Military Camp Observation | The Transformation Path of a New-Type Support Force
A "Graduation Answer Sheet" Written on the Training Ground
■ Duan Decheng, PLA Daily Special Correspondent Li Bingfeng, Zhang Xinkai
Late at night, in the communications battalion area of a Rocket Force unit, Battalion Commander Xie and several key personnel sat gathered around the long table in the operations room, spread before them several communications link diagrams and fault lists… They were war-gaming technical problems in the integration of fixed and mobile communications.
Battalion Commander Xie quickly jotted down one suggestion after another. This subject was also the topic of his master's thesis, which he had just successfully defended.
"If the battlefield command chain breaks at the 'last mile,' even the best tactics are castles in the air." He closed his notebook and said to the comrades beside him.
Late last year, Battalion Commander Xie successfully defended his thesis at the Rocket Force Command College and was awarded a master's degree. But what surprised people was that this commander, already holding his degree, is still to this day refining that graduation thesis.
"The thesis defense is only the starting point; the answer sheet for strengthening the military has no finish line." He explained: every additional round of war-gaming brings us one step closer to actual combat; every additional problem discovered adds one more point of probability of victory.
The topic Battalion Commander Xie initially proposed was sent back by his advisor for not being closely enough tied to actual combat. Just as he was puzzling over this, a transformation was quietly unfolding — the battalion he belonged to was accelerating its shift from "ensuring communications in peacetime" to "supporting communications in wartime."
Missile forces operate at a fast combat tempo, with highly centralized command, dispersed deployment positions, and complex electromagnetic environments. How to achieve communications-on-the-move (动中通), communications-under-jamming (扰中通), and communications-after-damage (毁中通)? How to make information flow truly become the "neural network" of battlefield command? His advisor's suggestion made Battalion Commander Xie clearly realize: "Breaking through the problem is not in the study, but on the battlefield."
"Relying on war-gaming alone won't work — answers must be found through confrontation." In the battalion's first organized training after consolidation, problems emerged one after another…
Battalion Commander Xie could no longer sit still. With the urgency of "combat begins tonight," he led key personnel to work out a three-in-one problem-solving model of "situation-driven, joint operations, live-force verification (情况牵引、联合作业、实兵检验)," attempting to eliminate the "temperature differential" between the training ground and the battlefield.
Subsequently, the entire battalion embedded combat-readiness requirements into every link of combat duty, equipment maintenance, and daily routines, gradually tempering and advancing the integration process through repeated emergency drills.
On one occasion, the battalion organized a red-versus-blue confrontation exercise, with officers and soldiers completing their mission under conditions of severed network, severed power, and loss of contact. The process of this confrontation also became solid empirical material in Battalion Commander Xie's thesis.
"The deeper the research goes, the more I feel my capabilities are insufficient." Battalion Commander Xie set a rule for himself: persist in studying cases and continuously update his knowledge base. He also frequently consults the battalion's senior non-commissioned officers on technical details. Master Sergeant First Class Du Jiuzeng remarked with feeling: "It is precisely this spirit of getting to the bottom of things that has influenced everyone — that is how we were able to break through multiple technical barriers."
Networking-on-the-move, damage-and-rebuild… Today, the battalion continues to achieve capability leaps. In a multi-branch joint exercise last year, they flexibly constructed a communications network and ensured stable operation of the command system in a heavy-jamming environment.
After multiple rounds of optimization, Battalion Commander Xie's "graduation answer sheet" has become a "research report" from the exercise ground — an "action guide" for new-type support written at the combat post.
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The Transformation Path of a New-Type Support Force
■ Duan Decheng, PLA Daily Reporter Fu Yu, Special Correspondents Li Bingfeng, Zhang Xinkai
In a certain sense, fighting a war means fighting logistics. A Rocket Force unit at the front line of support for victory is working to seamlessly link support elements with combat forces, driving a profound transformation in the domain of operational support.
As the tide of military strengthening surges forward, this entirely new force came into being at the right moment. From the outset, the unit's Party committee focused on its functional positioning, insisting on advancing reorganization and retraining as one, and conducting exercises and capability-building simultaneously.
How to achieve sensitive and efficient battlefield support response and bring into play the new effectiveness of operational support under the new organizational structure — there was no ready experience to draw on, and answers could only be sought through bold exploration and practice. The unit's Party committee led officers and soldiers in laying foundations and building momentum, answering the transformation questions of "Who are we," "What is our mission," and "How should we do our job."
[Photo caption: The unit conducts equipment offloading. Photo by Liu Zhici]
[Photo caption: The unit establishes a station during field training. Photo by Cai Jiyao]
[Photo caption: The unit conducts refueling training. Photo by Cai Jiyao]
Generating genuine combat power is destined to require blazing one's own trail
"The inability to find a comparable reference system was the first obstacle to the unit's construction and development." After the unit was formed, how should it be built, and how should officers and soldiers train? Because there were no precedents to follow and no templates to rely on, there was as yet no clear "standard answer."
After the unit was formed, its leadership immediately went to relevant units of sister services and branches to observe and learn, drawing on experience in transformation and development. Because the combat styles were markedly different, the "stones from other mountains" had reference value but could not be directly applied.
Consulting training syllabi and regulations, there was only a basic, universally applicable "framework." The unit's leadership recognized that, faced with new-type combat styles, complex battlefield environments, and joint operations requirements, generating genuine combat power was destined to require blazing their own trail.
Each level demonstrates for the level below; each level leads the level below. Confronting new problems in the course of construction, and drawing on the coordinated tasks and support-needs system the unit undertook, they compiled a "Three-Year Construction Plan," conducted coordinated training with missile brigades and forces of different specialties, refined support models through tempering, familiarized themselves with each other's tactics and procedures, and strove to achieve the systemic effectiveness of "united we are strong, combined we win (联则强、合则胜)."
"To take firm steps forward, you must look further ahead." They optimized the internal force composition and resource integration, organically integrating all subordinate elements to ensure precise embedding and effective capability release within system-of-systems operations, bringing into play the systemic advantage of "1+1>2."
Communications Battalion Commander Xie explained that in the past the communications battalion was only responsible for fixed communications station support; now the battalion has a "dual-drive" of mobile and fixed communications, with fuller force configuration and heavier responsibilities. How to integrate into the wartime command chain and clear the critical bottlenecks of communications-on-the-move, communications-under-jamming, and communications-after-damage became the challenge facing all officers and soldiers in the battalion.
In one basic training assessment, the communications battalion, when deploying on a certain subject, reduced the time required by nearly half compared to what the syllabus specified. Yet this seemingly "excellent" scorecard not only failed to earn recognition — it was actually "stopped" — because while the single-subject training had been executed well, the battalion's performance in the subsequent continuous assessment was unsatisfactory.
Similar problems existed to varying degrees across the subordinate battalions: "Assessment items were concentrated heavily on basic subjects, with few actual-combat subjects." On this point, Battalion Commander Yang of one of the unit's battalions had his own understanding: "Basic subject assessment standards are clear and results are straightforward, so they naturally become the focus of training."
"There is nothing wrong with building foundations, but if you only spin your wheels on the basics without leaping to system-of-systems capability, you are marking time in place." The unit's leadership pointed out incisively: the earlier problems are exposed, the more favorable it is for combat power generation.
A top-down "brainstorming (头脑风暴)" session quietly got underway. The unit organized battalion and company commanders and NCO staff officers to conduct a training-by-syllabus intensive course, discussing chronic training ailments such as "emphasizing form over substance (重表轻实)," "emphasizing individual soldiers over coordination (重单兵轻协同)," and "emphasizing assessments over actual combat (重考核轻实战)." Everyone refused to avoid contradictions or conceal shortcomings, sifting through problems one by one.
The target of problems is the growth point of combat power. "Any problem affecting system-of-systems operational effectiveness must be rectified in a closed loop." The unit's Party committee issued a military pledge, optimized the mechanism of "standing committee members helping build organic battalions, departments helping build small, remote, and dispersed units," providing full-coverage assistance in strengthening organizations and developing key personnel, and converting the "problem list" into an "effectiveness list" as quickly as possible.
From "individual soldiers training fast" to "the system linking up," from "getting through the subjects" to "holding up on the battlefield," the unit's training model underwent a profound change.
Battlefield support is not the "primary factor" in winning, but it is the "critical variable" that determines victory or defeat
"In the past, when equipment broke down, all we could do was call for help, and sometimes before the process was even complete, the operational opportunity had long since been lost." Recalling the awkward situation during a cross-region exercise a few years ago, Staff Officer Wan of the unit's operations and training department still feels regret.
It was the final battle of a red-versus-blue confrontation. A transport vehicle in one battalion was suddenly "destroyed by the enemy," its engine stalled, immobilized in mountainous terrain. All the battalion's officers and soldiers were frantic, able only to report up through channels by radio to request support.
"One phone call placed, one round of requests sent up, a long wait — and then support forces finally arrived, tardily." Staff Officer Wan said with a rueful smile.
The result: the mission ended in failure. Staff Officer Wan came to understand: battlefield support is not the "primary factor" in winning, but it is the "critical variable" that determines victory or defeat. If command is not smooth and resource mobilization is inflexible, even forces sharing the same training ground will be fragmented and uncoordinated, inevitably slowing the tempo and losing operational opportunities.
To break the impasse required transformation. By integrating communications, transportation, engineering, chemical defense, repair, and medical support forces, breaking down professional barriers, subordination barriers, and command disconnects, they gradually built a new system of "modular grouping, integrated response, and full-chain support (模块化编组、一体化响应、全链条保障)."
"Now, with one commander on the scene, all subordinate forces can be directly mobilized." Wan Chufang remarked with feeling: no more layer-upon-layer requests for instructions, no more need to "borrow personnel" or "borrow vehicles" — all resources are "coordinated for my use," and the process flows smoothly.
Once the link is open, effectiveness improves. Transportation Support Detachment Commander Zhang also felt this deeply: once a transport route is destroyed, he can directly order the engineering company to deploy, clear the route on the spot, and repair it quickly, ensuring seamless connection between support modules.
To improve the coordinated capability of support modules, the unit established a "two-level, three-category" support system, continuously revised and refined action plans, formulated standards for "modular grouping training confrontation rules" and "modular grouping training assessment scoring," and explored the support pathway of "planning and design — training implementation — after-action review — research and standardization — rectification and improvement," laying the foundation for subsequently expanding training content.
A live-force mission grouping training exercise unfolded in a certain area. A transport vehicle in one battalion suddenly broke down and could not continue forward. Upon receiving the report, the unit activated its emergency mechanism. Shortly thereafter, four technical specialists drawn from the "maintenance module," carrying equipment shelters, arrived at the scene by transport vehicle.
"One commander, multi-directional linkage; one order issued, multi-capability coordination." Staff Officer Wan said: with multiple modules coordinating, the on-scene commander, based on actual conditions, can complete personnel allocation, equipment mobilization, and materiel preparation, and rapidly reach the battlefield.
From "each fighting alone" to "clenching fingers into a fist (攥指成拳)," various support modules are plug-and-play, like field "Transformers."
"For one repair mission, the 'engineering + maintenance + transportation + medical support' modules can be mobilized; for one field bivouac, the 'barracks construction + water and electricity support + materiel delivery' modules can be combined." Section Chief Tang of one of the unit's sections frankly stated: this "modular grouping" model not only achieves "troops allocated by need, groupings organized by battle, dynamically adapted," but also ensures efficient command and rapid response.
How the war is fought is how support is built; what operations need is what support develops
Being able to clearly map out one's own capability indicators and achieve a leap in combat power — this transformation path was not easy for the unit.
As soon as the unit was established, it brought all support elements to a certain area to explore new paths for combined-arms training. The unit's leadership was resolute: "To temper 'new-quality support capability (新质保障力)' in actual combat, we must find the fulcrum that will lever up combat power construction — this exercise is precisely a comprehensive exploration after transformation."
They explored, trained, and organized results simultaneously, delineating "four-level capability indicators benchmarked against actual combat requirements" to refine standards for training and talent development; opened up the "data links" between the command post and each combat unit and support unit; and, relying on an integrated command platform, extended the command network toward the battlefield front.
The changes are visible and tangible. From fuel supply to equipment repair, from hot-meal forward delivery to engineering construction, a new-type chain connected to the information network, gradually achieving "command on a single map, linkage on a single chessboard (一张图指挥、一盘棋联动)."
At one exercise site, faced with a link interruption, a support detachment responded swiftly. The communications detachment dispatched operators carrying individual radios, portable satellite stations, BeiDou terminals, and other multi-type equipment to provide forward support. One person operating multiple devices, one device with multiple capabilities, multiple links fused — communications nodes were rebuilt. "This kind of scenario was something we couldn't have imagined before," remarked one participating soldier with feeling.
The deeper objective of the organizational adjustment is to release the endogenous potential of combat power. They focused on the most urgent generation problems, working to solve such challenges as how each support detachment's forces can efficiently integrate into the combat system and how to achieve precise coupling with missile forces.
In the second half of last year, they proactively aligned with battlefield requirements, organized logistics, equipment, and engineering support forces, and conducted joint training with a missile brigade. From fuel supply and hot-meal forward delivery, to transport support and materiel movement, to equipment repair and road construction, support missions ran through the entire operational process and covered the full mission area.
As soon as the battle began, the exercise control headquarters issued an order: "The engineering support team must open battlefield routes for multiple launch detachments." The mission area shifted; officers and soldiers maneuvered day and night, moving through mountainous forest areas and electromagnetic jamming zones… In the end, multiple launch platforms completed position construction on schedule, and the missiles lifted off as planned.
"How the war is fought is how support is built; what operations need is what support develops." Faced with the new support paradigm of "small groupings, large combined-arms, modular, multi-capable (小编组、大合成、模块化、多能化)" in future information warfare, the unit's traditional "single-skill-type" support model has become difficult to adapt to.
To this end, they used the annual "weak training subject list" as a handle, differentiated by "command, technical, tactical, and common" categories, conducted tiered and graduated training, adjusted and optimized training plans, and ensured improvement in training quality and effectiveness.
In one joint exercise, relying on an auxiliary software system, they achieved precise command and control of terminal elements, improving support response speed by more than 40%.
In recent years, a cohort of composite-type key personnel who "understand operations, know technology, and can command" has accelerated its growth within the unit, and the unit has won 2 team championships in Rocket Force-organized competitions…
The honors are a vivid portrayal of this new-type support force's accelerating transformation, and also a powerful motivation driving them toward victory on the future battlefield.
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This Edition's Editor in Dialogue with the Commander of a Rocket Force Unit ——
Forging "New-Quality Support Capability (新质保障力)"
As the need to deepen combat power construction advances, it is necessary to integrate and optimize command support, service support, communications, logistics, equipment, and other diverse forces to build an entirely new support force. Its "newness" lies not only in equipment upgrades or organizational adjustments, but more fundamentally in a root-level reshaping of the logic of support. Faced with the profound transformation of combat methods on the future battlefield, how does this force achieve sensitive support response and efficient operation? Around this topic, this edition's editor conducted a dialogue with the commander of a Rocket Force unit.
Editor: What explorations has the unit undertaken around forging "new-quality support capability (新质保障力)"?
Unit Commander: We have deeply integrated communications, operations, and comprehensive support elements, broken the past dispersed model of "each guarding their own patch," and achieved unified resource allocation and coordinated linkage. The support force integrates data support, information communications, materiel supply, maintenance support, and other multiple functions into one. Once ordered, it can rapidly reach the operational area, striving to provide the command organ and missile forces with precise battlefield data, diverse communications means, and continuous materiel supply.
Editor: To adapt to new combat patterns, how do you drive the transformation and upgrading of support personnel?
Unit Commander: Cultivating new-type support personnel requires the courage to break through traditional thinking and the skill to summarize experience and innovate methods in live-force training. Establish a "support + operations" integrated training mechanism, enabling support personnel to understand operational requirements in a joint operations context and achieve resonance between support plans and operational tempo; implement a "one specialty, multiple capabilities; one post, multiple proficiencies (一专多能、一岗多通)" cultivation model, encourage support personnel to study across specialties and rotate across posts, participate throughout in operational planning, mission war-gaming, and live-force confrontation, and elevate the comprehensive operational level of the support system.
Editor: How do you ensure that all types of support elements are "twisted into a single rope" on the battlefield?
Unit Commander: Future operations compete on system-of-systems capability. "How to set unified objectives, build linkage mechanisms, and forge coordination consciousness (定统一目标、建联动机制、凝协同意识)" must be advanced from multiple dimensions including mechanism and execution: take the operational mission as the sole point of departure, break down information barriers and process blockages, let orders reach the terminal directly and resources be delivered precisely; from commanders to ordinary soldiers, all must engrave coordination consciousness in their minds, forming support effectiveness of "1+1>2."
Editor: How does peacetime support serve wartime victory?
Unit Commander: We insist on running the combat power standard throughout the entire process, achieving precise alignment between the training system and operational requirements. Organized around support actions including command, communications, fuel, transportation, maintenance, and medical support, we organize specialized training in phases and at different levels — basic training to consolidate the foundation, professional training to deepen, and comprehensive exercises to verify. In peacetime, we set live-force conditions such as complex electromagnetic environments, sudden equipment failures, and overlapping multi-directional demands, tempering rapid response, continuous support, and emergency handling capabilities under high-intensity confrontation.
Editor: Please describe the future scenario of "new-quality support capability (新质保障力)."
Unit Commander: In terms of structure, explore and refine the construction of a command structure that integrates peacetime and wartime, coordinates military and civilian, and connects top to bottom, driving the shift from "segmented by line and block (条块分割)" to "system integration (体系集成)," achieving resonance and integrated linkage between operational command and support command. In terms of model, relying on big data and other technologies, drive the construction of an intelligent model to achieve precise resource matching, visible and controllable. In terms of capability, relying on the emergency support system and high-technology, build a support capability foundation that combines peacetime and wartime and enables rapid conversion, and enhance continuous support capability.