Doctrine Political Work

Place Personal Development Within the Broader Context of Combat Capability Building, and Willingly Serve as a Foundation-Layer for Combat Capability Building

把个人发展放到战斗力建设大局中考量,甘做战斗力建设夯基人

PLA Daily (解放军报) 7 June 2026

Summary

A political work commentary co-authored by Wu Xi and Niu Pengcheng calls on military Party member cadres to subordinate personal career advancement to long-term combat capability building, invoking the framing concepts of 夯基人 (foundation-layer), 显绩 (visible achievements), and 潜绩 (latent achievements) to argue that short-cycle performance metrics distort training and undermine 体系作战能力 (system-of-systems operational capability). The article documents a recognized institutional problem—cadres softening training standards, gaming inspections, and abandoning predecessors' work to manufacture visible results within their own tenure—that the PLA's own media has flagged repeatedly without resolving. The framing points to persistent tension between the PLA's promotion incentive structure and its stated combat-readiness standard, though the article itself offers no evidence of a new policy mechanism to close that gap.

Translation

Willingly Serve as a Foundation-Layer for Combat Capability Building

■ Wu Xi, Niu Pengcheng

● Place personal development within the broader context of combat capability building, willingly serve as a foundation-layer (夯基人) for combat capability building, and contribute to the cause of strengthening the military.

For Party member cadres in the military, the most important measure of performance (政绩) is the enhancement of combat capability. For military Party member cadres to establish and practice a correct view of performance (正确政绩观), they must devote all their thought and energy to the combat capability building of their units. Whether work planning revolves around fighting, and whether the allocation of effort is focused on the central task, directly bears on whether units can fight and win battles.

Yet looking at reality, some military Party member cadres have developed a distorted view of performance, most prominently manifested in an insufficiently firm commitment to the combat capability standard. Some, in order to keep things safe and avoid incidents, reduce training difficulty whenever possible and lower assessment standards whenever possible. Some treat leadership satisfaction as a weathervane, organizing work around inspections and directing their thinking toward evaluations and competitions. Still others practice "new officials ignoring old accounts" (新官不理旧账)—unwilling to build on the foundations laid by their predecessors, they rush to start fresh and produce new performance results, fearing that no achievements will be visible within their tenure. All of these are manifestations of self-interest and the pursuit of quick results. If left uncorrected, they will seriously damage units' combat capability building.

"The decisive factor in establishing and practicing a correct view of performance is Party spirit (党性)." Party spirit is the foundation upon which Party member cadres stand and fulfill their duties. If Party spirit weakens and selfish and impure thoughts take root and spread, it will blur the original intent of fulfilling one's duties, skew the orientation toward fighting and preparing for war, and shake the foundations of military building. Military Party member cadres should recognize that Party spirit is a solid barrier against selfish and impure thoughts. Only by persistently strengthening Party spirit training and elevating Party spirit cultivation can one, with the historical consciousness that "success need not come on my watch, but success must have my contribution" (功成不必在我，功成必定有我), place personal development within the broader context of combat capability building, willingly serve as a foundation-layer for combat capability building, and contribute to the cause of strengthening the military.

To lay the foundation for combat capability building, one must correctly handle the relationship between "visible achievements" (显绩) and "latent achievements" (潜绩). "Visible achievements" are like blossoms in spring—brilliant and eye-catching; "latent achievements" are like roots deep in the soil—quietly nourishing. The two form a dialectical unity that is mutually generative and complementary, unified under the combat capability standard and unified within the practice of strengthening and revitalizing the military. Focusing only on "visible achievements" leaves the foundation unstable; focusing only on "latent achievements" risks neglecting the present. The key to correctly handling the relationship between the two lies in overall coordination. On one hand, foundational work must be implemented in earnest. Training according to regulations must not be cut short, training in basic subjects must not be reduced to formality, and personnel training must not take shortcuts. These "latent achievements," though difficult to see results from in the short term, are the foundation for generating combat capability. On the other hand, combat-realistic assessments must be organized regularly, placing the results of basic training in a combat-realistic environment for verification, and using the feedback from "visible achievements" to correct the direction of "latent achievements."

Combat capability building requires each successive cohort to carry the work forward, and one blueprint to be drawn through to completion. "Flowery forms" (花架子) on the training ground, "face projects" (面子工程) during assessments, and "numerical performance results" (数字政绩) in reports may appear lively, but in reality they are harmful rather than beneficial to combat capability. Foundational work has a long cycle and slow results; it is not as eye-catching as launching a few high-profile projects. But combat capability building has its own objective laws: if basic training is not solid, tactical innovation is a castle in the air; if operational data is not accumulated, system-of-systems operational capability (体系作战能力) is water without a source. Facing the tide of the new global military revolution, facing changes in technology, changes in warfare, and changes in adversaries, we must neither follow convention blindly nor rush for quick results. Instead, we must endure the loneliness of "sitting on the cold bench" (坐冷板凳), apply sustained effort to foundational work, and cultivate key fields over the long term—only then can we achieve lasting results and genuinely enhance units' combat capability.

Original Chinese

甘做战斗力建设夯基人 ■吴曦牛鹏程 ●把个人发展放到战斗力建设大局中考量，甘做战斗力建设夯基人，为强军事业贡献力量对军队党员干部而言，最重要的政绩就是提升战斗力。军队党员干部树立和践行正确政绩观，就要把全部心思和精力用到部队战斗力建设上。工作筹划是否围绕打仗展开，精力分配是否聚焦中心工作，直接关系部队是否能打仗、打胜仗。然而反观现实，一些军队党员干部政绩观发生偏差，突出表现在战斗力标准树得不牢。有的为了保安全不出事，训练难度能降就降、考核标准能低就低；有的把领导满意度当成风向标，工作围着检查转、心思跟着评比走；还有的“新官不理旧账”，前任打的基础不愿意接续，急于另起炉灶出新政绩，生怕任期内看不见政绩。凡此种种，都是私心作祟、急功近利的表现，如果不加以纠治，必将严重影响部队战斗力建设。 “树立和践行正确政绩观，起决定性作用的是党性。”党性是党员干部立身履职的基础，倘若党性弱化，私心杂念滋生蔓延，就会模糊履职尽责的本心、偏移向战为战的导向，动摇军队建设根基。军队党员干部应认识到，党性是抵御私心杂念的坚固屏障，唯有持之以恒加强党性锻炼、提升党性修养，才能以“功成不必在我，功成必定有我”的历史自觉，把个人发展放到战斗力建设大局中考量，甘做战斗力建设夯基人，为强军事业贡献力量。为战斗力建设夯基，需要正确处理“显绩”与“潜绩”的关系。“显绩”如春日繁花，绚烂夺目；“潜绩”如深土之根，默默滋养。二者是相生相成的辩证统一体，统一于战斗力标准，统一于强军兴军实践。只重“显绩”，则根基不牢；只重“潜绩”，则有可能忽略当下。正确处理“显绩”与“潜绩”的关系，关键在统筹兼顾。一方面，要把基础性工作落到实处。按纲施训不能打折扣，基础课目训练不能走过场，人才培训不能图省事。这些“潜绩”短期内虽很难看到效果，却是战斗力生成的根基。另一方面，要定期组织实战化考核，把基础训练成果放到实战环境中检验，以“显绩”的反馈校正“潜绩”的方向。战斗力建设需要一茬接着一茬干，一张蓝图绘到底。训练场上的“花架子”、考核时的“面子工程”、汇报中的“数字政绩”，看似热闹，实则对战斗力有害无益。基础性工作周期长、见效慢，虽不像搞几项亮点工程那样引人瞩目，但战斗力建设有其客观规律，基础训练不扎实，战法创新就是空中楼阁，作战数据不积累，体系作战能力就是无源之水。面对世界新军事革命的浪潮，面对科技之变、战争之变、对手之变，我们既不能因循守旧，也不能急于求成，而要耐得住“坐冷板凳”的寂寞，在基础性工作上持续用力，在关键性领域长期深耕，才能久久为功，切实提升部队战斗力。