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Political Rectification Training in My Eyes | Don't Let "Grinding Out Documents" Wear Away One's Spirit

我眼中的政治整训|莫让“推材料”磨掉精气神
PLA Daily (解放军报) 4 August 2026
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A PLA political work officer writing in official military media recounts how a talented staff officer, Xiao Liu, initially refused a headquarters secondment because a previous drafting assignment had devolved into endless word-polishing with no substantive output — a practice the author frames as a symptom of formalism (形式主义) in military writing culture (文风) that the ongoing political rectification training (政治整训) campaign is meant to correct. The article documents how the campaign's 'short, substantive, and fresh' (短、实、新) standard is being applied at the organ level, with Xiao Liu's eventual turnaround — including a forwarded research paper on deviations in the outlook on political achievement (政绩观) — offered as evidence that the reform is producing results. Its value is as a record of how the PLA's political work apparatus frames the connection between document culture and officer motivation for mid-grade cadres, not as evidence of a structural change in how headquarters organs actually operate.

At the beginning of the year, I received a phone call from a staff officer named Xiao Liu, in which he politely declined an opportunity to be seconded for training at our headquarters organ. Xiao Liu was a top performer at a subordinate organ — disciplined in his work style, sharp in his thinking, and solid in his writing ability. He was a promising talent I had been watching for a long time. The chance to broaden one's horizons and sharpen one's abilities at a higher-level organ is something many people dream of, so why did Xiao Liu turn it down flat?

Over the phone, Xiao Liu spoke from the heart: "Honestly, I'm just afraid of grinding out documents all day long…" He described a previous experience working on drafts at a headquarters organ: a conference room, lights burning around the clock, a few people staring at a large screen, picking over every word and polishing every paragraph. Whether to write "vigorously advance" or "make focused efforts to drive forward" required repeated deliberation; whether to write "consolidate the foundation" or "firmly build the bedrock" required going back and forth. Subheadings had to have matching character counts; parallel sentences had to have identical rhythms; sometimes a draft would pass through layer after layer of review, be pushed back and forth, and end up right back at the first version.

As someone who has worked with written language for many years, I understand the hardships of "grinding out documents," and I know that what Xiao Liu said reflects, to a degree, the problems with writing culture (文风) in a small number of organs. Documents are, at their core, a vehicle for organizing work, deploying tasks, and summarizing experience. What matters is clarifying one's thinking, explaining measures clearly, and conveying the actual situation thoroughly. When form overtakes content, "grinding out documents" quietly loses its purpose.

Our Party has a long tradition of alertness to and correction of bad writing culture. During the Yan'an Rectification Movement, Comrade Mao Zedong sharply criticized writing culture problems in "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing" (《反对党八股》): "Pages of empty verbiage with nothing in it — that can still be called immature; but to put on airs and try to intimidate people with it is not only immature, it is downright rascally." He demanded that everyone "adopt a lively, fresh, and forceful Marxist-Leninist writing style." Comrade Deng Xiaoping, when drafting documents, always insisted on cutting words and explaining complex problems simply, so that the broad masses of cadres and the people could understand. In 1944, Deng Xiaoping, then acting secretary of the Northern Bureau, used a telegram of just over 700 characters to reply concisely and clearly to ten questions about various aspects of work in the anti-Japanese base areas. After reading it, Mao Zedong commented that the "content is excellent" and circulated it to various localities for reference.

At present, a small number of departments, in their "grinding out documents," place heavy emphasis on ornate phrasing and light emphasis on substantive effectiveness; heavy emphasis on formal sentence structure and light emphasis on candid analysis of actual conditions. Some go even further, equating repeated rounds of redrafting with taking something seriously, and treating document quality as a proxy for work quality. Writing culture is connected to work style (作风). A writing culture that over-polishes wording and prioritizes form over content not only wears away cadres' enthusiasm for their work and diverts time and energy from conducting research and getting real things done — it also imperceptibly distorts work orientation and breeds a formalism (形式主义) that prizes packaging over substantive effort. Over time, some comrades flinch at the sight of a major document. This is not young cadres being afraid of hard work; it is being afraid of pointless hardship and meaningless expenditure of energy.

Since the sustained deepening of political rectification training (政治整训), the entire military has drawn its sword against hollow and inflated writing culture, treating the improvement of writing culture as a prominent lever for rectifying formalism. Our own organ has strictly implemented the requirements of being "short, substantive, and fresh" (短、实、新) and resolutely eliminated the chronic ailments of being "long, empty, and false" (长、空、假). Documents that can go unwritten are resolutely not written; documents that can be shorter are resolutely cut down, with a firm emphasis on being practical and useful.

Rather than rushing to persuade Xiao Liu, I forwarded him several work bulletins and summaries of experience recently drafted by our organ — no boilerplate preambles or stock closing formulas, just concrete solutions to real problems. Reading those words that carried the smell of "gunpowder" and "soil," Xiao Liu's passion for writing was reignited, and he reported to the organ on time after receiving his orders.

When he first arrived, Xiao Liu still carried old habits. When drafting an analysis of the ideological situation among personnel, he borrowed several documents to look for ideas but could not get started for a long time. I smiled and encouraged him: "Don't rush to put pen to paper — come down to the grassroots with me first." We went deep into company-level units and had candid exchanges with officers and soldiers, collecting and analyzing first-hand information on their ideological dynamics. Xiao Liu had a sudden realization: good documents are not "picked out" word by word — they are "run out" in the field and "worked out" through practice. Within just a few months, Xiao Liu no longer blanched at the word "draft." He had become both a beneficiary and a practitioner of the reform of writing culture. A research document he wrote on "effectively preventing and correcting deviations in the outlook on political achievement (政绩观)" was forwarded by higher-level authorities because it struck directly at the pain points and offered specific measures.

The problem of "grinding out documents," on the surface, appears to be about studying written expression; at its root, it is a deviation in the outlook on political achievement and a misalignment in the outlook on work. It must absolutely not be treated as a trivial matter of wording — the distortion must be corrected at the level of ideology. Party organizations and leading cadres at all levels should keep a close watch and routinely correct bad writing culture; use the correct outlook on political achievement to recalibrate a distorted "document outlook" (材料观); take "is the content substantive, is it useful" as the primary standard; stop making excessive demands over word choice and phrasing; liberate cadres from pointless word games; and direct their energy toward the practice of building the force. Leading cadres in particular should take the lead in writing shorter pieces, speaking plainly, and doing real work — using a pragmatic writing culture to guide young cadres to advance unburdened, ensuring that "the rifle, the pen, and the backbone" (枪杆子、笔杆子、腰杆子) are all strong — and thereby influence and motivate officers and soldiers to fight hard battles and produce solid results.

Original Chinese
年初,我曾接到干事小刘的电话,他婉言推辞到我们机关借调锻炼的机会。小刘是下级机关的业务尖子,作风严谨、思维敏捷,文字功底也很扎实,是我盯了很久的好苗子。到大机关拓宽视野、提升能力,是多少人盼着的机会,小刘怎么就一口推辞了? 电话里,小刘掏了心窝子:“其实,我就是怕成天推材料……”他描述了之前跟着机关推稿的经历:一间会议室,数盏长明灯,几个人盯着大屏幕逐字抠、逐段磨。“大力推进”还是“着力推动”,要反复推敲;“夯实基础”还是“筑牢根基”,要来回斟酌。小标题字数必须一致,排比句节奏必须相同,有时层层把关、推来推去又回到第一稿。 作为常年和文字打交道的人,我了解“推材料”的苦衷,知道小刘的话一定程度上反映了少数机关的文风问题。材料本是梳理工作、部署任务、总结经验的载体,关键是要把思路理清楚、把举措说明白、把实情讲透彻。当形式盖过了内容,“推材料”就悄悄变了味。 对文风之弊,我们党早有警醒与纠治的传统。延安整风时期,毛泽东同志在《反对党八股》中就文风问题尖锐批评:“空话连篇,言之无物,还可以说是幼稚;装腔作势,借以吓人,则不但是幼稚,简直是无赖了。”要求大家“采取生动活泼新鲜有力的马克思列宁主义的文风”。邓小平同志起草稿件总是要求压缩文字、把复杂的问题说简单,让广大干部群众都能理解。1944年,时任北方局代理书记的邓小平,用700余字的电报,简洁清楚地回复了关于抗日根据地各方面工作内容的十个问题。毛泽东看后评价“内容极好”,批转各地参考。 当前,少数部门“推材料”重辞藻修饰、轻内容实效,重句式工整、轻实情剖析。更有甚者,将反复推稿等同于高度重视,把材料质量当成工作质量。文风连着作风,过度雕琢字句、重形式轻内容的文风,不仅消磨干部干事热情,分散搞调研办实事的时间精力,还会潜移默化扭曲工作导向,催生重包装轻实干的形式主义。久而久之,有些同志见到大材料就犯怵。这不是年轻干部怕吃苦,是怕吃无谓的苦、耗无意义的神。 持续深化政治整训以来,全军上下向虚浮文风亮剑,把改进文风作为纠治形式主义的突出抓手,我们机关也严格落实“短、实、新”要求,坚决破除“长、空、假”积弊。对于可写可不写的材料,坚决不写;对于可长可短的材料,坚决短下来,并且力求实在管用。 我没有急着说服小刘,而是给他转发了几份机关近期起草的工作简报和经验做法——没有穿靴戴帽的套话,满是解决问题的实招。看着那些带着“硝烟味”“泥土味”的文字,小刘对文字的热情重新被点燃,接到命令后按时来机关报到。 初来乍到,小刘依然带着惯性,在起草人员思想形势分析时,他借来多份材料寻找思路,却迟迟打不开局面。我笑着鼓励他:“别忙着动笔,先跟我下基层看看。”我们深入营连一线与官兵坦诚交流,收集分析第一手的官兵思想动态。小刘恍然大悟:好材料不是“抠”出来的,而是“跑”出来、“干”出来的。短短数月,小刘不再谈“稿”色变,成了改文风、正作风的受益者和实践者。他撰写的关于“有效防范和纠治政绩观偏差”的调研材料,因为直击痛点、措施具体,被上级转发。 “推材料”的问题,表面看是研究文字表达,根子上是政绩观偏差、工作观错位,绝不能只当“文字小事”看,必须从思想深处纠偏正向。各级党组织和领导干部应紧盯不良文风常态纠治,用正确的政绩观校正扭曲的“材料观”,把“内容实不实、管用不管用”作为第一标尺,不在遣词造句上过度苛求,把干部从无聊的文字游戏中解放出来,把精力投向部队建设的实践中去。领导干部更应带头写短文、讲实话、干实事,用务实文风引领年轻干部轻装上阵,做到“枪杆子、笔杆子、腰杆子”都过硬,影响和带动官兵打好攻坚之战、创造过硬实绩。