Master the Wisdom of 'Transformation' (化) to Achieve Surprise, Reverse the Battlefield Situation, and Secure Victory

Those Who Excel at 'Transformation' (化) Win

■ Hao Donghong

Military 'transformation' (化) refers to shifting thinking and converting problems. Its essence is the contest for initiative (主动权) embodied in 'imposing one's will on the enemy rather than being imposed upon' (致人而不致于人). It is a manifestation of the flexibility expressed in 'there are no constant conditions in war, just as there is no constant shape in water' (兵无常势，水无常形), and a demonstration of the dialectical thinking captured in 'turning the circuitous into the direct, and turning adversity into advantage' (以迂为直，以患为利). It demands that commanders not be bound by fixed forms or inherent advantages, but instead—through active 'conversion' (转化) and 'change' (变化) in dynamic confrontation—create evolutionary pathways (进化路径) favorable to one's own side, ultimately achieving the goal of defeating the enemy. In the contest against powerful adversaries, traditional Chinese military thought neither advocates compromise and concession nor champions blind brute force; instead, it gives full expression to the wisdom of 'transformation' (化). Whether it is change (变化), evolution (演化), or advancement (进化), all can help one accumulate strength, seize the initiative, and win room for survival. In operational command and the application of strategy and tactics, mastering the wisdom of 'transformation' (化) enables one to achieve surprise, reverse the battlefield situation, and secure victory.

Attach importance to changes in structure and form. The Art of War, chapter on 'Military Contention' (军争篇), states: 'Therefore, military operations are established through deception, set in motion according to advantage, and varied through division and concentration.' This means that combat operations must rely on ever-changing stratagems, with the dispersal or concentration of forces determined by what is advantageous. In terms of force structure, the emphasis is on combining division and concentration: forces may be dispersed in deployment during normal times—breaking the whole into parts (化整为零)—but when the enemy attacks, forces are rapidly integrated and superior strength concentrated to annihilate 'isolated and weak' enemies. In terms of force form, the combination of feint and substance (虚实结合) and the mutual support of unorthodox and orthodox forces (奇正相倚) are required. During World War II, in the Normandy landings, the Allied forces used a fictitious landing fleet as a feint, concealing their true strategic intentions and landing site—transforming (化) a false threat into something tangible and rendering (化) real strength invisible. As for when and how to change, the Art of War, chapter on 'Vacuity and Substance' (虚实篇), emphasizes: 'If I concentrate my forces as one while the enemy divides his into ten, then I attack his one with my ten, making my forces numerous and his few.' Cao Cao proposed: 'Forces divide and unite in response to the enemy's changes' (兵一分一合，以敌为变也). It is thus clear that the basis for changes in structure and form is 'acting in response to the enemy' (因敌而动), with the objective of achieving 'concentration on our side and division on the enemy's side' (我专敌分). Changes between division and concentration, between presence and absence, all serve the purpose of flexible maneuver to adapt to battlefield conditions—ensuring the ability to clench scattered fingers into a fist and form a combined force, or to create illusions that deceive the enemy. Changes in structure and form require commanders to possess a discerning eye (慧眼): achieving 'know the enemy and know yourself' (知彼知己) through thorough and effective enemy reconnaissance and penetrating, acute situational awareness; and deploying and commanding forces 'as the arm commands the fingers' (如臂使指) through unobstructed command networks and skillful overall planning and deployment.

Promote the evolution of risk and opportunity. The battlefield situation changes in an instant; 'danger' (危) and 'opportunity' (机) coexist, and the two convert into each other rapidly and frequently. Superior command art can help commanders effectively transform danger into opportunity (化危为机) and harm into advantage (化害为利). During World War II, the Allied forces of Britain and France were surrounded on the beach—a massive military catastrophe—yet the Dunkirk evacuation effectively preserved the vital forces of the Allied armies. These battle-hardened officers and soldiers became the backbone of the subsequent counteroffensive; the Allied forces accumulated strength in a moment of extreme crisis and were able to continue fighting. Fighting with one's back to the water is a cardinal taboo in military affairs, yet Han Xin at the Battle of Jingxing was able to give full play to subjective initiative: with the enemy in fierce pursuit, he used the desperate position of having a river at his back to lull the enemy into complacency and to ignite in his soldiers the resolve of 'placing them in a position of certain death so that they fight to survive' (置之死地而后生), effectively achieving the transformation of harm into advantage. Promoting the evolution of 'danger' and 'opportunity' first requires making good use of information asymmetry—causing the enemy to make erroneous judgments through deception and feints, thereby setting 'traps' to annihilate the enemy. For example, 'when encircling an army, leave a gap' (围师必阙) avoids encircling so tightly as to ignite the enemy's resolve to fight to the death; by seemingly leaving an escape route—'opening one side of the net' (网开一面)—it lures the enemy into charging into a 'pocket formation' (口袋阵) during their flight. Second, it requires seizing the time gap: when the adversary believes victory is assured but has not yet completed its deployment or encirclement, act decisively, using the time window to break out of the encirclement or launch a surprise attack. Finally, it requires maintaining a will differential (意志差): through daily training and tempering, ensure that one's own side surpasses the enemy in fighting spirit and capacity to bear pressure, and through death-defying charges and indomitable courage in actual combat, suppress and defeat the adversary.

Drive the evolution of technology and concepts. 'War is the least conservative of domains.' In an era of knowledge explosion, technology continuously iterates and upgrades, and military forces, organizational forms, and the form of warfare (战争形态) will also continuously evolve with the development of technology, the enemy situation, and the times. However, a military's military technology and concepts will not necessarily evolve naturally in step with advances in science and technology. If commanders cannot proactively anticipate and lead changes in the times, they will become passive, ultimately resulting in 'falling behind' and 'being beaten.' In the 1930s, the German military had already developed 'Blitzkrieg' centered on tanks, yet some senior commanders in the Polish military still directed partially mechanized cavalry using traditional tactical thinking and training models. This became an important reason for the rapid collapse of Polish forces in the Polish campaign. Thinking with the mindset of the last war will never win the next war. To this end, commanders must maintain a sense of 'knowledge panic' (知识恐慌), proactively study cutting-edge technologies and embrace technological trends, be adept at identifying shortcomings and pain points in realistic combat training, and actively apply new technologies and new thinking to solve difficult problems. They must break down 'boundary barriers' (边界壁垒), establish the concept of joint operations and integrated development, expand knowledge systems, deepen joint exercises and training, use an 'integrated mind' (集成头脑) to develop a 'collaborative brain' (协同大脑), and use new-quality productive forces (新质生产力) to 'incubate' new-quality combat capabilities (新质战斗力), accumulating greater odds of victory and confidence for winning future wars.