South China Sea East China Sea Exercises Doctrine Military Diplomacy

International Outlook | Japan-Philippines Military Binding Intensifies Regional Security Risks

国际瞭望丨日菲军事捆绑加剧地区安全风险

PLA Daily (解放军报) 14 May 2026

Summary

During the U.S.-Philippines 'Balikatan' exercise in May 2025, Japan participated for the first time as a full member with approximately 1,400 personnel drawn from all three Self-Defense Force branches, deploying the helicopter destroyer JS Ise, two additional surface combatants, and—in the exercise's most significant development—firing two Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles from Philippine territory to strike the decommissioned vessel BRP Quezon at a range of roughly 75 kilometers, with both countries' defense ministers observing. The live fire marks the first time Japan has conducted a surface-to-ship missile launch outside Japanese territory, and taken together with Japan's participation in amphibious, anti-submarine, and cyber subjects across northern Luzon, the Batanes Islands, and Palawan, it signals a concrete operational step in Japan's effort to extend its strike reach into the South China Sea periphery ahead of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement entering into force in September 2025. The article, published by a Chinese state-affiliated outlet, frames these developments as evidence of Japanese 'remilitarization' threatening regional stability—framing that itself signals Beijing's intent to contest the normative legitimacy of the Japan-Philippines security architecture as it institutionalizes.

Translation

According to foreign media reports, on May 6, Japan's Type 88 surface-to-ship missile completed its first live-fire launch outside Japanese territory during the "Balikatan" joint military exercise. This year's "Balikatan" exercise expanded further in scale, with participating forces exceeding 17,000 personnel. Japan participated for the first time as a full member, with its depth of involvement markedly elevated. From logistical support to serving as a primary exercise force, Japan is deepening its military binding (军事捆绑) with the Philippines, scheming to "borrow a boat to go to sea" (借船出海), thoroughly breaking the principle of "exclusively defensive defense" (专守防卫), and once again advancing toward the status of a major military power, threatening regional peace and stability.

In recent years, the "Balikatan" exercise has continuously expanded in scale, with subjects developing steadily toward high-intensity and combat-realistic directions, and participating forces gradually expanding from bilateral to multilateral. Japan's participation this time as a full member for the first time, and its first live-fire exercise on Philippine territory, is a concentrated manifestation of this trend.

Judging from the composition and subjects of Japan's participation, its role has undergone a clear change. It is reported that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Air Self-Defense Force all dispatched forces, totaling approximately 1,400 personnel; and deployed the helicopter destroyer JS Ise, the destroyer JS Ikazuchi, the amphibious transport ship JS Shimokita, as well as C-130H transport aircraft and Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles. The subjects of participation are no longer limited to low-sensitivity areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response, but have extended to multiple combat-realistic subjects including multinational maritime joint operations, amphibious operations, joint air and missile defense, and cyber offense and defense.

The subjects in which Japan participated are highly targeted and provocative. The exercise locations covered northern Luzon Island, the Batanes Islands, and the waters near Palawan Island. On Luzon Island, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's amphibious operations brigade conducted beach-landing exercises with the Philippine Army, and also carried out cross-domain integrated anti-landing exercises with U.S. and Philippine participating forces, conducting live-fire against targets including unmanned target vessels. Of particular note, the 1st Artillery Brigade of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force launched two Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles, striking the retired Philippine vessel BRP Quezon approximately 75 kilometers offshore; Japan's Minister of Defense and the Philippine Secretary of National Defense both observed the launch on site. In the waters near Palawan Island, Japan deployed the destroyer JS Ikazuchi and the amphibious transport ship JS Shimokita to participate in exercises covering subjects such as anti-submarine warfare and maritime replenishment. The subjects in which Japan participated carry a clear combat orientation toward maritime denial, island and reef offense and defense, and maritime passage control. This means that the nature of Japan's participation in Philippine military activities has shifted from a symbolic presence to substantive embedding.

This change is closely related to the Reciprocal Access Agreement signed by Japan and the Philippines. The agreement takes effect in September 2025 and simplifies procedures for the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Philippine military to mutually enter each other's territory for training, exercises, disaster relief, and other activities, providing institutional facilitation for the movement of personnel, equipment, and weapons and for logistical coordination between the two sides. In other words, the entry of Japan's Self-Defense Forces into the Philippines is no longer merely a temporary arrangement but is now supported by a stable mechanism. The current "Balikatan" exercise is an important juncture at which this institutional arrangement moves from paper to practice.

The rapid warming of Japan-Philippines defense cooperation is by no means purely military exchange; behind it lie multiple strategic calculations.

For Japan, the Philippines is an important fulcrum for expanding its military activity radius. In recent years, Japan has continuously strengthened its military deployment in the southwestern direction, reinforcing maritime and aerial surveillance, missile deployment, and rapid mobility capabilities around the Southwestern Islands, attempting to steadily push its security perimeter outward. The Philippines sits at the intersection of the South China Sea, the Luzon Strait, and the Western Pacific, occupying a highly important geostrategic position. By entering the Philippines through the "Balikatan" exercise, Japan can not only enhance its joint operational capabilities with the Philippines and other countries, but can also extend its military reach further into the South China Sea periphery, expanding its own military influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

At a deeper level, Japan is using so-called "regional security cooperation" to seek a complete break from the constraints of the postwar order. In recent years, Japan's new security documents have established the development of "counterstrike capabilities" (打击能力) against adversaries, accelerated the introduction and development of long-range strike weapons, and simultaneously signed or advanced access-type agreements with Australia, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and other countries, paving the way for Self-Defense Force cross-border activities. Japan's participation in this exercise is, on the surface, participation in joint training; in substance, it is yet another important measure to advance the normalization and institutionalization of Self-Defense Force overseas activities. The substantive content of its so-called principle of "exclusively defensive defense" is being quietly hollowed out, one exercise and deployment at a time.

For the Philippines, bringing in Japan is yet another move to use external forces to increase its security leverage. Since the Marcos administration took office, the Philippines has continuously strengthened defense ties with Japan, Australia, and other countries, opened more military facilities, and promoted joint patrols and multilateral exercises and training. Its purpose is nothing more than to bolster its own confidence by drawing in extra-regional forces. However, this approach may appear to expand security options, but in reality it is continuously compressing the Philippines' strategic autonomy, causing it to become progressively dependent on external forces and to fall into a passive position.

Both Japan and the Philippines package the relevant cooperation as "defensive arrangements" or "maintaining regional stability," but this cooperation, which emphasizes bloc confrontation (阵营对抗), not only does nothing to contribute to regional stability but instead causes both parties to fall into a security dilemma.

Japan's process of "remilitarization" (再军事化) warrants the highest vigilance. After the end of World War II, Japan long adhered to the principle of "exclusively defensive defense" under the constraints of the peace constitution, with overseas military activities subject to strict limitations. However, in recent years, Japan's right-wing forces have continuously used changes in the surrounding security environment as a pretext to push for the expansion of Self-Defense Force activity scope, upgrades in equipment capabilities, and loosening of security policy. Japan's combat forces entering Philippine territory and participating in combat-realistic subjects such as anti-ship operations and air and missile defense have clearly exceeded the scope of ordinary defense exchanges. Japan's launch of offensive missiles outside its own territory goes far beyond the scope of "self-defense," indicating that its "new-style militarism" (新型军国主义) has taken shape and become a serious problem, gravely threatening regional peace and stability.

The Philippines' strategic autonomy faces further erosion. Security cooperation should serve national interests, but if one becomes excessively dependent on external military forces, one can easily be drawn into the strategic designs of other countries. In recent years, the Philippines has continuously expanded its military linkage with foreign militaries. While this appears to gain more external support, it is in fact causing the Philippines to gradually become a platform for the forward deployment and military exercises and training of extra-regional forces. Once regional tensions escalate, whether the Philippines can avoid becoming a sacrificial pawn in great-power competition is a question that must be asked.

Peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region have not come easily. There is nothing inherently wrong with normal defense cooperation between countries, but if military presence is expanded under the guise of exercises, and bloc confrontation is reinforced under the pretext of cooperation, the ultimate result will only be the transformation of security cooperation into an amplifier of risk. For Japan, what it truly should do is deeply reflect on history and handle military and security policy with caution, rather than continuously breaking through postwar constraints by using external platforms. For the Philippines, what it truly needs is to return to dialogue and consultation, rather than embedding itself in the strategic chess game of external forces. After all, blindly binding oneself to others in matters of security will only invite fire upon oneself and bring blowback.

Original Chinese

据外媒报道，5月6日，日本88式岸基反舰导弹在“肩并肩”联合军演中完成境外首次实弹发射。今年的“肩并肩”军演规模进一步扩大，参演兵力超过1.7万人，日本首次以正式成员身份参演，参与深度显著提升。从后勤辅助到演练主力，日加强与菲深度军事捆绑，图谋“借船出海”，彻底打破“专守防卫”原则，重新向军事大国迈进，威胁地区和平稳定。近年来，“肩并肩”军演规模持续扩大，课目不断向高强度、实战化方向发展，参演力量也从双边逐步扩展为多边。日本此番首次以正式成员身份参演，并首次在菲律宾领土上进行实弹演习，就是这一趋势的集中体现。从日本参演的阵容与课目看，其扮演的角色发生明显变化。据悉，日本陆上、海上、航空自卫队均派出力量参加，总兵力约1400人；并投入“伊势”号直升机驱逐舰、“雷”号驱逐舰、“下北”号两栖运输舰，以及C-130H运输机和88式岸基反舰导弹等装备。参演内容不再局限于人道救援、灾害应对等低敏感领域，而是延伸至多国海上联合行动、两栖作战、联合防空反导和网络攻防等多个实战化课目。日本参演的课目具有极强的针对性和挑衅性。此次演习地点覆盖吕宋岛北部、巴坦群岛以及巴拉望岛附近海域。在吕宋岛，日本陆上自卫队两栖作战旅与菲律宾陆军实施抢滩登陆演练，还与美菲参演部队开展跨域一体化反登陆演练，并对无人靶船等目标进行实弹射击；更值得关注的是，日本陆上自卫队第1炮兵旅发射2枚88式岸基反舰导弹，命中距岸约75公里的菲律宾退役舰船“奎松”号，日本防卫大臣、菲律宾防长均现场观摩了此次发射。在巴拉望岛附近海域，日本出动“雷”号驱逐舰、“下北”号两栖运输舰参加反潜作战、海上补给等课目演练。日本参与的这些课目具有明显的海上拒止、岛礁攻防和海上通道控制的实战指向，这意味着日本参与菲方军事活动的性质，已由象征性存在转向实质性嵌入。这一变化与日菲签署的《互惠准入协定》密切相关。该协定于2025年9月生效，简化了日本自卫队和菲律宾军队相互进入对方领土开展训练、演习和救灾等活动的程序，为双方人员、装备、武器携带及后勤协调提供了制度性便利。换言之，日本自卫队进入菲律宾不再只是临时性安排，而是有了稳定的机制支撑。此次“肩并肩”军演，正是这一制度安排从纸面走向实践的重要节点。日菲防务合作快速升温，绝非单纯的军事交流，其背后包含多重战略考量。对日本而言，菲律宾是其拓展军事活动半径的重要支点。日本近年来持续强化西南方向军事部署，围绕西南诸岛加强海空监视、导弹部署和快速机动能力，试图将安全防线不断向外推。菲律宾位于南海、巴士海峡和西太平洋交汇地带，地缘位置十分重要。日本借“肩并肩”军演进入菲律宾，不仅可以提升与菲律宾等国的联合作战能力，更能将其军事触角进一步延伸至南海周边，扩大自身在亚太地区的军事影响力。更深层次看，日本正借助所谓“地区安全合作”，谋求彻底摆脱战后体制束缚。近年来，日本新版安保文件确立发展对敌“打击能力”，加快引进和发展远程打击武器，同时与澳大利亚、英国、菲律宾等国签署或推进准入类协定，为自卫队跨境活动铺路。日本此次参演，表面上是参与联合训练，实质上是推动自卫队海外活动常态化、制度化的又一重要举措。其所谓“专守防卫”原则的实质内涵，正被一次次的演训和部署悄然掏空。对菲律宾而言，引入日本也是其借助外部力量增加安全筹码的又一动作。马科斯政府上台以来，菲律宾持续强化与日本、澳大利亚等国的防务联系，开放更多军事设施，推动联合巡航和多边演训，其目的无非是通过拉拢域外力量以增强自身底气。然而，这种做法看似扩大了安全选项，实际上却在不断压缩菲律宾的战略自主空间，使其逐渐依赖外部力量，陷入被动。日本和菲律宾均将相关合作包装为“防御性安排”或“维护地区稳定”，但这种突出阵营对抗的合作，不仅无助于地区稳定，反而使自身陷入安全困境。日本“再军事化”进程令人高度警惕。二战结束后，日本在和平宪法约束下长期坚持“专守防卫”原则，海外军事活动受到严格限制。然而，近年来日本右翼势力不断以周边安全形势变化为借口，推动自卫队活动范围外扩、装备能力升级和安全政策松绑。此次日本作战力量进入菲律宾本土，并参与反舰作战、防空反导等实战化课目，已明显超出一般防务交流范畴。日本在境外发射进攻型导弹，更是远远超出了“自卫”范畴，表明其“新型军国主义”成势为患，严重威胁地区和平稳定。菲律宾的战略自主面临进一步削弱。安全合作本应服务国家利益，但若过度依赖外部军事力量，就容易被卷入他国战略设计。菲律宾近年来不断扩大同外国军队的军事联动，看似获得更多外部支持，实则使自身逐渐成为域外力量前沿部署和军事演训的平台。一旦地区局势升温，菲律宾能否避免沦为大国竞争的牺牲品，恐怕要打上问号。亚太地区和平稳定来之不易。国与国之间开展正常防务合作本无可厚非，但若借演习之名扩大军事存在，借合作之机强化阵营对抗，最终只会使安全合作异化为风险放大器。对日本而言，真正应该做的是深刻反省历史、谨慎处理军事安全政策，而不是借外部平台不断突破战后约束；对菲律宾而言，真正需要的是回归对话协商，而不是把自身嵌入外部势力的战略棋局。毕竟，一味在安全上相互捆绑，只会引火烧身，反噬自身。