Exercises Political Work

Establish and Practice the Correct Outlook on Political Achievement | Break Through Empty Formalism in Training, Focus Effort on Winning

树立和践行正确政绩观丨破除训练虚功瞄准打赢用劲

PLA Daily (解放军报) 22 June 2026

Summary

A Northern Theater Command Air Force helicopter brigade conducted nighttime live-fire and sea-target shooting exercises over the Bohai Sea this year, with the brigade Party committee using a political achievement rectification campaign to force its operations and training section to replace competition-oriented training plans with subjects derived from actual combat requirements. The article documents a specific institutional dysfunction—unit training plans optimized for measurable near-term scores rather than combat readiness—and records the brigade Party committee's use of ideological campaign machinery to correct it, fitting a recurring PLA pattern in which political work channels are deployed to address problems that are fundamentally organizational and incentive-based. The candid self-criticism from the training section chief, naming the utilitarian bias toward assessable subjects over hard-to-quantify new capabilities, provides a ground-level account of how peacetime evaluation metrics distort training priorities in PLA aviation units.

Translation

A Certain Brigade of the Northern Theater Command Air Force Guides Party Member Cadres to Direct Their Efforts Toward War——

Break Through Empty Formalism in Training, Focus Effort on Winning

■ Jiang Yang, Liang Shuang

Summer on the Bohai Sea, rotor blades thundering. Several helicopters from a certain brigade of the Northern Theater Command Air Force skimmed the sea at low altitude, locked onto targets, and opened fire from the air. "Target precisely destroyed!" a staff officer from the brigade reported to the commander.

Since the beginning of this year, a series of subjects closely approximating actual combat conditions—including nighttime live-fire shooting and sea-target shooting—have become routine training content for the brigade. This transformation stems from the brigade Party committee's practical measures to turn the blade inward, rectify deviations in the outlook on political achievement (政绩观), and firmly establish an orientation toward war-fighting.

For a period in the past, the brigade's training subjects were at times mismatched with actual combat requirements. At one brigade meeting, when relevant organs and each battalion reported on training conditions, members of the brigade Party committee standing committee raised pointed questions: some training content was outdated and lacked breakthroughs, and new subjects had not been added on the basis of actual combat requirements.

Faced with the unsparing questioning from Party committee standing committee members, the brigade's operations and training section chief engaged in self-reflection and candidly acknowledged: "When formulating training plans, there was indeed a utilitarian mindset that emphasized competition evaluations and assessments while slighting practical combat application; for new subjects requiring breakthroughs, because the payoff period is long and results are difficult to quantify, they were not incorporated into daily training plans..."

After the meeting, brigade Party committee standing committee members launched an investigation into this problem and found that the phenomenon of prioritizing near-term results over practical combat application was not an isolated case. "Fixating only on the current scorecard rather than aiming at winning on the future battlefield is, at its root, a deviation in the outlook on political achievement. If not corrected in a timely manner, it will inevitably damage the foundation of the unit's combat effectiveness." In conjunction with the study and education campaign on establishing and practicing the correct outlook on political achievement, the brigade Party committee demanded that Party member cadres resolutely rectify ideological understandings and training styles that deviate from the combat effectiveness standard, and place the center of gravity of all work on improving actual combat capability.

With ideological barriers broken, steps became more grounded. In response to the reality of units being dynamically dispersed and conducting training at multiple locations, brigade Party committee standing committee members each assumed their respective responsibilities, leading organ section personnel to go down to each battalion and frontline positions to conduct research and tackle key and difficult training subjects; adhering to the principle of "how the battle is fought is how the troops train" (仗怎么打，兵就怎么练), subjects were set in close alignment with actual combat, driving training transformation and upgrading; selected personnel of different specialties were dispatched to conduct regular rotating spot-checks and guidance, driving improvements in the contribution rate of organizing and conducting training, subject research, and other activities to combat readiness.

With the assistance of the brigade Party committee and organs, a certain battalion abandoned the concept of "results-only-ism" (唯显绩论), proactively leveraged the cooperative zone mechanism to construct a complex adversarial environment, and launched a new round of cross-service chain-building and communications-linking exercises. Focusing on key and difficult content such as ultra-long-distance link support, they repeatedly forged the hard skills needed to win. Not long ago, during a cross-service training exercise, the battalion started from foundational work and cleared link bottlenecks one by one. "Training is not to compete for glory, but only to win on the battlefield!" a battalion cadre said with conviction.

As the study and education campaign deepened, the brigade's officers and soldiers continued to direct their efforts toward practical utility and war-fighting: a certain chemical defense unit, in response to a capability bottleneck among drivers of a certain type of vehicle, arranged for backbone personnel to take turns going to the station's motor transport company for intensive skills training; the station focused its energy on resolving difficult and stubborn problems, effectively converting the reduction in problems into incremental gains in combat effectiveness building... The brigade's leadership introduced that they will continue to consolidate the results of the study and education campaign, guide officers and soldiers to concentrate all their thoughts and energy on combat effectiveness, and with a hard-working style of true effort and solid action, drive the brigade's combat effectiveness building to a new level.

Original Chinese

北部战区空军某旅引导党员干部向战发力—— 破除训练虚功瞄准打赢用劲 ■姜洋梁爽夏日渤海，旋翼轰鸣。北部战区空军某旅数架直升机低空掠海，锁定靶标，凌空射击。“目标被精准摧毁！”该旅一名参谋向指挥员汇报。今年以来，夜间实弹射击、海靶射击等一系列贴近实战的课目，成为该旅常态化训练内容。这一转变，源自旅党委刀刃向内纠治政绩观偏差、树牢向战为战导向的务实举措。过去有段时间，该旅训练课目一度与实战要求不匹配。该旅一次会议上，机关相关部门和各大队汇报训练情况时，旅党委班子成员提出尖锐问题：训练内容有些老套、缺乏突破，未能立足实战要求增设新课目。面对党委班子成员不留情面的质询，该旅作训科科长自我反思，坦言：“制订训练方案时，确实存在重评比考核、轻实战应用的功利化思想；对需要攻关的新课目，因见效周期长、成果难量化，未纳入日常训练计划……” 会后，该旅党委班子成员针对这一问题展开调研，发现重眼前成绩、轻实战应用的现象并非个例。“只盯着当下的成绩单，不瞄准未来战场谋打赢，归根结底是政绩观出现了偏差。如果不及时纠治，必然会损害部队战斗力根基。”旅党委结合树立和践行正确政绩观学习教育，要求党员干部坚决纠治偏离战斗力标准的思想认识和训练作风，把一切工作重心放在提升实战能力上。思想破冰，脚步更实。针对部队动态分散、多地组训的实际，旅党委班子成员各负其责，带领机关科室人员下沉至各大队和一线点位，围绕重难点训练课目展开研究攻关；坚持“仗怎么打，兵就怎么练”，紧贴实战设置课目，推动训练转型升级；选派不同专业精干力量定期巡回抽检、指导工作，推动提升组训施训、课题研究等对备战打仗的贡献率。在旅党委和机关帮带下，某大队摒弃“唯显绩论”观念，主动依托协作区机制构设复杂对抗环境，展开新一轮跨军兵种建链通联研练。他们围绕超远距离链路保障等重难点内容，反复锤炼打赢硬功。前不久，在一次跨军兵种训练中，该大队从基础工作做起，逐个打通链路堵点。“训练不为争彩头，只为战场打得赢！”大队一名干部坚定地说。随着学习教育深入开展，该旅官兵持续向实用劲、向战发力：某防化队针对某型车辆驾驶员能力瓶颈，安排骨干轮流到场站汽车连进行技能强训；场站将精力放在解决疑难症结上，使问题的减量有效转化为战斗力建设的增量……该旅领导介绍，他们将持续巩固学习教育成果，引导官兵把全部心思和精力向战斗力聚焦，以真抓实干的过硬作风，推动部队战斗力建设迈上新台阶。