Doctrine Political Work

This Schedule Is More Than a March Route — It Is a Prescription for Governing the Military

这张日程表不只是行军路线，更是治军良方

PLA Daily (解放军报) 6 August 2026

Summary

Officers and soldiers from an Eastern Theater Command Air Force unit visited the Memorial Hall of the Central Red Army's Long March Departure in Ruijin, where study of the 1934 'Field Army Action Schedule from October 10 to October 20' — the Central Revolutionary Military Commission's first operational order for the Long March — prompted a structured discussion on training management failures at the grassroots level. The article documents a recurring institutional problem: grassroots units breaking established training plans before higher-echelon evaluations to run overtime crash remediation, which the piece frames as violating the principles of 计划性 (planning discipline) and 组织性 (organizational discipline) the schedule embodies. The framing points to persistent tension between evaluation pressure and systematic training at the unit level, using historical precedent as the authoritative corrective rather than a current directive — standard political-education content whose value is as a record of how the Air Force frames training governance problems to junior NCOs and staff officers.

Translation

A March Plan Born in Desperate Straits

■ Chen Feiying

The "Field Army Action Schedule from October 10 to October 20," issued by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in Ruijin. [Archival photograph]

Midsummer in southern Jiangxi: trees lush and dense, heat waves scorching.

Stepping into the Memorial Hall of the Central Red Army's Long March Departure, a reproduced schedule caught the attention of officers and soldiers from a unit of the Eastern Theater Command Air Force.

It was the "Field Army Action Schedule from October 10 to October 20," issued by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission (中革军委) in Ruijin — the first document to deploy the Red Army's Long March operations, and a plan for a systematic, comprehensive strategic withdrawal.

"This table is laid out in an orderly fashion, with the tasks of each day and each unit planned with such clarity." Second-Class Staff Sergeant Li Wenfeng traced the table horizontally and then vertically, studying the dense time nodes and division of tasks, and could not help but feel moved.

Behind the table lay night after night of storm and darkness —

In the deep autumn of 1934, the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign had failed. Enemy forces blockaded the Soviet area layer by layer, and tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers were encircled. At this moment of extreme peril, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission calmly assessed the battlefield situation, coordinated seven columns of forces, and carefully arranged a coherent and complete plan for the withdrawal operation.

Taking the 9th Red Army Corps alone as an example, the plan's operational discipline (计划性), scientific character (科学性), and organizational character (组织性) were fully on display: on the eve of the withdrawal, the Red Army did not rush to break camp and retreat, but instead cleared local threats in place, consolidated positions, and continued routine military-political training, firmly holding the rear base. Beginning on October 11, units were progressively consolidated and moved in an orderly fashion toward designated assembly areas. By the 14th, all preparations — river-crossing materiel, personnel groupings, and combat-readiness inspections — were fully complete. In the deep night of the 17th, the force used the cover of darkness to cross the river covertly, quietly breaking through the enemy's blockade line. After breaking out, they continuously dispatched forces to conduct forward reconnaissance and harassment operations, using flank cover to pin down the enemy's advance and create conditions for the Central main force to drive deep and escape the encirclement.

That thin schedule bore the weight of the coordination of thousands upon thousands of troops and the calculations of a life-or-death battle. For a moment, none of the officers and soldiers present spoke, yet in their hearts they were moved as one.

"The table is well-organized and clear in its assignment of responsibilities and authority, fully demonstrating that no matter how pressed for time or how critical the situation, the Red Army never forgot to formulate a specific and thorough march plan," Corporal Xie Wansong analyzed. The action schedule had rules, standards, and discipline; the language was concise but highly specific, and the annotations section set out in detail the march formations and combat boundary lines. At the same time, it did not constrain the initiative of front-line units: each unit could independently assess the enemy situation it faced, handle matters as circumstances required, and use waiting intervals to shore up weaknesses and press ahead with training.

"Organizational discipline and planning discipline (组织性、计划性) are important guarantees for a march — this experience was forged in the fires of battle and soaked in blood." At this point, Teng Yue, a staff officer in the training section, recalled the wrong turns his unit had taken in organizing training in the past.

Previously, when preparing for higher-echelon evaluations, some grassroots units, in order to rapidly improve scores, broke with established training plans and conducted overtime crash remedial training, making no distinction for individual soldiers' baseline capabilities and giving no consideration to the pressures of duty-watch assignments. It appeared that training time was being extended and training intensity increased, but in reality, difficult and key subjects were not being studied in depth and foundational capabilities were not improving steadily. Some soldiers even participated in training under prolonged fatigue, which wore down their motivation for self-directed study and training.

"Our predecessors were still able to plan scientifically in the midst of a life-or-death crisis — we have even less reason to advance blindly. We must coordinate with discipline and without losing flexibility." In the course of the exchange, participants reached a consensus: what this schedule reveals is not only a march route, but also a prescription for governing the military (治军良方) grounded in seeking truth from facts (实事求是) and scientific overall coordination (科学统筹). Applied to today's training, this means formulating training content by echelon, setting training standards by level, and — given the practical reality that sudden tasks such as duty-watch, support missions, and field training exercises easily disrupt training schedules — establishing mechanisms for dynamic training adjustments, staggered make-up training, and daily after-action reviews.

Original Chinese

绝境中的行军计划 ■陈菲莹中革军委在瑞金发布的《野战军由十月十日至二十日行动日程表》。资料图片盛夏赣南，树木苍郁，热浪灼灼。走进中央红军长征出发纪念馆，一张复刻的日程表吸引了东部战区空军某部官兵。那是中革军委在瑞金发布的《野战军由十月十日至二十日行动日程表》，是第一份部署红军长征行动的文件，是一份系统性、全局性战略转移的方案。 “这份表格排布有序，对每一天、每一支部队的任务都规划得如此清晰。”该部二级上士李文峰沿着表格，先横再纵，研究着细密的时间节点和任务划分，不由感慨。表格背后，是一个个风雨如晦的暗夜—— 1934年深秋，第五次反“围剿”失利，敌军层层封锁苏区，数万红军身陷重围。局势凶险之际，中革军委沉着研判战局，统筹7路兵力，周密排布出连贯完整的转移行动方案。仅以红九军团为例，行动计划性、科学性、组织性便展露无遗：转移前夕，红军并未急于拔营撤离，而是就地清剿隐患、稳固阵地、常态开展军政训练，牢牢守住后方根基。10月11日起，部队梯次收拢，向预设集结地域有序机动；14日全面完成渡河物资、人员编组、战备核查等筹备工作；17日深夜依托夜色隐蔽渡河，悄然突破敌军封锁线。突围之后，他们持续派出兵力前出侦察、袭扰牵制，以侧翼掩护拖住敌军步伐，为中央主力部队纵深挺进、跳出包围圈创造条件。薄薄的日程表，承载了千军万马的调度、生死战局的考量。一时间，在场官兵无人言语，心底却不约而同生出感慨。 “表格条理分明、权责清晰，充分表明，哪怕时间再紧张、情况再危急，红军仍不忘制订具体周详的行军计划。”中士谢万宋分析道，行动日程表有章法、有标准、有纪律，文字虽简练，但十分具体，附注部分还详细规定了行进阵式和战斗分界线。同时并未束缚一线活力，各部队可结合当面敌情自主研判、临机处置，利用待机间隙补强短板、抓实训练。 “组织性、计划性是行军的重要保证，这一经验，是在战火中炼出来、血水中泡出来的。”说到这里，训练科参谋滕跃想起了单位以往组训时走过的弯路。此前备战上级考核，部分基层单位为快速提升成绩，打破既定组训计划，加班突击复训，不区分官兵能力基础、不兼顾岗位执勤压力。看似训练时间拉长、训练力度加大，实则重难点课目钻研不深、基础能力提升不稳。甚至有的官兵长期疲劳参训，消磨了自主研训的积极性。 “先辈们在生死危局中尚且科学统筹，我们更不能盲目冒进，要统筹有度、不失灵活。”交流中，大家形成共识，这张日程表展现的不只是行军路线，更蕴藏着实事求是、科学统筹的治军良方。运用在如今的训练中，就是要分层制订训练内容、分级设定训练标准，同时针对执勤、保障、驻训等突发任务容易打乱训练进度的实际情况，建立动态调训、错峰补训、每日复盘机制。