You Can't Just "Find Thorns" Without "Pulling Them Out" — This Brigade Got Serious About Reforming Its Headquarters Work Style

You Can't Just "Find Thorns" Without "Pulling Them Out"

— An Account of How a Headquarters Organ of a Brigade Under the 82nd Group Army Transformed Its Work Style

■ PLA Daily Special Correspondents Qu Kaiming and Liu Han

"Punches must be steady; strikes must be precise!" Not long ago, on the training ground of a company under a certain brigade of the 82nd Group Army, a demonstration of combat techniques was underway, organized and led by the headquarters training guidance team. Several professional instructors invited from military academies explained the key points of each movement on site, while training cadres from each battalion and company observed and studied together.

Prior to this, the headquarters training guidance team had gone to the grassroots level to conduct an inspection and discovered a number of problems with that company's combat technique training. Facing the guidance team, Company Commander Tian looked aggrieved: "Every company generally lacks professional cadres, and higher levels have never standardized the key points of the movements."

After hearing Company Commander Tian's words, the guidance team did not simply record the problems and leave. Instead, they immediately convened the training cadres from each battalion and company on the spot to understand the situation and work out solutions. One week later, professional instructors were brought to the training ground to provide guidance and demonstrations, and the "headache" that had been plaguing each company's training was resolved.

"Think less about 'whether this should be reported,' and think more about 'how this should be solved.'" The words of Staff Officer Cheng, head of the training guidance team, articulate the work philosophy that now guides this brigade's headquarters in building up the grassroots level. This transformation traces back to a weekly handover meeting.

Previously, Section Chief Li of the brigade headquarters had led a team to the grassroots level for an inspection — on one hand to investigate equipment safety hazards, and on the other to collect material for comments and critiques at the weekly handover meeting. During the inspection, they discovered problems including malfunctioning alarms in the arms rooms of individual battalions and companies, and insufficient storage capacity in vehicle yard surveillance systems.

Following established practice, Section Chief Li quickly sorted through the problems, compiled a notification report, and submitted it on time to the section responsible for leading the handover meeting. He assumed this "timely and efficient" report would be well received. To his surprise, when the brigade leadership received the material, they immediately halted the notification and summoned Section Chief Li.

"Without dedicated supplies or maintenance authority, can a single notification report actually solve the problem?" "The same type of problem was rectified last time, yet it has appeared again — where exactly has the headquarters' responsibility for guidance and mentorship been fulfilled?" … Faced with a barrage of questions from the brigade leadership, Section Chief Li's face turned red on the spot.

The grassroots unit was the subject of the notification, but the "paddle" came down on the headquarters section chief. The brigade leadership made their position clear: "Inspection and notification are the means; solving problems is the purpose. The headquarters cannot perform its duties as a 'hands-off shopkeeper' (甩手掌柜), and still less can it transfer its own responsibilities onto the grassroots, only notifying without resolving, only holding accountable without mentoring — that is a floating work style (作风漂浮) and an absence of responsibility." To that end, the brigade Party committee decided that Section Chief Li would explain the situation and make a self-criticism at the weekly handover meeting.

"A section chief made a self-criticism because he filed a notification against the grassroots." Once the news broke, it immediately sparked heated discussion throughout the brigade.

"The brigade is getting serious this time about rectifying the headquarters work style." "Some of the problems the headquarters reports, the grassroots genuinely has no capacity to solve — we've been hoping the headquarters would lend a hand and help out." "The headquarters and the grassroots cannot 'fight their own separate battles,' and even less can they pass the buck to each other when problems arise." … The heartfelt words of officers and soldiers conveyed their expectation for a transformation in the headquarters work style.

At first, Section Chief Li felt wronged, believing he had simply followed procedure and had no intention of making things difficult for the grassroots. Afterward, he reflected deeply: "The brigade leadership's questions woke me up. The habitual thinking that headquarters cadres must most urgently discard is 'that's the grassroots' problem,' and the passive mindset they must most urgently eliminate is 'wait for it to be reported up, wait for it to be raised, wait for the problem to surface.'"

Defects in work style must be investigated and corrected immediately (立查立改). Seizing on this incident as an opportunity, the brigade turned the blade inward and launched a rectification of headquarters work style. It explicitly established a closed-loop mechanism for problem rectification (问题整改闭环机制): for any problem identified by higher levels or uncovered through self-inspection, responsibility must first be clarified by level — problems belonging to the headquarters are to be led and resolved by the headquarters; problems belonging to the grassroots are to be addressed by the headquarters helping the grassroots rectify them; for areas where responsibilities and authorities overlap or are unclear, the headquarters is explicitly required to step forward proactively and bear first-contact, first-responsibility (首问首责), resolutely eliminating the "passing of the buck" (责任"甩锅") and the "spinning in place" of problems (问题"空转").

Some time ago, Section Chief Li once again led a team into that same company. This time, in addition to bringing a "problem list," he also brought dedicated batteries, repair tools, and several professional technical cadres, providing hands-on guidance for repairs and point-to-point resolution of hazards. As the items on the "problem list" were cleared one by one, officers and soldiers gave Section Chief Li their enthusiastic approval.

"In the past, when the headquarters came to inspect, we were anxious inside, afraid of being reported and held accountable. Now when the headquarters comes to the grassroots, we step forward on our own initiative and are willing to speak up about our difficulties." A grassroots commanding officer remarked with feeling that now when headquarters work teams come down to the grassroots, there is less blunt accountability and criticism, and more attentive guidance and mentorship — the headquarters and the grassroots are drawing closer together.

(At the request of those interviewed, the names of individuals in this article are pseudonyms.)

Short Commentary from a Junior Soldier (小兵快评)

When the headquarters goes to the grassroots to conduct inspections, the emphasis should be on discovering problems, and the key should be on solving problems. This requires headquarters cadres to break out of the barriers of authority and responsibility, set aside the posture of "referee," take up the responsibility of "service provider," transform "reporting problems" into "dissecting problems," and transform "assigning rectification" into "jointly breaking through difficulties" — asking one more question, "What does the grassroots need?", thinking one step further, "What can I solve?", and truly using solid, concrete guidance and mentorship to resolve difficulties on the spot and deliver service to the front line. (Zou Fei)