How Was the Red Army's 'Iron Discipline' Forged?
■ Zhong Yanlin
In 1930, the Central Military Commission drew on relevant Soviet regulations and directives to formulate the Draft Disciplinary Regulations of the Red Army (《红军纪律条令草案》). The draft was divided into four chapters—General Provisions, Awards, Punishments, and Supplementary Provisions—explaining the necessity of promulgating the disciplinary regulations and detailing the rules governing rewards and penalties. The image shows a portion of the General Provisions. [Archival photograph]
Strict discipline is the glorious tradition and distinctive advantage of the Chinese Communist Party, and also the important foundation upon which the Red Army depended for its survival and development. The Red Army's iron discipline was not only a necessary condition for military victory but also a defining characteristic of the people's army under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The formation and forging of strict discipline is a precious spiritual legacy of the long revolutionary practice of the Chinese Communist Party and the people's army.
Strengthening Organizational Discipline in the Army
A sound structure and strict organizational discipline were the keys to building an "iron Red Army." The Red Army's discipline was fundamentally different from the discipline of the old armies, which existed solely to oppress soldiers; commanders and fighters alike were equally bound by it, setting a strong example.
In December 1929, the Front Committee of the 4th Red Army convened the Ninth Party Congress of the 4th Red Army (i.e., the Gutian Conference). The conference established the principle of the Party's absolute leadership over the people's army, put forward that the Red Army must submit to Party leadership, establish proletarian ideology, rectify various erroneous ideologies, strengthen the worker backbone and Party backbone within the Red Army, and consolidate the Party's absolute leadership in the Red Army. The Resolution on the Question of Expanding the Red Army (《扩大红军问题的决议案》), passed at the First Party Congress of the Central Soviet Area, explicitly stated: mobilizing Communist Party members, Youth League members, and trade union members in the Soviet areas—along with their cadres—to join the Red Army was absolutely necessary for strengthening the political organs and Party organizations within the Red Army.
The Red Army's discipline was never maintained through beating and cursing, but rather through political education as the primary means—on the basis of proletarian solidarity, using the spirit of self-criticism (自我批评) and the spirit of education, mutually supervising and encouraging one another, so as to promote conscious observance of discipline by all. Red Army political education was not merely agitation and explanation of certain political questions; it also provided basic education on questions of the Chinese revolution, enabling every Red Army soldier to consciously and resolutely fight to the end for a Soviet New China, and making Red Army units the propagandists and organizers of the Soviets. The results of Red Army political education were significant; Red Army commanders and fighters took the lead and became models of disciplinary observance.
Attaching Importance to Mass Discipline in the Army
Mass discipline (群众纪律) directly concerns the image of the army among the masses. Not infringing upon the interests of the masses became a rule that Red Army units were required to observe.
In the early period of the Red Army's founding, the "Three Main Rules of Discipline and Six Points for Attention" (三大纪律，六项注意) were promulgated—military discipline directed at protecting the interests of the masses. The "Ruijin Dabodi Grain Borrowing and Repayment" incident is a vivid example of observing mass discipline. On the eve of the Chinese New Year in 1929, the 4th Red Army arrived at Dabodi to billet. The local people of Dabodi village did not understand the Red Army, and many fled. At that time, Red Army officers and soldiers were both hungry and cold, and funds were insufficient. They had no choice but to borrow grain from the local people, leaving IOUs. Several months later, the Red Army returned to Dabodi and repaid the money to the people, winning their praise.
On April 5, 1929, the reply from the Front Committee of the 4th Red Army to the Central Committee mentioned that the ratio of time the Red Army spent fighting to time spent doing mass work was one to ten. The Red Army was not only to fight battles but also to shoulder tasks such as propagandizing among the masses, organizing the masses, and arming the masses. Red Army commanders and fighters shared weal and woe with the masses of the Soviet areas, winning their active support.
To further tighten military discipline, on March 21, 1930, Mao Zedong and Zhu De issued the Third Order of the Headquarters of the 4th Red Army at Tangjiang Town, Nankang County, Jiangxi—the Order on Rectifying Military Conduct and Discipline (《整顿军风纪的训令》). The order stated: "Military conduct and discipline are matters that must be strictly observed; there can be no slackening whatsoever, lest adverse effects be produced among the masses… All officers and soldiers are earnestly urged to comply with the Three Rules of Discipline and Six Points for Attention… Therefore, all violations of military conduct and discipline, regardless of severity, must be investigated and dealt with." The Red Army also arranged inspection teams to examine the enforcement of discipline within units and to carry out rectification of problems identified.
Vigorously Enforcing Integrity Discipline in the Army
Integrity discipline (廉洁纪律) was also an important component of the Red Army's strict discipline. Red Army commanders and ordinary soldiers alike emphasized clean governance and self-discipline and opposed corruption, playing a significant role in maintaining the purity and combat effectiveness of the army.
On January 2, 1932, the Order Forwarded by the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission Transmitting the Provisional Central Government's Regulations on Overall Finance (《中革军委转发临时中央政府对整个财政的规定的训令》), jointly signed by Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, and Peng Dehuai, stipulated: "In addition to separately ordering each army group, each army, and each independent division to transmit instructions to their subordinate financial organs for compliance and implementation, this order is hereby issued directing the [chief] concerned to instruct all subordinate financial organs at every level to strictly implement this order and the Provisional Financial Regulations promulgated by the Central Government, as well as the various newly printed bookkeeping forms." In February 1932, the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission issued the Proposal on Quartermaster Work Issues (《经理工作问题提案》) and the Regulations on Quartermaster Transparency (《经理公开条例》). The regulations were divided into three parts: audit of accounts, publication of accounts, and preservation of account books and vouchers. Addressing the problem that the quartermaster (financial) work of the various organs, schools, hospitals, and Red Army units under the Military Commission had not yet established a correct, unified, and independent work system, the regulations further clarified various provisions and required units and quartermaster organs at all levels to implement them faithfully.
The Red Army's financial discipline was extremely strict. For example, "proceeds from expropriating local tyrants (打土豪) must be turned over to the public": all funds raised had to be submitted and could not be privately diverted or embezzled. All local tyrants captured and all funds confiscated by each company or regiment were to be reported in full and handed over to the division political department, and the division political department was to report to the army group political department and the General Political Department according to various forms every ten days or at the conclusion of each fundraising operation. The expropriation of local tyrants had to be approved by the regimental political section or political department; individual companies could not freely confiscate the property of local tyrants. The distribution or issuance of confiscated property to the masses was also to be handled by the regimental political section or the directly superior political organ; individual companies could not handle this freely.
The Red Army also managed funds with great strictness. At critical moments in the counter-"encirclement and suppression" (反"围剿") campaigns, the Red Army reduced special expenditures and miscellaneous outlays to the greatest extent possible; items other than urgently needed goods need not be purchased. Special expenditures exceeding two yuan required prior approval from the division commander and political commissar and the consent of the quartermaster department before being disbursed, for companies, regiments, and division directly subordinate units; for army and army group directly subordinate units, prior approval from the commander at that level and the consent of the quartermaster organ at that level were required before disbursement; otherwise, reimbursement was categorically not permitted.
Strictly Enforcing Wartime Combat Discipline
The Red Army attached great importance to building wartime discipline. In combat against the enemy, there was not only unified action but also unified will, ensuring that officers and soldiers strictly executed wartime discipline and securing the ultimate victory in war.
First, ensuring that units resolutely executed orders from higher authorities. Strictly observing orders from higher authorities was one of the Red Army's most important wartime disciplines. On July 27, 1933, the Chinese Revolutionary Military Commission promulgated the Oath of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (《中国工农红军誓词》). Article Five stipulated: We observe revolutionary discipline (革命纪律) in the interest of class, obey orders from higher authorities, and if we violate or are disloyal to these, we willingly accept the sanctions of revolutionary discipline and are willing to be criticized by our comrades. Personnel who failed to execute orders from higher authorities in combat would be criticized and even punished after the battle.
Second, strictly implementing the system of secrecy. At the National Political Work Conference on February 7, 1934, Zhou Enlai stated: Maintaining military secrets is a matter of discipline. Political workers must be especially vigilant—when giving speeches or conducting propaganda, it is absolutely impermissible (绝不容许) to speak of military dispositions and thereby leak military secrets. When explaining the mission of a single company, one must not speak of the military dispositions of the entire regiment. Should any such leaking of military secrets occur, it must be subject to severe punishment under military law.
Third, correctly handling and treating prisoners of war. This was an important element of Red Army wartime discipline. In the course of combat operations, the Red Army earnestly implemented the policy of giving preferential treatment to prisoners of war. For example: enemy soldiers were not killed; wounded and sick enemy soldiers were given medical treatment and assistance; enemy soldiers who had developed revolutionary consciousness were welcomed to join the Red Army; prisoner soldiers who requested to return home were issued travel passes and travel expenses by the Red Army and allowed to return to their home villages…
It was precisely through iron discipline that the Red Army continuously grew and strengthened. History has eloquently demonstrated: discipline not only won the hearts of the people but also forged the invincible combat power of the people's army.