Focusing on Improving Inspection and Supervision Work Methods: What Lessons Can Be Drawn from These Two Units
Inspection and supervision is an important means by which higher headquarters guide and assist the building of grassroots units and advance the implementation of grassroots work. However, in practice, because a small number of headquarters cadres hold muddled views and maintain an unreliable work style, inspection and supervision becomes distorted and goes off course—not only failing to help grassroots units identify and resolve problems, but also disrupting the normal order of grassroots units. This issue's "Special Focus" centers on the experiences of a certain regiment of the Xinjiang Military District and a certain brigade of the Eastern Theater Command Navy in improving their inspection and supervision work methods, in the hope of offering readers some reflection and insight.
—The Editors
Certain Regiment of the Xinjiang Military District——
Inspection and Supervision: Listen More to What the Grassroots Has to Say
■ Gao Chuanshuo, Teng Yufei
"According to the plan, shouldn't specialized skills training be organized at this time?" Some time ago, headquarters cadres from a certain regiment of the Xinjiang Military District went to grassroots units to conduct inspection and supervision. Checking against the training weekly schedule, they found that the 7th Red Company was conducting physical fitness training during the time slot designated for specialized skills training, and accordingly concluded that the company's training ethos was unreliable and that it was not organizing training according to plan.
However, the company had good reason for doing so: the field training site where they were stationed was located deep in the Karakoram range between two mountains, at an altitude of over 5,100 meters, with complex and changeable weather conditions that easily affected outdoor training subjects such as physical fitness training. Initially, they attempted to move training to a sunroom, but the indoor space was limited and some training items still could not be conducted; over time, the personnel's training scores declined noticeably. After some deliberation, the company therefore decided to adapt to local conditions and adjust training content at any time based on weather.
Just before the headquarters inspection team arrived, the company had swapped the scheduled times for physical fitness training and specialized skills training due to weather conditions—and was caught in the act.
What was in fact a pragmatic measure adapted to local conditions was about to result in a public criticism notice. Company Commander Zhao was filled with bitterness. He watched the headquarters inspection team gradually recede into the distance, his hand gripping the training weekly schedule alternately loosening and tightening, until finally he could only heave a long sigh.
At the subsequent two-way review meeting between headquarters and grassroots units, Company Commander Zhao recounted the experience: "We did not fully follow the training weekly schedule, but we only adjusted the time sequence in which the various training subjects were conducted—we absolutely did not engage in skewed or missed training. This was something we were compelled to do by objective factors. It is beyond reproach for headquarters to act by the book, but one cannot be overly doctrinaire and rigid; when pointing out problems, one must also consider the actual circumstances of the grassroots units…"
Company Commander Zhao's remarks resonated with the soldier representatives present. Some said that in plateau areas the climate can differ greatly within just a few kilometers, and that when the company considered adjusting uniforms based on actual conditions, it was publicly criticized by headquarters for "failing to wear uniforms uniformly as required." Others frankly stated that when a sudden family crisis arose, they obtained company approval to receive a mobile phone to contact family members, only to be criticized by headquarters for "unauthorized use of a mobile phone"…
Company Political Instructor Wang also recounted his own experience: during an inspection and supervision visit, headquarters found that some oxygen cylinders were empty and therefore concluded that the company had "inadequate support and was not thoroughly implementing the oxygen-refilling system." However, this was because the company had suffered a sudden electrical fault the previous evening, rendering the oxygen generators equipped to some squads and platoons inoperable, leaving personnel with no choice but to use the oxygen cylinders.
"When the oxygen generators cannot be used, isn't using oxygen cylinders for support precisely what oxygen cylinders are for? Surely we shouldn't, for the sake of passing inspection, leave the oxygen cylinders sitting on a shelf and make the soldiers tough it out? Before headquarters reaches a conclusion, shouldn't it first understand the relevant circumstances, or at least give the grassroots unit an opportunity to explain?" Political Instructor Wang's questions left more than a few of the headquarters cadres present flushed with embarrassment.
After a long silence, Section Chief Fan of the troop management section took the lead in self-reflection: "The purpose of headquarters inspection and supervision is to rectify problems and standardize development—not to issue public criticism notices for the sake of issuing public criticism notices. There is nothing wrong with grassroots units making reasonable adjustments based on actual circumstances; we truly should not generalize from one instance."
Headquarters personnel then engaged in reflection one after another, clarifying that compliance of ledgers and synchronization of plans should not be the sole standard for measuring work, recognizing that methods such as checking for problems through a screen and making judgments by mechanically copying regulations are manifestations of being divorced from grassroots realities, and determining that these must be rectified.
After the meeting, the regiment routinely carried out embedded assistance (蹲点帮带), selecting headquarters cadres to be stationed permanently at grassroots sites, transforming "door-to-door supervision and inspection" into "embedded point assistance," helping headquarters cadres abandon "office thinking" and "one-size-fits-all modes," and genuinely going into the grassroots to understand actual conditions and confront contradictions and problems head-on. To improve the quality and effectiveness of inspection, supervision, and guidance work, they also established a fault-tolerance and error-correction mechanism that distinguishes whether the cause of a problem is subjective dereliction of duty and responsibility or objective constraints; for problems of an incipient or tendential nature, or problems caused by objective reasons, the emphasis is on on-site reminders, immediate correction, and guidance toward standardization, with excessive public criticism notices and repeated accountability strictly prohibited.
In addition, the regiment opened up channels for grassroots feedback, established a commander's mailbox, and routinely collected grassroots difficulties, personnel demands, and work suggestions, creating reverse pressure on headquarters to firmly establish a service-to-the-grassroots mindset, improve work methods, and transform work style.
In recent days, the regiment's troop management section has taken the lead in coordinating with various functional sections to investigate and identify construction difficulties at field training sites, and has compiled a list of difficulties to be resolved and a list of time-limited rectification and assistance responsibilities, receiving favorable reviews from the grassroots.
Certain Brigade of the Eastern Theater Command Navy——
Public Criticism Notices: Don't Jump to Conclusions Lightly and Carelessly
■ Pan Wei, Wang Yinyin, Dong Shizhao
"Time was pressing and the inventory and registration of supplies was still in progress—surely that's no basis for concluding that we had 'slack thinking' and a 'loose work style'? Our company commander only wanted to explain the specific circumstances, yet that became 'an improper attitude'…" In the height of summer, when the leadership of a certain brigade of the Eastern Theater Command Navy went to the grassroots to conduct research, a recounted experience by Second-Class Staff Sergeant Yang Gang of a certain company drew their attention.
Previously, the brigade's headquarters inspection team had gone to a field training site to conduct inspection and supervision. Because the company's personnel had only recently moved into the site and some work was still in progress, there were some lapses in internal affairs standards and the implementation of regulations, which the inspection personnel recorded. Company Commander Chen had wanted to offer an explanation, but was seen as making excuses, and the company was criticized for "slack thinking and loose work style among personnel during field training, and an improper rectification attitude on the part of the unit's cadres."
"We did indeed have a problem with inadequate inventory and registration of supplies at the time, but that is a completely different matter from having problems with thinking and work style." Yang Gang believed that there was nothing wrong with headquarters conducting inspection and guidance work, but that it also had to be truthful and realistic and could not make reckless conclusions.
After conducting a thorough investigation, the brigade leadership found that similar situations had been far from rare in past headquarters inspection and supervision processes: a certain company's clerk, having too much work on hand, failed to register the company's routine work in a timely manner and was characterized by headquarters as "failing to fulfill duties and responsibilities"; a certain company's equipment maintenance was inadequate and the company was criticized by headquarters for "insufficient combat-readiness awareness"… In the eyes of a small number of headquarters cadres, it seemed that the higher the "pitch" of criticism, the better it demonstrated their own achievements.
In response to these situations, the brigade's headquarters cadres frankly acknowledged their own concerns: "If inspection and supervision only records minor and miscellaneous matters, it seems to reflect a low level of competence"; "If the problem list is not comprehensive, there is worry that leadership will think one's work is not conscientious"; "Amplifying problems in the telling can better serve as a warning"…
"When all is said and done, it is still a deviation in the view of achievements (政绩观)—treating grassroots problems as one's own accomplishments." On this, the brigade leadership took a clear-cut stance: "It is not that the grassroots cannot withstand criticism—it is that headquarters' work thinking and guidance methods have problems!" They pointed out incisively that the purpose of inspection and supervision is to help grassroots units identify the root cause of illness and excise the lesion, and that this must be done in a truthful, realistic, and case-by-case manner. "Escalating issues and slapping on labels (上纲上线、乱扣帽子)" not only damages the image and authority of headquarters, but also buries what are originally clear and specific problems beneath sweeping empty talk and stock phrases, leaving grassroots personnel confused and unable to carry out rectification effectively.
To this end, the brigade required headquarters to transform its work style and stipulated that inspection and supervision must achieve "three distinctions" (三个区分): distinguish "insufficient experience" from "ideological deviation"; distinguish "improper methods" from "absence of responsibility"; distinguish "objective constraints" from "subjectively lowering standards." In addition, they established a review mechanism for public criticism notices, requiring that any content involving qualitative assessments must be accompanied by specific factual evidence and a statement of grassroots circumstances, to prevent problems such as subjective conjecture, generalizing from one instance, and deliberate escalation.
The grassroots units feel most acutely whether headquarters' work style has genuinely changed. Recently, when Staff Officer Sun of the brigade's troop management section led a team to inspect a grassroots unit, he found that some of a certain company's combat-readiness supplies were not stored in a standardized manner. After investigation, he learned that this was because the company had just completed a position rotation. He therefore did not register this as a problem, but instead provided on-site guidance on standardizing the arrangement of supplies and urged the company to complete rectification within a set time. The company's political instructor was deeply moved: "Now headquarters inspections have less 'label-slapping' and 'board-hitting,' and more 'taking the pulse and diagnosing the illness' and 'prescribing and dispensing medicine.' Everyone's spirit for getting things done is smoother and their drive is stronger."