Doctrine Internal Security

Before and After the Chamdo Campaign: The Decisive Battle for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet

昌都战役前后：实现西藏和平解放的关键一役

PLA Daily (解放军报) 5 June 2026

Summary

A PLA Daily historical essay by Tan Tianxiao reconstructs the October 6–24, 1950 Chamdo Campaign, in which six PLA regiments — drawn from the 18th Army, the Qinghai Cavalry Detachment, and the 126th Regiment of the 14th Army's 42nd Division — crossed the Jinsha River, encircled and destroyed the main force of the roughly 8,000-strong Tibetan Army (藏军), and seized Chamdo, with the cavalry detachment's advance seizure of Zongyishan cutting off the enemy's western escape route. The piece documents the CCP's deliberate framing of the campaign as 以打促和 — "use battle to promote peace" — establishing that military action was conceived from the outset as a coercive instrument to force the Lhasa government to the negotiating table, not as an alternative to negotiation. Published on the 75th anniversary of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, the framing points to how the PLA institutionally positions the Chamdo Campaign as the legitimate foundation of Tibet's "peaceful liberation" — a narrative baseline useful for tracking how official military media constructs the historical case against Tibetan separatism.

Translation

The Decisive Battle for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet — Before and After the Chamdo Campaign

■ Tan Tianxiao

[Caption] After the liberation of Chamdo, Tibetan people express their gratitude to People's Liberation Army officers and soldiers. Archival photo.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet. Seventy-five years ago, the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet formally signed the Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet through democratic consultation and negotiation. The agreement consists of a preamble and 17 articles, and is therefore commonly known as the "Seventeen-Point Agreement."

The peaceful liberation of Tibet involved an arduous and complex struggle. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Central People's Government repeatedly extended invitations to the local government of Tibet for peaceful negotiations and the realization of peaceful liberation, but the entrenched reactionary forces in Tibet's upper strata stubbornly refused to negotiate, and the process of peaceful consultation came to a near standstill. On February 25, 1950, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent a telegram to the Southwest Bureau stating: "Our army's plan to station troops in Tibet is unwavering, but every method may be employed to negotiate with the Dalai clique so that the Dalai Lama remains in Tibet and reaches a reconciliation with us." The telegram also instructed the Southwest Bureau and the Northwest Bureau to carefully study conditions in Tibet, identify suitable individuals to go to Lhasa to conduct outreach work, and draft conditions for negotiations with the Tibetan authorities. Deng Xiaoping immediately organized investigations and research and presided over the formulation of four guiding principles for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. In May, in order to negotiate with the local government of Tibet, Deng Xiaoping — then First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau — presided over the drafting of ten conditions for negotiations with the local government of Tibet in accordance with the spirit of CCP Central Committee instructions, and submitted them to Comrade Mao Zedong for review. The contents included: the implementation of national regional autonomy (民族区域自治) in Tibet, the implementation of freedom of religion, respect for the religious beliefs and customs of the Tibetan people, and the entry of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet. These ten points in effect constituted the basic guidelines and policies of the CCP Central Committee and the Central People's Government for resolving the Tibet question, and were consistent with the actual conditions of all sectors in Tibet. The CCP Central Committee gave full affirmation to these ten conditions. On May 29, Mao Zedong wrote the following comment on the telegram containing the "Conditions for Negotiations with Tibet" submitted to the Central Committee by the Southwest Bureau on the 27th: "With the exception of Article 8, to which the words 'Tibetan leading personnel' should be added, all may be approved." The CCP Central Committee publicized the Central Committee's peaceful proposals to the local government of Tibet through radio broadcasts, correspondence, and other means, and successively approved the dispatch of patriotic personages familiar with Tibetan affairs and possessing a degree of influence in Tibet to conduct outreach work among Tibet's upper strata, urging them to respond to the Central Committee's call and realize the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

At the time, the local government of Tibet, under the interference of imperialist forces, had been persistently attempting to split Tibet away from the motherland's territory. On November 2, 1949, Tibet's "Foreign Affairs Bureau" sent a telegram to Mao Zedong regarding so-called Tibetan "independence," stating that Tibet "has always enjoyed the right of independence and self-governance; please do not allow troops to cross the border into Tibetan territory." At the end of 1949, the local government of Tibet began preparing to dispatch "goodwill missions" to countries including Britain, the United States, India, and Nepal to seek support for "Tibetan independence." At the same time, the local government of Tibet dispatched another delegation to Beijing. However, the purpose of this "Tibetan delegation" was to declare "Tibetan independence" to the Central Committee; it had absolutely no sincerity in conducting peaceful negotiations with the Central Committee. The "Tibetan delegation" first went to India, where it subsequently remained for an extended period and continued to engage in activities to split the motherland. Patriotic personages who traveled to Tibet to advocate for reconciliation were also obstructed and persecuted by imperialist forces and the local government of Tibet.

In addition, the Tibetan authorities, with the support of imperialist forces, actively expanded their military and prepared for war, transporting weapons and equipment into Tibet from abroad, expanding the scale of the Tibetan Army (藏军), and organizing large numbers of local soldiers. By September 1950, the Tibetan Army together with local militia totaled approximately 8,000 personnel, who had already taken up defensive positions in and around Chamdo, in an attempt to use the natural barrier of the Jinsha River to prevent the PLA from entering Tibet.

Confronted with the local government of Tibet's determination to close the door on peace talks — its vain attempt to use the natural barrier of the Jinsha River and the Hengduan Mountains as a shield, seize control of the vital arteries into Tibet, and use military force to prevent the PLA from entering Tibet — on August 23, 1950, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee's Southwest Bureau stating: "If our army is able to occupy Chamdo in October, it may be possible to prompt the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing for negotiations and achieve a peaceful resolution." The strategic concept of launching the Chamdo Campaign to "use battle to promote peace" (以打促和) was formally established.

An important condition for realizing "use battle to promote peace" was to annihilate the main force of the Tibetan Army in and around Chamdo, and not allow it to withdraw westward and preserve its strength. If the mission of annihilating the enemy could not be accomplished, or if few enemy forces were annihilated, this would not only be unfavorable to the Central Committee's peaceful negotiations with the local government of Tibet, but would also increase the difficulties facing our army in its advance on Lhasa. With the approval of the CCP Central Committee, the Second Field Army deployed a force of six regiments — comprising part of the 18th Army, the Qinghai Cavalry Detachment, and the 126th Regiment of the 42nd Division of the 14th Army of the Yunnan Military Region — to conduct the Chamdo Campaign from October 6 to 24, 1950.

In response to the characteristics of the Tibetan Army's defensive line — long frontage, great depth, insufficient strength, and dispersed disposition — the participating PLA units formed two operational groups, a northern group and a southern group. The northern group was composed of the 52nd Division, the army-level artillery battalion, reconnaissance battalion, and engineer battalion, the 54th Division's artillery company, and the Qinghai Cavalry Detachment. The southern group was composed of the 157th Regiment of the 53rd Division and the 126th Regiment of the 42nd Division of the 14th Army of the Yunnan Military Region. They adopted a combination of frontal assault and flanking envelopment, attacking along multiple axes, with the aim of concentrating and annihilating the Tibetan Army in Chamdo and areas to its west. On October 6, our participating units began crossing the Jinsha River westward, and the Chamdo Campaign commenced.

Subsequently, our army's units on all axes, disregarding fatigue, pursued the enemy vigorously and rapidly closed in on Chamdo. Seeing that defeat was inevitable, the head of the Chamdo General Headquarters prepared to abandon Chamdo and scatter in flight. On the 19th, Chamdo was liberated. The enemy then fled in the direction of Bangda and Baxu, but our cavalry detachment had already seized Zongyishan (宗驿山) to the southwest of Chamdo ahead of the enemy, taking control of the mountain pass and the road. On the 20th, the enemy was blocked by our forces at Zongyishan and, with no way out and under our political persuasion efforts, ceased resistance. Thereafter, the main force of our army's northern group shifted to sector-by-sector mopping-up operations to eliminate scattered remnant enemy forces. By the 24th, the Chamdo Campaign concluded in victory.

The victory of the Chamdo Campaign annihilated the main force of the Tibetan Army, opened the route for the advance into Tibet, shattered the schemes of imperialists and Tibetan separatists to use military force to obstruct the PLA's advance into Tibet, and created the conditions for the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

Original Chinese

实现西藏和平解放的关键一役—— 昌都战役前后 ■谭天啸昌都解放后，藏民向解放军官兵致谢。资料图片今年是西藏和平解放75周年。75年前，中央人民政府和西藏地方政府通过民主协商谈判，正式签订《中央人民政府和西藏地方政府关于和平解放西藏办法的协议》。协议由前言和17项条文组成，故简称《十七条协议》。西藏的和平解放经历了艰难复杂的斗争。新中国成立后，中央人民政府多次向西藏地方政府发出和平谈判、实现和平解放的倡议，但西藏上层顽固势力执意抗拒谈判，和平协商的进程近乎停滞。1950年2月25日，中共中央致电西南局指出：“我军进驻西藏的计划是坚定不移的，但可采用一切方法与达赖集团谈判，使达赖留在西藏与我和解。”电报中还指示西南局、西北局认真研究西藏情况，物色适当人选去拉萨做争取工作，并拟定与西藏当局谈判的条件。邓小平立即组织调查研究，主持制定了和平解放西藏的四条方针。5月，为了同西藏地方政府谈判，时任西南局第一书记的邓小平根据中共中央指示精神，主持拟定了同西藏地方政府进行谈判的十项条件，并报毛泽东同志审阅。内容包括：实行西藏民族区域自治、实行宗教自由、尊重西藏人民的宗教信仰和风俗习惯、中国人民解放军进入西藏等。这十条实际上是中共中央和中央人民政府对解决西藏问题的基本方针和政策，符合西藏各方面的实际。中共中央对这十项条件给予充分肯定。5月29日，毛泽东在西南局27日报送中央的《与西藏谈判条件》的电报上批示：“除第八条应加‘西藏领导人员’数字外，均可同意。”中共中央通过广播电台、书信等方式向西藏地方政府宣传中央的和平主张，并先后批准派遣熟悉西藏情况并对西藏有一定影响力的爱国人士，对西藏上层开展争取工作，劝说其响应中央号召，实现西藏和平解放。当时，西藏地方政府在帝国主义势力的干涉下，一直企图把西藏从祖国版图中分裂出去。1949年11月2日，西藏“外交局”就所谓西藏“独立”给毛泽东发电报，称西藏“一直享受着独立自主的权利，请不要让军队越境进入西藏领土”。1949年底，西藏地方政府开始准备向英国、美国、印度、尼泊尔等国派出“亲善使团”，为“西藏独立”寻求支持。与此同时，西藏地方政府派出另一个代表团前往北京。但这个“西藏代表团”的目的是向中央宣布“西藏独立”的，毫无与中央进行和平谈判的诚意。“西藏代表团”先到印度，此后长期滞留印度并继续从事分裂祖国行径。前往西藏劝和的爱国人士也遭到了帝国主义势力和西藏地方政府的阻拦和迫害。此外，西藏当局在帝国主义势力的支持下积极扩军备战，从国外运送武器装备进入西藏，扩编藏军规模，组织大量土兵。至1950年9月，藏军加上地方民团约8000人，已在昌都及其周围地区布防，企图凭借金沙江天险阻止人民解放军进藏。面对西藏地方政府决意关闭和谈大门，妄图利用金沙江天险和横断山脉天然屏障，扼守入藏的咽喉要道，以军事力量阻止解放军进入西藏的消极态度，1950年8月23日，毛泽东电示中共中央西南局：“如我军能于10月占领昌都，有可能促使西藏代表团来京谈判，求得和平解决。”发起昌都战役实现“以打促和”的战略构想正式形成。实现“以打促和”的重要条件，是将藏军主力歼灭于昌都及附近地区，不能让其西撤保存实力。如果不能完成歼敌任务或歼敌不多，不仅不利于中央与西藏地方政府的和平谈判，还会增加我军进军拉萨的困难。经中共中央批准，第二野战军以第18军一部、青海骑兵支队和云南军区第14军第42师第126团等部共6个团的兵力，于1950年10月6至24日举行昌都战役。针对藏军防线长、纵深大、兵力不足而且分散的特点，人民解放军参战部队组成北、南两个作战集团，北线集团由第52师和军直炮兵营、侦察营、工兵营、第54师炮兵连和青海骑兵支队组成，南线集团由第53师第157团和云南军区第14军第42师第126团组成，采取正面攻击和翼侧迂回相结合的战法，多路攻击，力求聚歼藏军于昌都及其以西地区。10月6日，我参战部队开始西渡金沙江，昌都战役拉开序幕。随后，我军各路部队不顾疲劳，勇猛追击，迅速逼近昌都。昌都总署首领见败局已定，准备放弃昌都，分散溃逃。19日，昌都解放。敌人随后向邦达、八宿方向逃窜，但我骑兵支队已先敌抢占了昌都西南的宗驿山，控制了山垭口及道路。20日，敌人在宗驿山遭我军阻击，在走投无路和我方政治争取的情况下，停止抵抗。此后，我军北线部队主力转入分区清剿，肃清零星残敌。至24日，昌都战役胜利结束。昌都战役的胜利，歼灭了藏军主力，打通了进军西藏的通道，粉碎了帝国主义和西藏分裂分子以武力阻扰解放军进军西藏的企图，为和平解放西藏创造了条件。