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Firepower Resources Available for Coordination Grow Increasingly Rich; Tactical Controllers' Vision No Longer Confined to Land

能调度的火力资源日益丰富,战术引导员视野不再局限于陆地
PLA Daily (解放军报) 9 July 2026
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A brigade of the PLA 73rd Group Army has built a cross-service tactical controller development program, embedding personnel in naval and Air Force units to learn aircraft penetration logic, naval fire employment, and munitions effects data, after after-action reviews identified a systemic pattern of friendly-fire incidents and delayed fire support caused by controllers who lacked working knowledge of non-Army platforms. The article documents a concrete joint integration problem at the tactical level — Army controllers defaulting to organic artillery and misapplying cross-service munitions parameters — and records the brigade's institutional fix: compiled equipment reference booklets, cross-service embedding rotations, and a standing liaison mechanism with naval and Air Force units. This fits the broader PLA pattern of joint operations capability lagging at the controller and coordination layer even as the fire-strike architecture above it matures, and it raises the question of how widely this brigade-level remediation has been adopted across 73rd Group Army or the Eastern Theater more broadly.

A Brigade of the 73rd Group Army Improves Tactical Controllers' Joint Operations Capability—— Sharpening the Eyes That See Through the Battlefield ■ Chen Hongbin, PLA Daily Special Correspondent Liao Xiaobin

In the early hours of a summer morning, armor rumbled across a training ground as a multi-service cross-regional joint training exercise entered its most intense phase. An assault element of a brigade of the 73rd Group Army, tasked with an offensive mission, came under "enemy" fire and was brought to a halt.

At the critical moment, the brigade's tactical controller Zhang Tao decisively directed a friendly naval vessel to strike the "enemy" firing position, helping the assault element break through the "enemy" defensive line.

"If a tactical controller's capabilities are not up to standard, an entire combat operation can fall apart at the last moment." Stepping off the training ground, the brigade's leadership told reporters that in recent years, as the joint operations system has been continuously refined and the fire-strike chains linking different services and branches have grown increasingly complete, tactical controllers positioned at the forward line of troops have become like the "nerve endings" connecting each fire unit, and their capability and quality directly determine the effectiveness of joint operations.

Zhang Tao feels this deeply. One year, the brigade participated in realistic confrontational training organized by a higher echelon. During the exercise, as a forward attack element suddenly came under "enemy" fire suppression, Zhang Tao immediately requested fire support from the organic artillery, only to be told that the artillery element was being harassed by a small "enemy" force and could not provide a timely fire response. The tactical opportunity was fleeting; in desperation, Zhang Tao turned to directing an airborne aircraft to fire missiles in support. In the end, although the "enemy" target was destroyed, the missile's lethal radius far exceeded Zhang Tao's estimate, resulting in "friendly fire" casualties among his own forces.

"I had no idea this type of missile was so powerful." During the after-action review, Zhang Tao was filled with remorse. Having come from an artillery background, he was thoroughly familiar with the strike effectiveness of various artillery pieces, and when directing fires on the battlefield he had habitually "stuck with what he knew and avoided the unfamiliar." Over time, this left him with a poor understanding of the damage characteristics of munitions from other services and branches.

Zhang Tao's story was not an isolated case. In subsequent after-action reviews, the brigade found that a considerable number of tactical controllers had, to varying degrees, an insufficient grasp of the equipment capabilities of other services and branches and an inadequate understanding of fire coordination rules.

"Fire-strike guidance concerns the overall battlefield situation; we must do everything possible to help tactical controllers remedy their shortcomings." The brigade's leadership explained that they proactively contacted multiple academies and equipment manufacturers, compiling into reference booklets information on the capabilities and typical employment scenarios of the main combat fire platforms of other services and branches for tactical controllers to study at any time. Simultaneously, the brigade organized its backbone personnel to conduct a comprehensive review of typical cases from routine exercises and training, which were used as intensive training materials for tactical controllers. After a period of time, the brigade's tactical controllers had broadly mastered the equipment capabilities and fire coordination rules of multiple services and branches, resulting in more precise fire requests and more efficient target guidance.

Just when it seemed that understanding the "temperament" of each service's and branch's fire strikes would be enough to direct fires with ease, a training exercise the previous year gave Zhang Tao another profound lesson. During that exercise, the brigade's left-flank assault group had barely launched its charge when it was suddenly met with fierce fire counteraction from "enemy" forward positions, causing large numbers of "casualties." At the critical moment, Zhang Tao promptly directed Air Force aircraft to provide air fire support. However, the Air Force aircraft were long delayed in appearing in the designated airspace, and the fire support arrived more than ten minutes behind schedule. Zhang Tao was completely baffled.

"The route you recommended passes through 'enemy' air defense forces along the way; we had no choice but to detour on short notice..." At the after-action review, an Air Force pilot spoke bluntly. These words made Zhang Tao flush with embarrassment: he had been fixated solely on the narrow task of "directing fire strikes" without thinking from the pilot's perspective—the route that appeared shortest had sent the friendly aircraft directly into the adversary's air defense fire network.

This "late" fire support made the brigade realize: a tactical controller must have a pair of clear eyes that see through the entire battlefield. If one focuses only on one's own task while ignoring the risks faced by forces of other services and branches, "guidance" can become "misdirection." To this end, the brigade's Party committee adjusted its development approach, embedding tactical controllers in units of other services and branches for follow-on training: going deep into aviation units to understand aircraft performance limits and penetration logic; entering shipboard command compartments to learn firsthand about naval fire employment and route planning...

As the path of cross-service joint training and co-development has continued to open up, the tactical controllers of the brigade have steadily filled the gaps in their overall battlefield awareness. Today, the brigade has established a routine communication and liaison mechanism with naval and Air Force units, regularly exchanging personnel for instruction and discussion.

During a joint training exercise not long ago, the reporter observed the following scene: special operations soldiers infiltrated deep into "enemy" territory, transmitting real-time target information back to the brigade's tactical controllers; the brigade's tactical guidance team coordinated closely with the special operations soldiers to direct timely fire strikes; an Army Aviation element pressed forward at ultra-low altitude while the brigade provided it with precise fire suppression.

Stepping off the training ground, the brigade's leadership remarked with feeling: "Today, our tactical controllers' vision is no longer confined to 'land.' They are constantly looking further toward the 'deep blue' and upward toward the 'clouds.' The firepower resources they can coordinate have grown increasingly rich, laying a solid foundation for the smooth conduct of joint operations."

Original Chinese
第七十三集团军某旅提高战术引导员联合作战能力—— 擦亮洞察战场的双眸 ■陈鸿斌 解放军报特约记者 廖晓彬 夏日凌晨,某训练场装甲轰鸣,一场多军种跨区域联合训练进入白热化阶段。担负进攻任务的第73集团军某旅突击分队遭“敌”火力阻击,导致行动迟滞。 紧急关头,该旅战术引导员张涛果断引导友邻部队舰艇,对“敌”火力点实施打击,帮助突击分队撕开“敌”防线。 “战术引导员能力不过关,整个作战行动都可能功亏一篑。”走下训练场,该旅领导告诉记者,近年来,随着联合作战体系不断健全,不同军兵种的火力打击链路日益完善,身处前沿阵地的战术引导员如同联接各火力单元的“神经末梢”,其能力素质直接决定联合作战效能。 对此,张涛感触颇深。那年,该旅参加上级组织的实战化对抗训练。训练中,眼看前沿攻击分队突遭“敌”火力压制,张涛当即申请本级炮兵进行火力支援,却被告知炮兵分队正遭“敌”小股兵力袭扰,无法及时提供火力响应。战机稍纵即逝,情急之下,张涛转而引导空中战机发射导弹支援。最终,虽然“敌”目标被摧毁,但导弹杀伤半径远超张涛预估,导致己方部队被“误伤”。 “没想到这型导弹的威力这么大。”复盘时,张涛懊悔不已。炮兵出身的他对各型火炮的打击效能了如指掌,以往在战场上引导火力时,习惯性地“用熟避生”,久而久之,造成他对其他军兵种弹药的毁伤特性缺乏了解。 张涛的故事并非个例。该旅在后续复盘中发现,不少战术引导员不同程度存在对其他军兵种装备性能掌握不深、火力协同规则理解不透等问题。 “火力打击引导事关战场全局,必须想方设法帮助战术引导员补齐短板。”该旅领导介绍,他们主动联系多家院校、装备厂家,将其他军兵种主战火力平台的性能、典型应用场景等知识编印成册,供战术引导员随时学习。同时,该旅组织骨干全面梳理平时演训中的典型案例,作为战术引导员的强训教材。一段时间后,该旅战术引导员普遍掌握了多军兵种装备性能与火力协同规则,火力请求更精准、目标引导更高效。 本以为摸清了各军兵种火力打击的“脾性”,就能游刃有余地引导火力,然而去年的一次训练再次给张涛上了深刻的一课。那次训练中,该旅左翼突击群刚刚发起冲锋,突遭“敌”前沿阵地猛烈火力反制,造成大量“人员伤亡”。紧急关头,张涛及时引导空军战机实施空中火力支援。然而,空军战机迟迟未出现在预定空域,火力支援比计划时间晚了十几分钟,张涛满心不解。 “你建议的那条航线,沿途有‘敌’防空力量,我们不得不临时绕飞……”复盘会上,一名空军飞行员直言不讳。这番话让张涛脸红耳热:自己只盯着“引导火力打击”这一亩三分地,却没有站在飞行员的角度去思考——那条看似最短的航线,恰恰将友军战机送入了对手的防空火力网。 这次“迟到”的火力支援,让该旅意识到:战术引导员要有一双洞察战场的明眸,如果只盯着自己的任务,忽视其他军兵种部队面临的风险,“引导”可能变成“误导”。为此,该旅党委调整培养思路,将战术引导员“嵌入”各军兵种部队跟训:深入航空兵部队,了解战机性能边界与突防逻辑;走进舰艇指挥舱,实地学习海上火力运用与航道规划…… 随着跨军兵种联训共育的路子持续走开,该旅战术引导员对战场整体认知的短板被不断补齐。如今,该旅与海军、空军部队等建立常态沟通联络机制,定期互派人员授课交流。 在不久前的一次联合训练中,记者注意到这样一个片段:特战队员潜入“敌”纵深,为该旅战术引导员实时回传目标信息;该旅战术引导组与特战队员紧密配合,及时引导火力打击;某陆航分队超低空突进,该旅为其提供精准火力压制。 走下训练场,该旅领导感慨地说:“如今,我们战术引导员的视野不再局限于‘陆地’,而是不断远眺‘深蓝’、仰望‘云端’,所能调度的火力资源日益丰富,为联合作战的顺利实施夯实了根基。”