Eyewitness Accounts of the Consolidation and Training | Theoretical Study Carrying the "Smell of Gunpowder"
Theoretical Study Carrying the "Smell of Gunpowder"
■ Dong Shunshuo, Officer, Political Work Department, Certain Air Force Brigade
Deep in the night in midsummer, the lights blazed inside the command tent of a certain Air Force brigade's headquarters element, where a fierce "brainstorming session" with no moderator and no prepared remarks was underway. The topic written on the whiteboard was impossible to ignore: How does political work embed itself into the joint fire strike chain?
"Political work must account for time! Agitation at each node cannot exceed 90 seconds, or it will disrupt the tempo of combat." "In an environment where personnel are highly dispersed, time and space are shifting rapidly, and mental stress is acute, wartime political work must be carried out quickly wherever an opening exists—it demands strong relevance and real effectiveness." …
Sparks of thought flew in all directions as the debate continued. The whiteboard filled up with dense mind maps, and the outline of an "embedded political work operational plan (政治工作嵌入式作战方案)" gradually took shape through the depth of the discussion.
This kind of theoretical study carrying the "smell of gunpowder" moved me deeply.
For a period before this, headquarters theoretical study had looked quite different: each section took turns reading documents aloud; leaders stressed the significance and laid out requirements; those in the audience underlined key points and copied notes; and the meeting adjourned on schedule. On the rare occasions when discussion was organized, one commonly heard empty formalities like "Let me first state my position" and "I found this deeply inspiring." Some comrades were unwilling to truly rack their brains or truly clash on the issues.
Where was the problem? During the political consolidation and training (政治整训), a brigade leader cut straight to the point: theoretical arming cannot merely arm the mouth—it must arm the mind and guide combat readiness. Study divorced from actual-combat requirements can only be wasted effort! We must refine the examination and correction of deviations in the performance-achievement outlook (政绩观) as it relates to combat readiness and warfighting, and make whether something is conducive to raising combat effectiveness the hard standard (硬杠杠) for measuring all work.
In the discussion, I placed myself in the frame and conducted a searching self-examination. I honestly acknowledged that my own participation in theoretical study had real "hard defects (硬伤)": first, the content was hollow—I fixated on higher-level documents and recited them by rote, never converting them into my own cognitive framework; second, the form was rigid—I simply sat and listened to lectures, with no genuine clash of ideas. Beyond that, my own motivation for study was not pure enough. Study was mostly about completing a task; I had a going-through-the-motions mentality and was not driven from the heart by a desire to study warfighting and build my capabilities.
Round after round of searching self-examination opened the curtain on reform of the headquarters night school (机关夜校).
The brigade Party committee took the lead in setting the example by establishing a new "three do-not-discuss (三不讲)" rule: do not discuss it if it is not connected to actual combat readiness; do not discuss it if there has been no personal reflection; do not discuss it if there has been no clash of views and debate. Every night school session must establish a "three-account ledger (三本账)": come in with real problems, conduct real clashing debate, and leave with real plans.
The spearhead of rectification struck first at "topic selection." Previously it was "study whatever the higher level tells you to study"; now it is "study whatever warfighting lacks." We brought the "chokepoint (卡脖子)" problems identified through after-action reviews of training exercises directly into the night school. Topics such as "How does political work penetrate hearts and minds during cross-region movement," "How is the psychological line of defense fortified in a complex electromagnetic environment," and "How can wartime mobilization be both brief and forceful" were without exception hard bones picked out from exercise summaries and after-action reports.
The change in work style directly produced a leap in the quality and effectiveness of study. During one study session discussing the topic "How do wartime political cadres respond rapidly," a brigade leader posed a challenge: "Of the response plans that political cadres are putting forward right now, how many have been derived through data-based deduction? Deciding by experience and intuition will not work on the battlefield."
Drawing on our study, we immediately consulted comrades in the operations and training section, researched psychological monitoring data on officers and soldiers collected during field training, and reached a conclusion: beginning at the fourth hour of high-intensity combat, the cognitive capacity of officers and soldiers declines markedly. At that point, political work should not involve lengthy reasoning; instead, it should help officers and soldiers stabilize their psychological line of defense. …
It was precisely through this kind of research and collision that the point of emphasis for political work was found. The "Battlefield Psychological Resilience Training Plan (战场心理韧性训练方案)" we subsequently developed on this basis was piloted during field training, after which the psychological stress-response time of officers and soldiers was measurably shortened.
Today, the propaganda section no longer shuts itself in to write lesson plans but goes deep into the training ground to collect information on ideological trends. Behind every data point in the security section's psychological services plan lies an analysis of the psychological expenditure associated with actual-combat training subjects.
Since the beginning of this year, the headquarters night school has expanded from an initial format focused exclusively on political cadres to encompass the military, support, and equipment domains as well. The more profound change lies in the fact that, at the level of thinking, everyone has made the shift from "being made to study" to "wanting to study," and from "studying to be seen" to "studying for war."
Every headquarters night school session still blazes with light. Every time I see the mind maps, lists of problems, and embryonic plans left on the conference room whiteboard after the debates, I feel a particular sense of fulfillment—theoretical study is no longer a slogan but has become combat effectiveness that can be seen and touched.
(Compiled by Tang Long and Zhu Haitao, special correspondent for the PLA Daily)