Examining the Real-Combat Grounding of Political Rectification Training Through the Correction of a Fuel Support Shortfall
The floodwaters recede, exposing the "thorn" lodged in the heart — Examining the real-combat grounding of political rectification training (政治整训) through the correction of a fuel support shortfall
■ Liang Yu, Staff Officer, Operations and Training Section, PAP Guigang Detachment
Editor's Note: Problems are the voice of the times, and also the targets of rectification training. In carrying out all work related to training for war preparedness, ideological corrosion (思想上的锈蚀) is often more dangerous than the rusting of guns and artillery. Correcting empiricism and inertial thinking (经验主义与惯性思维) in training for war preparedness, and breaking through war-readiness shortfalls, is precisely the essential meaning of driving political rectification training deeper and grounding it more firmly in reality.
Beginning today, the PLA Daily launches the "Analysis of Typical Cases" column, which, through "dissecting the sparrow" (解剖麻雀) and perceiving the greater through the smaller, presents the vigorous practice of grassroots units in correcting entrenched problems and advancing development through political rectification training. Through one typical case after another carrying the "smell of soil" and "smell of gunpowder," the column records the vivid stories of Party organizations at all levels and the broad ranks of Party member officers and soldiers tempering Party character (党性) through the correction of problems, forging work style through after-action review and self-examination, and elevating capabilities through identifying and filling gaps. We invite your attention.
"After continuously maneuvering across multiple disaster-affected sites, the premixed fuel for the outboard motors of the assault boats was insufficient, requiring on-site improvised mixing, which posed an extremely serious hazard."
At the after-action review of the flood-relief operation conducted by the Mobile Company of the PAP Guigang Detachment, the remarks of Corporal Xiao Hou struck me — sitting nearby as a participant in the review — like a sudden weight in my chest, plunging me into deep self-criticism and reflection.
In fact, more than a month earlier, when we were deploying preparatory work for flood prevention and emergency response, our working group had conducted a special assessment of the fuel support requirements for the assault boats. Based on a comprehensive analysis of the flood conditions at the garrison over the years, everyone concluded that no large-scale severe inundation had occurred in the area for more than a decade; even the most serious flood-relief operation two years prior had consisted mainly of reinforcing embankments, with the assault boats deployed infrequently and covering short distances. On the basis of the assessment that the probability of an extreme situation arising was not great, we made the judgment: premixed fuel is not suitable for long-term storage after mixing; given the limited intensity of flood conditions in previous years, preparing too much would result in expiration and scrapping, easily causing waste; calculated roughly according to the task situation in previous years, conventional combat-readiness requirements would be fully met. In the end, the allocation quantity was fixed according to the established conventional standard.
Reality, however, developed precisely in the direction of "not very probable." When the floodwaters swept in, officers and soldiers drove the assault boats to maneuver continuously for hours across a vast expanse of water, moving between multiple disaster-affected sites, and fuel consumption far exceeded that of any previous mission. By the time the unit transferred to the third disaster-affected area, the reserve premixed fuel began to run critically low. Officers and soldiers could only use bulk fuel carried on the vehicles to mix on the spot, with the ratio controlled entirely by experience. The rescue soldiers feared both that an incorrect mixing ratio would damage the engines and that delays would cost precious rescue time, and for a time were in a state of frantic confusion. The panic of that period has since lodged itself in the hearts of the rescue commanders like a thorn that cannot be pulled out.
In this round of reflection on the problem, I did not evade responsibility, but instead stepped forward to conduct a thorough self-criticism: the shortage of a few cans of fuel seems like a small matter, but what it reflects is an inertial pattern of thinking (思维惯性) that has long been latent within me in the work of training for war preparedness.
Political rectification training was born of war and is rectified for war; its ultimate objective is to forge a steel force capable of winning battles. Over the years, the detachment's real-combat-oriented (实战化) development has been continuously advanced, and the overall war-readiness foundation is solid. The detachment Party committee has organized study and discussion on multiple occasions, repeatedly emphasizing that preparing for war and fighting must be treated as the first priority, driving the deep integration of political rectification training with real-combat-oriented training and major exercise and training missions, so that Party member officers and soldiers are tested under complex environments and extreme conditions, and tempered in the hard skills needed to win through resolving the problems of "two insufficiencies" (两个能力不够) and "five incapabilities" (五个不会).
During study and discussion, I understood all of these principles, but when it came to concrete practice, I still could not break free from the constraints of old experience. "On the battlefield, every kind of extreme situation can occur. In peacetime, lacking adversarial awareness (敌情意识) and planning inadequately — only doing things by the book and by convention — means that once an unexpected situation arises, all one can do is watch helplessly as things fall apart." This experience gave me a lesson burned into my bones.
After the after-action review concluded, I systematically organized these problems into a report and submitted it to the detachment. The detachment Party committee acutely recognized that this was not a minor matter of a single category of material stockpile, but rather a common problem caused by empiricism and inertial thinking in war-readiness work, and decided to use this as an entry point to conduct a special after-action review and examination of war-readiness work.
In the course of the examination, we discovered that the "unexpected" situations exposed by this flood-relief operation extended far beyond fuel alone: it was unexpected that the rate at which the flood situation escalated far exceeded that of the same period in previous years, and the conventional response tempo could not keep pace with the changing disaster conditions; it was unexpected that the scale of civilian evacuation exceeded the estimates in the contingency plans, leaving life-saving and resettlement supplies insufficient; it was unexpected that the complex aquatic environment far exceeded the scenarios of routine training, and many special-situation responses had no ready-made contingency plans to follow…
Every single one of these, at root, demonstrated that the war-readiness string was not drawn taut enough, that there remained a habit of using old experience to address new situations, and of using conventional standards to anticipate extreme risks.
Having reflected deeply on the pain, the detachment Party committee took the lead in conducting comprehensive rectification. Departments across the headquarters proactively claimed responsibility for problems and converted the fruits of reflection into institutional mechanisms. Each department, benchmarked against real-combat standards, launched a "look-back" (回头看) review of the contingency plan system, revising and improving all categories of contingency plans for sudden-onset missions, refining response procedures for extreme scenarios, and ensuring that contingency plans are transformed from "documents in a drawer" into "action guides ready for use at any moment." A comprehensive review of material stockpile standards across all domains was conducted, and a tiered-response, dynamically escalating stockpile mechanism was established. Real-combat-oriented training content was adjusted to add subjects including extended continuous operations, maneuver without rear-area resupply, and special-situation response in complex environments, breaking fixed exercise patterns.
In the course of rectification, the operations and training department took the lead in adjusting the stockpile model, separately sealing gasoline and engine oil in matched containers according to the mixing ratio, and establishing a flood-warning-linked replenishment mechanism — when the warning level is elevated, supplies are simultaneously adjusted and allocated as needed, both avoiding idle waste and ensuring sufficient stockpiles under extreme conditions.
The floodwaters have receded, but the scene of mixing fuel on the spot keeps surfacing in my mind. This thorn lodged in my heart keeps me ever vigilant: in preparing for war and fighting, there has never been a fixed answer that settles the matter once and for all. Thinking one layer further toward risk, and pressing one degree closer to real combat, is the only way to seize those most critical few minutes when each test arrives.
(Compiled by Pan Xin, Ni Xiuhao, and reporter Chen Xiaojie)
Reporter's Notes
The "Unexpected" Is the True Test
A minor material shortfall in a flood-relief operation reflects deep-seated problems that exist broadly in the domain of emergency war preparedness. Compared with the visible shortfalls in equipment and materiel, the inertia and experience-dependence embedded deep in thinking are the most concealed and most lethal risks constraining training for war preparedness.
"Of all the troubles under heaven, the most impossible to address is that which goes by the name of peace and order with nothing happening, while in reality harboring unforeseen calamity." A prolonged stable environment, year after year of routine missions, and ossified work standards can very easily cause officers and soldiers to develop a "habitual sense of security" (惯性安全感). Defining future risks by past experience, responding to extreme contingencies with conventional plans, and substituting established standards for extreme-condition calculations — this may appear to be acting by the rules and performing one's duties prudently, but in reality it reflects insufficient baseline thinking (底线思维) and inadequate warfighting consciousness.
The essence of training for war preparedness is to contend with uncertainty. The reason battlefield special situations and sudden contingencies are so difficult to handle is precisely that they are always "unexpected." Clinging to old experience and old methods, entrusting safety to luck and victory to chance, is a form of habitual cognitive laziness — a formalism (形式主义) that must be resolutely guarded against in war-readiness work.
Confronting the changes in technology, the changes in warfare, and the changes in adversaries, all levels must use political rectification training as the leading force, correct the formalism of "training to be watched, exercises to be watched" (练为看、演为看), break through the peacetime accumulated malady of "not conducting training when danger looms, not drilling troops when risk is present" (危不施训、险不练兵), dig out root causes from the depths of thinking, and apply real effort to correcting entrenched problems, making the most thorough preparations based on the worst-case assumptions. Always thinking one layer further toward risk and preparing one additional contingency is the only way to stabilize the overall situation amid changing circumstances, and to seize total victory amid the unexpected.