Orders could not be issued, and forward elements fell into chaos. Nearly 20 minutes of communications blackout directly caused the red force's defeat.
At the after-action review, the company commander of a certain company in the detachment, Li Hong, did not rush to explain himself, nor did he criticize or blame anyone. He wrote in his notebook: "Defeat Entry No. 1: Weak anti-jamming capability in communications; emergency backup measures absent."
After the meeting, Li Hong tore out that page, walked straight to the bulletin board in the garrison hall, and posted it there, adding a line of prominent text: "Today's defeat is tomorrow's teacher."
"In the past, this kind of mistake would be handled internally and would never be reported up the chain in full — isn't this just airing our dirty laundry?" some soldiers muttered privately. Li Hong was resolute: "Hide it and cover it up, and tomorrow you'll stumble again!"
The news spread quickly through the detachment. Reactions among officers and soldiers varied: some were impressed, some took a wait-and-see attitude, and some were worried — would doing this affect the unit's chances of being commended? Would it make superiors think they were incompetent?
But Li Hong had his own accounting. "Over the years, as the intensity of combat-realistic training (实战化训练) has grown and new equipment has been fielded at an ever-faster pace, some problems recur year after year. The root cause is a lack of the courage to confront failure." He said frankly: "The defeat itself is not frightening. What is frightening is covering it up, allowing it to eventually develop into a greater hidden danger."
This publicly posted "Defeat Log" quickly caught the attention of Staff Section Chief Liu of the detachment's operations and training section. He photographed the entire list and brought it to a "Company Commanders' Forum" activity, with a clear purpose — good practices worth promoting across the entire detachment.
Skeptical voices followed: "Commendations and awards are based on achievements and honors. If you make failures public, what will superiors think when they see it? Will the career advancement of those 'named on the list' be blocked?"
Company Commander Wan of a certain company was the first to step up and share his personal experience: in a multi-element coordinated exercise, his command error caused a vehicle crew's position to be exposed, and the mission was judged a failure. Per regulations, this defeat should be recorded and its causes analyzed. He hesitated for an entire day, for a simple reason: "If this gets out, where does the company's face go?"
Voices of support were equally forceful: "Every after-action review dissects problems with great clarity, but nothing comes of it afterward. The next time a similar problem arises, we're still at a loss. On the battlefield, will the enemy give us a second chance? If we don't 'log and close out' our defeats, the lessons will forever remain at the level of lip service."
Immediately after, Company Commander Wang of another company shared a positive example: in a recent comprehensive exercise, scouts failed to accurately track the "enemy's" movements in adverse weather, causing the operation to fail. As soon as the exercise ended, Commander Wang immediately surfaced the problem and organized officers and soldiers to pool their ideas, ultimately producing a complete set of operational contingency plans for different weather conditions, thoroughly plugging the gap.
The debate lasted nearly an hour.
"A defeat is not a scar — it's a target! Fear losing face, and sooner or later you'll lose your substance!" In the end, the detachment's leadership delivered a definitive ruling: "Implement it! But the rules must be clear — which defeats must be recorded, how they are recorded, how they are rectified, and who conducts acceptance verification. Everyone must know where they stand."
Within a few days, a prominent "Defeat Log" bulletin board was erected at the entrance to the detachment headquarters hall. And so this mechanism was rolled out across the entire detachment.
Li Hong took the lead in posting three additional problems exposed during the confrontation exercise: coordination breakdown, command lag, and support failure. After each problem, rectification measures and completion deadlines were clearly marked.
Company Commander Wan also listed in detail four shortfalls in his own command capabilities, and drafted a specific study plan and phased assessment scheme.
"From today on, we're getting serious about our problems!" The two company commanders looked at each other and smiled.
Today, the "Defeat Log" bulletin board has become a focal point of attention for officers and soldiers throughout the detachment. From communications blackouts to tactical errors, from equipment failures to command blind spots, problems of all kinds are analyzed and recorded in detail. The log is by no means a matter of "record it and forget it" — the detachment's training supervision team conducts a unit-by-unit, item-by-item review of rectification progress at the end of each month. Once an item meets the standard, it is closed out.
Officers and soldiers are often gathered in front of the bulletin board, discussing. Everyone compares the list against their own unit's problems and draws on the experience of sister units. Squad Leader Jiang Yucheng of a certain company told this reporter that his unit was once "listed" for equipment failures caused by inadequate maintenance. During the rectification period, the company not only improved its maintenance procedures but also organized cross-position operational training. "Equipment readiness rates have improved significantly. In the past, we always wanted to 'turn the page.' Now everyone looks forward to problems being ferreted out and thoroughly resolved!" said Jiang Yucheng.
From "covering up scars" to "setting up targets," what has changed is not only the attitude toward training, but the entire unit's conception of performance (政绩观). In the past, some units simplistically treated "zero problems" as an achievement, fearing that exposing shortcomings would affect commendations. Now, genuine achievement is reflected not only on the trophy board but on the training ground where soldiers are prepared for war. Officers and soldiers say that daring to expose defeats and getting serious about problems is what it means to be responsible for winning.
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"Defeat Log": A Clear-Eyed Transparency
■ Yang Yang, Xu Fuze; PLA Daily Special Correspondent Wang Da
A certain detachment of the People's Armed Police Zhejiang General Corps organizes its engineer and chemical defense elements to conduct simulated rescue operations. Photo by Yao Zhixiang.
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From "Concealing Illness and Avoiding Treatment (讳疾忌医)" to "Daring to Expose Shortcomings" —
The "Defeat Log" records the "abnormal indicators" of combat effectiveness; its significance lies in pointing the direction for focused effort.
In summer, Staff Section Chief Liu of a certain detachment of the People's Armed Police Zhejiang General Corps paid a follow-up visit to the grassroots level, his gaze habitually drawn to the "Defeat Log" public display wall. The list that had contained only six lines three months ago now had 48 entries recorded in dense text, 35 of which had been crossed out — beside each record were before-and-after comparison data and on-site photographs. Old entries were barely closed before new ones were added. Watching the lively scene of officers and soldiers crowding around the display wall to voluntarily "expose shortcomings" and discuss rectification plans, he could not help but recall the resistance encountered when the "Defeat Log" was first introduced.
When the detachment Party committee decided to roll out the "Defeat Log" across the entire detachment, discussion at the grassroots level was rife.
Behind this lay a widespread misconception — equating "defeat" with "blemish."
"Everyone had misgivings," admitted Director Lu of the detachment's political work office. "They feared affecting the unit's image, feared superiors questioning their capabilities, feared it would affect commendations and awards."
Faced with skepticism and misgivings, the detachment Party committee did not rush to rebut. Instead, it decided to "lay the issues out in the open." At a dedicated question-and-answer session, the detachment's leadership offered an analogy: "A medical examination report that flags abnormal indicators doesn't lead anyone to conclude the patient is unhealthy just because a few arrows appear. The 'Defeat Log' records the 'abnormal indicators' of combat effectiveness; its significance lies in pointing the direction for focused effort."
To put officers and soldiers at ease, the headquarters simultaneously issued three supplementary regulations: First, defeats that are proactively reported and rectified will not be entered into personal files and will not affect commendations or awards; concealment will be subject to serious accountability. Second, each defeat entry must be closed out within 45 days; after closure, it is transferred to training archives for reference and is no longer publicly displayed. Third, a closed-loop management system of "discovery, recording, rectification, acceptance verification, and accountability" is implemented, with no "filtering mechanism" and no "self-inspection and self-verification."
Looking closely at the "Defeat Log," it specifies only six elements: problem description, rectification measures, completion deadline, responsible party, acceptance standard, and remarks. There is no vague "the company bears overall responsibility," no sweeping "improvements to be made going forward" — only specific details: who rectifies it, when, to what standard, and who verifies it.
From "concealing illness and avoiding treatment" to "daring to expose shortcomings" — a thin sheet of paper records the transformation in officers' and soldiers' thinking.
Corporal Yang Zijie of a certain company felt this deeply. During one assessment, his exploration of a new algorithm caused information overload, affecting overall communications connectivity. He expected to be criticized, but when the operations and training section learned of it, rather than holding him accountable, they immediately refined the guidelines: clearly distinguishing between "accountability-type defeats (责任性败绩)" and "exploratory defeats (探索性败绩)." Failures resulting from challenging high-difficulty tasks or exploring new methods of warfare are noted as "exploratory defeats" when recorded — no accountability, no disciplinary action. This regulation acted like a key, unlocking the lock in officers' and soldiers' hearts.
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From "Concealment" to "Proactive Mine-Clearing" —
If hidden problems are not promptly identified and corrected, they are like submerged reefs that will ultimately sink the ship.
Once the ideological barrier was crossed, the inertia of old behavior remained.
In Staff Officer Qian's metal cabinet in the operations and training section, more than ten old ledgers were locked away. Leafing through them, every page looked pristine — but he knew in his heart that some of those numbers were merely a coat of fine paint, beneath which lay corrosion.
In the past, officers and soldiers tacitly observed an unspoken "survival code": when inspections came, always say "no problems"; when organizing training, always choose the easiest tasks; when it came to innovation, wait for "guidance from above." Anyone who dared to raise problems was, at best, criticized for "lacking perspective," and at worst, suspected of "being incompetent."
In the early stages of exploring the "Defeat Log," every unit's list was blank. Staff Officer Qian called each company one by one to ask, and received a strikingly uniform answer: "Our company has no problems!"
If hidden problems are not promptly identified and corrected, they are like submerged reefs that will ultimately sink the ship. The detachment Party committee resolved to further refine the list's content: first, "proactively exposing problems" was changed from a deduction item to a credit item, with positive incentives in annual assessments upon verification. Second, a "defeat-sharing" mechanism was established: when one company exposes a problem, the entire detachment conducts a corresponding self-inspection, and rectification experience can be directly referenced.
This measure took effect quickly. One company entered "worn buckles on night-training equipment" into the log; the logistics section immediately inspected the same type of equipment across the entire detachment, replaced them uniformly, and averted a potential hazard.
Company Commander Jiang of a certain company was the last in the entire detachment to fill in the log. He was convinced his company had "absolutely no defeats." The secret was simple — lower the difficulty.
Until one live-fire shooting adjustment request was rejected by the training supervision team, and the record was faithfully entered onto the detachment's "Defeat Log": "Long-term practice of lowering difficulty to ensure safety; combat effectiveness development progress is lagging."
That evening, Company Commander Jiang shut himself in the conference room. Keeping him company on the wall were two "Safety Excellence Unit" plaques.
The transformation came on a rainy night. This time, Commander Jiang did not apply to adjust the training plan. Officers and soldiers dropped to the ground and crawled through mud and water. Some stumbled, some scraped their skin — but not one stopped.
Standing in the rain, Commander Jiang suddenly felt that the "safety" of the past had in fact been a form of laziness.
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From "Pass or Fail" to "Truly Hardened or Not" —
Before, "good enough" was enough; now they understand that "good enough" means "not good enough."
When the "Defeat Log" first went up on the wall, officers and soldiers of a certain battalion would instinctively lower their heads as they passed the display board. Battalion Commander Dong felt the most pressure — he had the most defeat entries under his name: wrong route selection for hot-meal forward delivery, exceeding the time limit for directing field vehicle park tent erection, ineffective construction of perimeter fortifications… Some issues that had previously been regarded as "not a big deal," once written in black and white on the list, weighed as heavy as a thousand pounds.
At one point, the detachment Party committee had debated internally: would making the list public dampen everyone's enthusiasm? After discussion, the detachment's leadership said: "If we don't even have the courage to confront problems directly, how can we talk about fighting?"
At one after-action review, officers and soldiers habitually attributed problems to "weather," "equipment," and "terrain." But Battalion Commander Dong suddenly spoke up: "Stop deflecting responsibility. We didn't think things through. Write it down, put it on the list!" In that moment, he completed the transition from "fearing problems" to "seeking out problems." He later summarized: once a problem has gone through the closed loop of recording, rectification, and closure, a defeat becomes a catalyst for a leap in capability.
Private First Class Tang Jinquan had a catchphrase: "Good enough is good enough." In every training subject assessment, he aimed only to clear the "passing line." This "long live the passing grade" mentality was not uncommon at the grassroots level. After investigation, the detachment Party committee concluded that the root cause lay in the evaluation standard — asking only "pass or fail," not "truly hardened or not."
To address this, the "Defeat Log" added a "progress margin evaluation" mechanism, looking not only at absolute scores but also at incremental improvement.
One day, a new entry appeared on the "Defeat Log" concerning Tang Jinquan's squad: squad tactical coordination was insufficiently tight, with a time 8 seconds slower than the excellence standard. Tang Jinquan was unconvinced: "It's only 8 seconds — what does it matter?"
The company political instructor standing nearby said nothing. The next day, during political education class, he played a clip of real battlefield footage: due to coordination that was off by a few seconds, a platoon was caught under enemy fire and wiped out to the last man.
"A few short seconds, and an entire platoon was lost!"
The instructor's words burned into Tang Jinquan's heart like a branding iron. Over the following week, he and his comrades gave their full effort to coordination. At the next assessment, their score surpassed the excellence standard by 4 seconds.
On the day the problem was closed out, Tang Jinquan voluntarily signed his name: "Before, 'good enough' was enough. Now I understand that 'good enough' means 'not good enough'!"
The change spread throughout the entire company. First Squad raised its shooting target from "qualified" to "excellent"; Fifth Squad changed its equipment maintenance target from "on time" to "zero faults"…
Today, each unit's "Defeat Log" continues to be updated dynamically. Every crossed-out line on the list bears witness to the stumbles this force has taken, and marks the coordinates of their determined pursuit of improvement on the road to victory.
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Hiding and Covering Up: Small Problems Will Eventually Become Major Hazards
■ Li Hong
After that confrontation exercise defeat, I overrode dissenting opinions and posted the "Defeat Log" on the bulletin board. The moment I put it up, my own heart was pounding.
Once the "Defeat Log" was made public, the rapid response from headquarters surprised me considerably. That same day, the signals section called to ask in detail whether there were any technical bottlenecks or practical difficulties. Immediately after, the signals, operations and training, and logistics sections each dispatched key personnel to the company to provide technical support, going through the list item by item, assisting on-site in identifying root causes and drafting countermeasures.
An even more gratifying change occurred on the training ground. The mentality of lowering difficulty to get passing scores and save face had become nearly impossible to find. A clear orientation took hold across the detachment: encourage exploration and innovation, challenge high-difficulty subjects — even a defeat in a confrontation exercise is evaluated far more favorably than a "false victory" achieved at low difficulty.
At after-action reviews, the old habit of emphasizing objective reasons disappeared, replaced by proactive assumption of responsibility: "What is my responsibility?" When problems arise, there is no longer hesitation over "whether to report it" — instead, it is proactively recorded and entered on the list. A consensus has taken root among officers and soldiers: bring problems into the open, and everyone works together to solve them; hide and cover them up, and small problems will eventually become major hazards.
The old practice of "reporting good news but not bad news" may appear to protect the unit's image on the surface, but in reality it erodes the foundation of combat effectiveness. Fear of exposing problems inevitably leads to skirting around contradictions; unwillingness to own defeats inevitably lowers training standards; fear of affecting commendations inevitably produces satisfaction with "good enough" rather than "truly hardened." This is not building achievement — it is squandering the odds of victory on tomorrow's battlefield!
Not long ago, the company participated in a confrontation exercise again. We developed multiple contingency plans targeting the shortfalls exposed earlier, prepared sufficient countermeasures, and even proactively requested that the "blue force" increase jamming intensity. Although we achieved victory, at the after-action review I still solemnly listed several "defeats" based on new problems discovered during the exercise.
Someone asked me: you won, and you're still listing defeats — isn't that being too exacting? I said: there is no perfect victory on the battlefield, only continuous improvement. Gaps concealed by today's victory, left unresolved, may become the reason for tomorrow's defeat! Resolve one more problem in peacetime, and you face one less setback in wartime.
Several months have passed. Entries on the list are continuously being "closed out," and new problems are being recorded in a timely manner. The list grows thinner and thinner, but our confidence grows stronger and stronger. I have come to deeply understand: a force that dares to expose its defeats and has the courage to revolutionize itself is a force with true strength, true promise, and the ability to win.
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Garrison Observer Section Editor in Dialogue with the Commander of a Certain Detachment of the People's Armed Police Zhejiang General Corps ——
Calibrating the Combat Effectiveness Yardstick
A "Defeat Log" that confronts problems directly reflects not only shortfalls and weaknesses, but also serves as a "barometer" of a unit's conception of performance (政绩观). When "zero problems" is simplistically treated as an achievement and "not daring to try" is one-sidedly regarded as prudence, combat effectiveness may erode amid a false prosperity. In response to this phenomenon, the Garrison Observer section editor conducted a dialogue with the commander of a certain detachment of the People's Armed Police Zhejiang General Corps.
Editor: Some argue that the "Defeat Log" is airing dirty laundry and damages the unit's image. What is the internal connection between this concern and one's conception of performance?
Detachment Commander: The core of one's conception of performance lies in answering the question: "What constitutes genuine achievement?" If one treats avoiding incidents, avoiding embarrassment, and avoiding criticism as achievement, then concealing problems and evading contradictions becomes an "instinctive choice." The military exists to fight — whether it can win is the fundamental yardstick for measuring a soldier's achievement! By this yardstick, the longer training shortfalls are covered up, the deeper the hidden dangers are buried, and the further one drifts from the goal of winning. The "Defeat Log" is absolutely not airing dirty laundry — it is a self-revolution and self-improvement with the blade turned inward (刀刃向内). It tells us: a unit's good image is not the gloss on a report form, but the courage and commitment to confront problems directly and to cut out the bone to cure the disease (刮骨疗毒).
Editor: Drawing broader lessons from the "Defeat Log," what other changes has establishing a correct conception of performance brought about?
Detachment Commander: Establishing a correct conception of performance requires first answering the questions: "For whom is achievement built, what kind of achievement, and by what means?" Combat effectiveness is the sole and fundamental standard. Deviate one inch in one's conception of performance, and implementation of work will deviate one foot. Today, the evaluation orientation no longer simply judges by "whether there are problems," but by "whether one dares to face problems and is good at solving them." On the training ground, the "scripted" exercises staged in the past to protect "face" and avoid exposing problems have diminished; proactively setting up difficult and dangerous scenarios and treating every confrontation as a "rehearsal" for actual combat have increased. The atmosphere of getting serious, getting tough, and proactively exposing combat effectiveness shortfalls has grown stronger; the phenomenon of concealment and of concealing illness and avoiding treatment has diminished. This transformation is a vivid embodiment of focusing on actual combat and exerting effort toward winning.
Editor: Establishing a correct conception of performance is not the work of a moment — it requires sustained, long-term effort. To fundamentally rectify officers' and soldiers' conception of performance, in what areas do you plan to concentrate effort going forward?
Detachment Commander: The key lies in properly handling the dialectical relationship between "visible achievement (显绩)" and "latent achievement (潜绩)." We must have the courage to work hard and sustain effort on "latent achievement" — accurately identifying and thoroughly analyzing every shortfall exposed in training, digging deep to the root cause behind every "defeat" entry, and repeatedly tempering every weakness until it is truly hardened. Only when the latent work is done sufficiently will visible achievement follow naturally; only when latent achievement is solidly built will visible achievement be sustainable over the long term. This requires leaders at every level to abandon the pursuit of quick results and instant success, and with the spirit of "success need not be credited to me" and the commitment of "success must have my contribution," to focus steadily on building the grassroots and laying foundations, advancing combat effectiveness step by step, and accumulating strength for victory on the battlefield.